An Elucidation Of Jaspers' Concept of Existenz in the Boundary Situations by Ara, Roshan
AM SlUCIDATIOM Of JASPSRS' 
cowan Of sxisrswz IN TMS 
BOUNDARY SITUATIONS 
ABSTRACT 






Department of Philosophy 





, ( Ace. No ' ' 
;^ /^  
1 3 MAR 200? 
ABSTRACT 
Introduction is divided into three parts : the first part deals with the 
historical background and traces the development of the concept of 
being as dealt with by Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes. Thales 
recognized water as the basic reality; Anaximander too accepted one 
reality and gave it the name of boundless something. Anaximenes 
regarded air as the fundamental principle of all things. We also find this 
unity of being in the philosophy of Parmenides. Pythagoras proposed a 
radical concept when he said that the unlimited is real and the finite 
diversity of one's experience is the limit imposed on the unlimited. In 
the philosophy of Plato being expresses itself through essences where as 
according to Aristotle abstractions like whiteness, horseness etc. become 
known only in the white objects and the horses etc. 
Descartes distinguished mind and matter as the two levels of being, 
and Spinoza gave his theory of psycho-physical parallelism locating mind 
and matter as the two aspects of being. In the philosophy of Leibniz 
being is exteriorized as monads. 
(1) 
Locke and Berkley regarded sense experience as the source of 
knowledge, and Hume accepted knowledge as evolving from impressions. 
Kant gave a new impetus to this thinking by saying that sensibility or 
understanding alone cannot bring us knowledge : a synthesis of the two 
is a necessary pre-requisite. In Hegel's system reason is the highest 
principle underlying the reality of being. 
The second part of the Introduction is concerned with Kierkegaard 
occupying primacy of place in Jaspers thought : both for Kierkegaard 
and also for Jaspers the moment of choice is significant. The individual 
takes his own initiative and is not guided by any one. This freedom also 
makes him fully responsible for it. As far as the concepts of time and 
eternity are concerned both Kierkegaard and Jaspers hold identical views. 
For both of them it is the present moment which is decisive. 
The second influence seems to be that of Nietzsche. Both Jaspers and 
Nietzsche are undogmatic in their approach to Christianity, but instead 
of Nietzsche's Nihilism Jaspers asserts his philosophical faith. The main 
difference between religious faith and philosophical faith is that while 
(2) 
the former is based upon the revealed text and the authority of the Church, 
the latter is based upon personal commitment unsupported by any 
authority. 
Jaspers was also profoundly influenced by Kant's distinction of the 
phenomena and noumena. But unlike Kant who regarded God as a 
postulate only, Jaspers says that one discovers God when one goes 
beyond the sensory world. 
Also worth noticing is the fact that Jaspers' philosophy is rooted in 
his relation to Max Weber. One cannot talk of an influence on Jaspers as 
an element which could be separated from his own positive thinking. 
Jaspers was a good deal influenced by Idealism and Protestanism. He 
however does not accept Christ as an incarnation of God through 
affirming at the same time that he is the ultimate reference-point 
illuminating for us the correct way. 
Jaspers was also indebted to Platonic Idealism in which idea is an 
encompassing unity of the perceivable. Jaspers regards reality as neither 
(3) 
the subject, nor the object but something which encompasses both : he 
calls it Encompassing. 
The third part of the Introduction deals with the structure and pattern 
of 'Philosophic' the various themes and motifs with which' it deals and 
his approach to each problem. 
The first chapter deals with Jaspers' very important concept of 
Encompassing. According to him it is not possible to grasp the totality of 
being : it is divisible into subject and object. In other words every 
intentional act is directed towards an intended object. Jaspers in his 
concept of Encompassing is indebted to Kant 's transcendental 
philosophy. According to Kant the subject can never become an object. 
What looks like an object is some sort of detachment behind which the 
subject withdraws itself. This 'being for us' is called by Kant appearance. 
Jaspers discusses Encompassing in terms of its modes. Encompassing 
is constituted of two modes : the subject and the object. Subjectivity 
provides us with three divisions of these modes : existence ( Dasein) 
consciousness in general and spirit. To this Jaspers adds two other 
(4) 
divisions of the encompassing : a transcendent mode of subjectivity 
(Existenz) and the other of objectivity (Transcendence). The medium of 
their realization is called Reason. 
Many points of criticism are levelled against this concept. Knauss is 
of the view that the seven modes do not represent a clear-cut connection 
or order. Consciousness as such is the all - embracing structure of our 
self or being. The number of the modes are arbitrary. One is Transcendence, 
the other consciousness-as- such but there are many Existenzes and 
existences. 
Insistence on the subject- object dichotomy as the basic situation of 
our knowledge invites us to look for being beyond this split. Jaspers 
admires those mystics who try to overcome this fissure in favour of a 
total oneness of subject and object through the disappearance of 
objectivity and the extinction of the ego. 
The second chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses 
situation in general and boundary situations particularly. Like other 
Existentialists Jaspers also affirms that man is a situational being. He 
(5) 
cannot step out of one situation without entering the another. By boundary 
situation he means a situation which is inevitable. One cannot just ignore 
or avoid it. For instance, one is born at a certain time in history, belongs 
to a particular family, is a man or a women, young or old - in short one is 
not a man in general and this places him in the boundary situation. 
The second part of the chapter discusses at length the boundary 
situations like death, suffering, struggle and guilt. Death as an objective 
fact is not a boundary situation. It is when we anticipate death and dread 
its approach that it becomes a crucial boundary situation. Here an 
attempt is made to compare this concept with Heidegger's concept of 
death. It is significant to note that whereas Heidegger has close affinities 
with Jaspers' concept of death, Sartre offers a contrast to it. Sartre is 
bitter in his attitude towards death. 
The second boundary situation, suffering, is treated on similar lines. 
To be more explicit Jaspers says on the one hand that it is an objective 
fact, that suffering is inevitable, etc. On the other hand, be urges man to 
face it with courage and strength. 
(6) 
The third boundary situation is struggle. According to Jaspers, a struggle 
is waged at the physical level between two individuals. For example, the 
food that we eat, the place that we occupy, the position that we hold 
imply that we deprive our fellow beings in one way or the other Marx's 
views are in close consonance with Jaspers' views in this regard. 
According to Marx it is in view of production that classes occupy dissimilar 
positions : the subordinate class is the target of all kinds of exploitation. 
The fourth boundary situation is guilt. According to Jaspers, guilt is 
an inevitable feature of human existence. Every action that one performs 
involves us in guilt and each choice that one makes lands us into guilt. 
Kierkegaard and Hartman too regard man as guilt-laden. 
The third chapter presents man as a concrete, finite and temporal 
being. Man's finitude involves him in history in which sphere he realizes 
his potentialities. One's theoretical knowledge of history becomes 
meaningful when its thought contents put up a challenge before us. Thus 
in obedience to the existential call the individual fulfils his sense of 
historicity when he is actively involved in the processes of history. 
(7) 
The questions of freedom and communication are also raised with 
regard to one's finite existence. One grows and develops by communion 
with others. It is in his finiteness that he becomes aware of his potentialities 
and strives in such a way that from it springs the existential impulse to 
elevate himself through his freedom. In one's finite existence is heard 
the unconditional imperative. This happens when one is in danger of 
losing oneself. The existential call comes as the command of one's 
authentic self bidding one's empirical existence. In response to the 
unconditional command one makes a choice and it stems from the sense 
of freedom. 
It is in the boundary situations that the existential imperative is most 
clearly heard. In situations like death, suffering and guilt the choice seems 
to be whether one succumbs to these situations or faces them boldly. If 
one listens to the unconditional command one is supposed to take these 
situations upon oneself or else lose oneself. 
The fourth chapter discusses existence in a special sense which is 
exclusively Jaspers' own. According to Jaspers, one is able to win over 
(8) 
Existenz when one achieves authenticity. In an elucidation of Existenz 
one recognizes different concepts as signs of Existenz : choice, 
communication, historicity etc. Jaspers regards freedom not as an 
objective fact but an existential experience. In making use of freedom 
one is guided by the law of moral imperative, but it only enlightens but 
never determines one's decision. What is significant in this regard is that 
one has taken an initiative even though it may not be rational. This 
freedom of choice places utmost responsibility on the individual which 
fills him with a feeling of dread. 
Another sign of Existenz is communication. In communication one is 
illuminated if one is considerate towards the other. One must be 
prepared to take any risk and face any test if one wants to establish 
communicative ties with the other. 
Existenz is also historic. Historicity stands for the exceptional moment: 
that in which the past and the future become coalesced. Historicity has to 
be distinguished from the cares and pursuits of existence. Enclosed by 
coercions and inhibitions one struggles to attain a sense of fidelity. 
(9) 
Fidelity implies keeping faith in ones' parents, in experiences of 
childhood and in places which have impinged upon us. 
According to Jaspers the situational character of Existenz expresses 
itself into three eventualities : being-in-the -world, being-amidst-others 
and being-towards-transcendence. Thus Existenz in relation to being poses 
a metaphysical issue and in connection with truth it becomes an episte-
mological question. According to Jaspers existential truth is individual 
and it has to be won over. Thus struggle is needed for the achievement of 
a truthful authentic existence. It is a combat between two entities who 
have a common objective : the attainment of truth. It is not aimed at 
achieving superiority over the other, nor is any secrecy maintained. Both 
wish to arrive at a conclusion, jointly. Sartres' views are also expressed 
in this regard. According to Sartre conflict ensues between two individuals 
when one's freedom is usurped by the other's 'look'. He has a feeling as 
if his whole universe is being demolished by this look'. This is one of the 
dimensions of a person's encounter with others. 
The fifth chapter on the concept of Transcendence is of great 
(10) 
significance because the main thrust of Jaspers' process of argumentation 
is based on this concept. He points to two different approaches to 
Transcendence : formal transcending and existential relation to 
Transcendence. One can reduce Transcendence to the following categories : 
a) the categories of objectivity such as being and Nothingness, form and 
matter, the universal and the particular. 
b) the categories of objectivity such as time, space and substance. 
c) the categories of freedom such as possibility, Existenz etc. 
The four existential relations are expressed in the form of antimonies 
a) Estrangement and love. 
b) Fall and elevation. 
c) Righteousness and passion. 
d) Unity and multiplicity. 
Estrangement or defiance expresses itself in questioning the 
ways of God and finding fault with them. However surrender is a 
corollary of defiance : one surrenders only after defiance. 
(11) 
b) Elevation and fall : Existenz is both divorced from existence and is 
drawn towards it. 
c) Righteousness and passion : Jaspers uses the simile of Day and Night 
for these opposed tendencies. Day stands for reason, stability, order 
etc. and Night symbolises impulse, bust and passion. Both these 
tendencies co-exist in man. 
d) Unity and multiplicity : the concepts of unity and multiplicity are 
simultaneous : the concept of the one God beyond all personifications 
is there. 
Another way to apprehend Transcendence is through revelation. This 
is mediated through the incommunicable language of being. 
When the recipient explains his experience in terms of language, the 
second stage begins which may be termed as mythical communication. It 
expresses itself in the following three forms. 
a) One personifies the objects of nature. Jaspers refers to experiences 
like spanning the sublimity of the sea through its immensity etc. 
(12) 
b) The myth of a world beyond reality reduces empirical reality to mere 
sensory phenomena. Existenz makes intrusion into the super-sensory 
world. 
c) At the third level all reality becomes mythical. Jaspers gives the 
example of Van Gogh whose paintings make an appeal because he strove 
to discover a mythical quality in landscape, people and objects. 
According to Jaspers ciphers are not limited to the three forms 
mentioned above. Anything can serve as a cipher of Transcendence, no 
matter how trivial it is. Cipher is not intelligible by interpretation, it is to 
be understood intuitively. The truth of the cipher depends on the person 
who apprehends this truth. It may be added that the reading of ciphers is 
not to be learned, for it is primarily a matter of faith. 
Ciphers are manifested in nature, art and history and man himself is a 
cipher. According to Jaspers, the failure of all efforts to apprehend the 
absolute is itself the expression of an ultimate cipher which we may call 
the cipher of foundering. 
(13) 
In the chapter "critical appraisal" points of criticism levelled against 
Jaspers are mentioned, particularly that his philosophizing ispositionless. 
The second point is that his philosophy does not culminate in logical 
reasoning. Thirdly that what he has to convey is very simple : his ideas 
are painstakingly formulated while one is groping one's way through his 
dense vocabulary. 
In an elucidation of Existenz one may point out that existence has an 
antinomical structure. One is constantly faced with the choice of taking 
up a particular course of action and gain Existenz or evade a decision 
and sink into mere existence. 
A boundary situation is expressed in an antinomy too. Take, for 
instance, death. Death as envisaged by us is something far-fetched and it 
is felt closely when it is experienced as the specific death of a specific 
individual. It is for this reason that besides potential death Jaspers speaks 
also of immanent death. It is this immanent death which points towards 
the 'beyond' of man's being. The fear of death is eased in exalted 
moments like an act of commitment, in view of a heroic dead or at the 
.(14) 
point of a great vision. Thus death is embraced in order to win Existenz. 
Taking into account the second boundary situation, suffering, Jaspers 
envisages if from two angles. According to Jaspers evil is rooted in the 
very nature of things. All entities are potentially perfect but actually 
imperfect. This evil is lack or omission of good. Furthermore, a basic 
distinction has to be made between physical suffering and moral evil. 
The former is entailed by nature and the latter is the result of man's 
actions. However, the dysteleology manifested in the misery of life can 
be alleviated by belief in teleology. 
As far as the third boundary situation, guilt, is concerned Jaspers says 
that one is guilty through the very fact of being finite. In other words, 
every act that one performs involves one in guilt. This is opposed to the 
Christian concept which does not regard guilt as a constituent of one's 
existence. Similarly, the Christian belief that the death of Jesus on the 
Cross is an atonement of the sins of mankind is not acceptable to Jaspers. 
He thinks that each man is responsible for his own sins. However, guilt 
is condoned by goodwill. 
(15) 
The fourth boundary situation is struggle. According to Jaspers, how 
ever passively one demands one's share and whatever fair means one 
uses in this respect, there is bound to be a clash between the legitimate 
claims of two persons. Existence no doubt depends on struggle, force or 
power, but it also depends on cooperation, compromise and understanding. 
This struggle for physical survival is counterbalanced by struggle for 
authenticity which Jaspers calls loving struggle. The struggle for 
physical sustainment is tainted by selfishness and egoi.sm : loving 
struggle is based upon concern and care. Loving struggle does not aim at 
achieving superiority over the other. It aspires for a common goal, hence 
victory or defeat over one another is not conceivable. Criticism and 
questioning is welcome in this struggle. It is waged in different forms of 
relationship like master and servant, husband and wife, father and son 
etc.: it is supposed to be a clash of ideals and points of view. 
Thus we find that elucidation of Existenz can best be undertaken in 
relation to morality. The moral dilemma that confronts the individual is 
whether to maintain one's identity and achieve authenticity or to 
(16) 
sacrifice one's integrity and lose Existenz. The conscientious individual 
faces the boundary situations courageously and thus rejects existence in 
view of a genuine true Existenz. 
Boundary situations bring us to the edge of a precipice where one, 
experiences Nothingness or God. It is Jaspers' contention that the way of 
philosophical vision and the way of prayer and worship cannot be united 
in a single life. Again we arrive at the boundary and take one path or 
another. Jaspers' message is that whichever path we take we must strive 
vigorously to achieve our end. 
In the chapter "Jaspers and the global situation" such topics as 
Colonialism, Nationalism and role of the United Nations are discussed 
and this Jaspers talks about in "The future of Mankind". Moreover 
freedom is jeopardized by Totalitarianism and human life is under the 
threat of the Atom bomb. Thus man has cognizance today on a global 
scale of the relevance of Jaspers' basic concepts. 
(17) 
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PREFACE 
Karl Jaspers, the great German philosopher, is one of the most semi-
nal minds in the history of the philosophy of the twentieth Century. 
He started his career working in a psychiatric hospital and retained 
this position for seven years. He then switched over to the teaching of 
psychology in the Faculty of philosophy. In 1919 he published his book 
psychologic der Weltansch auungen which is supposed to be the earliest 
writing in the so-called modern school of Existentialism. 
The questions which were posed about the world and time, about man 
and his situation in this world and also ultimate situations (death, suffer-
ing, chance, guilt, struggle) questions about freedom, love, truth etc. were 
later elaborated on. These questions were not however systematically 
worked out. Nevertheless they created a stir in the world of philosophy 
and Jaspers says in his philosophical auto-biography that they became 
the corner - stone of his further speculations. 
In 1922 when be occupied the chair for philosophy in Heidelberg, he 
took to the study of philosophy in a more thorough way. His Psychologie 
der Weltanschauungen was a great success. At that time courses in the 
(i) 
psychology of religion and in the psychology of morals were arranged. 
Thus there was a lot of scope for publishing such works. 
In December 1931, his magnum opus work entitled 'philosophic' 
appeared in three volumes. It is based not on mere speculation but 
Jaspers unfolds the concrete experiences of the philosopher himself. It is 
not derived from a general principle but developed systematically. It is a 
master-piece of close reasoning and insight, subtle analyses and a 
confession of faith too. It will not be incorrect to treat his philosophy as 
basically religious in spirit. 
Jaspers, during the national Socialist regime, hoped for the intervention 
by the Western powers to save Germany from tyranny. He was dismissed 
from his post at that time. In 1948 he accepted an offer to the chair of 
philosophy at Basle. 
According to Jaspers scientific knowledge is incidental to all philoso-
phizing. Philosophical truth however is not based on scientific accuracy. 
Science confers no meaning on life and offers no guidance. It has its own 
limits. There is a type of thinking which is not cogent or valid from the 
point of view of science. But it finds its way into one's true self and 
(ii) 
evokes the potentialities within it. 
Jaspers seems to think that the essence of man reveals itself in 
ultimate situations. For this reason he encountered even the most sordid 
realities of life unflinchingly. For the same reason he chose medicine 
and psychiatry in order to know the limits of human potentialities and to 
see through what was mere pretence. 
Boundary situations and Communication are recurring themes through 
out the writings of Karl Jaspers. He confesses in his auto-biography that 
inspite of the benign company of his loved ones he yearned for a company 
which could be pure and condid. Hence communication was a primary 
concern for him since his youth and it became one of the fundamental 
questions of philosophy later on. 
According to Jaspers philosophy begins with an inquiry into the situation in 
which the philosopher finds himself in the world. Human Dasein is not 
existence according to Jaspers, but man in his Dasein is 'possible existence'. 
This possible existence realizes itself by an existential choice. By the 
exercise of freedom of choice one recognizes one's true self. Thus freedom 
is the beginning and end in the process of the illumination of existence. 
(iii) 
INTRODUCTION 
Though Existentialism as a movement actually begins with the post-war 
situation in Europe, yet it can be traced as far back as Greek thought. The 
problem with which all existentialist thinkers are concerned is the problem 
of being. This problem was dealt with by all Greek thinkers. Thales, for 
instance pointed out that Being is the universal principle of all things. 
By affirming that everything is water and from water everything comes, 
he made it explicit that the basic element of the universe is one. 
His successor Anaximander put forward his theory of 'boundless 
something' according to which the opposite elements in nature arise from 
and melt into one single substance. Thus according to him, too, it is in 
the first principle of the universe that both the material and the efficient 
cause of all creation and destruction lie hidden'. Anaximenes, the pupil 
of Anaximander, proposed air as the prime substance and explained all 
change by the principle of rarefaction and condensation. Anaximenes 
pointed out that since the quantitative inequality between what is less in 
1. Sinari : Reason in Existentialism, p. 147-148 
(1) 
one place and more in the other characterizes all that is, no change can be 
explained without the existence of what is not. We find this unity of 
Being in the writings of Parmenides. According to him Being is 
complete, spherical, motionless which comes neither from something nor 
from nothing, for there is nothing outside it except itself. Pythagoras 
thought that what is unlimited is real, and that the finite diversity of one's 
experience is the result of the limit being imposed on the unlimited'. 
When we come to Plato we find that for him Being expresses itself 
through essences. When he explained that ideas or essences exist prior to 
and having no relationship with things of actual experience he meant that 
essences form the highest principle of existence only to be intelligible. 
Whatever is intelligible is universal and essential for a true knowledge 
of Being^ 
Aristotle disagrees with Plato's theory of essences. He was concerned 
with the living man, this or that, and not man stripped of all attributes. 
1. Sinarip: 148-49 
2. Ibid p : 152 
(2) 
The abstractions like whiteness, horseness and manness are known only 
as they become real in the white objects, the horses or human beings. 
Among the scholastics we find Aquinas who claimed that essences 
exist in the particular objects as their whatness and it is the mind of God 
that is the repository of them all'. 
The age of Reason begins with Descartes. Though he accepted the 
dualism between mind and matter, that is, the two levels of being, yet he 
affirmed that it is the law of reason which governs them both. Spinoza 
propounded his theory of psycho-physical parallelism and regarded mind 
and matter as the two aspects of Being. It is this Being which in the 
philosophy of Leibniz is equated to the centres of spiritual force that 
reflect the principle of reason^. 
John Locke, the founder of empiricism, bitterly attacked Descartes' 
theory of innate ideas. According to him it is through sense experience 
that one has access to knowledge. Berkley's subjective idealism and 
Hume's skepticism follow logically from Locke's revolutionary theory^ 
1. Sinari p : 155 
2. Ibid p : 156-57 
3. Ibid p : 158 
(3) 
According to Berkley material things do not have an independent 
existence and as his famous dictum states esse-percipi, to "exist" and to be 
perceived are one and the same thing. Locke's theory culminates in Hume's 
philosophy, according to Hume all knowledge springs from "impressions" 
through a process of combination and separation.' Hume had argued that 
this combination in an object was just a matter of habit and without 
justification Kant emphasized that such combinations are necessary in 
virtue of the very structure of human consciousness. This difference is 
profound and in this lies Kant's answer to Hume's skepticism.^ 
According to Kant without sensibility no object would be given to us, without 
understanding no object would be intelligible; he says, "thoughts without 
concepts are blind". Kant, however, is emphatic on the point that experience 
alone cannot give us objects. There is always a synthesis of experience and such 
synthesis is not found in experience: it is imposed by the understanding.^ 
1. Sinarip : 159 
2. Sloman R.C : From Rationalism to Existentialism p : 18 Queens College of the city 
University of New York. Humanities Press p :18 
3. Ibidp: 16, 18 
(4) 
Kant's successor Fichte began with the assertion that the human ego 
is an expression of the Absolute. Being is a living and developing process 
which governs all individual consciousness.' Schelling agreed with Fichte 
that the Absolute or God unveils him self in the form of conscious selves. 
It might be said that the philosophical systems of Fichte and Schelling 
present a kind of pantheistic Idealism. For them being is a passage in 
time culminating in the Absolute Mind or Reason.^ 
In the Hegelian system Reason is the highest principle underlying the 
reality of Being. Society, for example, is the expression of reason 
objectified. It has evolved by means of the wills and desires of individual 
men. Its laws, customs, traditions, institutions are therefore rational. 
Similarly history is never the result of any one individual reason, but the 
outcome of the interests, desires, needs and purposes of the multitude. 
One of the notable reactions to the philosophy of Hegel was the 
neo-Romantic tendency to up-hold a creative principle which rejects the 
1. Sinari p : 162. 
2. Sinari p : 166. 
3. Ibid 
(5) 
supremacy of Reason. We may mention Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and 
William Dilthey in this regard. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, through their 
doctrine of will, undermined the role of reason. 
Besides these neo-Romantics, pragmatists and phenomenologists have 
put forward ideas akin to Existentialism. One may mention Husserl, 
Bergson and Max Scheler in this regard. Bergson, through his theory of 
dynamic intuitionism dissolved Being into a vital impulse (elan, vital) 
and explained the individual living being as part of that impulse.' 
The Existentialist debt to the doctrine of Husserl lies first of all in his 
insistence on the priority of every day world over the world presented by 
the sciences. It is on the basis of everyday world that the possibility of 
its scientific study arises. 
A second debt is Husserl's rejection of the cartesian cogito. Descartes 
viewed the relation between consciousness and its objects as contingent. 
Objects might never have been accessible to consciousness. For the 
existentialist as well as for Husserl this view is difficult to uphold. 
1. Ibidp: 172. 
(6) 
According to Sartre consciousness is nothing apart from its directedness: 
hence not something which could stand in causal relation to other things. 
The world we experience needs our contribution in order to be asit is, 
and Nietzsche was right in rejecting the illusion of worlds-behind-
The-scene.' 
The greatest debt to Existentialism is the doctrine of intentionality. 
Phenomenology insisted on the fact that conscious acts must be directed 
to objects. Secondly the doctrine requires that objects are to be mediated 
by meanings. As Merleau Ponty puts it intentionality demonstrates that 
"we are condemned to meaning.^ 
Finally one should not overlook existentialist echoes of Husserl's 
conviction that philosophy is not a mere intellectual exercise but a 
procedure of self discovery. For example, Jaspers says that by Existenz 
philosophy man makes room for himself.^ 
1. Cooper DAvid E : Existentialism Blackwell publishers 1990 p : 46- 7 
2. Cooper David E : p : 47. 
3. Macquarrie J : Existentialism p : 29. 
(7) 
So far as pragmatism is concerned both pragmatism and Existentialism 
are opposed to abstract intellectualism. Both emphasize action instead of 
being. They both recognize the risk of faith as an attitude about which 
one is compelled to decide by the demands of concrete existence. Both 
look for the affirmation or falsification of faith in terms of its fulfilment 
or diminution of humanity'. 
Against this historical background we may establish the relation in 
which Karl Jaspers stands to the main tradition of Western philosophy. 
This may be expressed in two ways. 
In the first place he has stated three conditions for a serious study of 
philosophy. They are 
(1) Participation in scientific inquiry, experience of the sciences, their 
methodology and critical approach make the scientific attitude indispensable 
to genuine philosophical quests 
(2) The study of great philosophers. One cannot find one's way to 
1. Macquarrie J. p:30 
2. Jasphers : Way to Wisdom. Translated by Manheim Ralph. (New Haven Yale University 
Press) 1954 p : 168-69 
(8) 
philosophy without a knowledge of its history. In this endeavour one must 
take into account the work of great philosophers. But this will be fruitful 
only through actual participation which is awakened in the course of such 
a study. 
(3) A conscientious approach to the conduct of daily life. Truth in 
philosophy is that which must be incorporated in life. This truth must be 
arrived at by personal quest and commitment and not by reflection alone. 
In the second place, Jaspers aims at the renewal of the Western 
philosophical tradition by incorporating into it the thought of Kierkegaard 
and Nietzsche. While he does not accept the results of these, he is 
indebted to the methods of both.' 
Jaspers is closer to Kierkegaard than any other existentialist thinker. 
The loss of individuality which agitated the mind of Jaspers first 
disturbed Kierkegaard. The latter complained against the loss of the self 
in aestheticism. 
1. Allen EL : Existentialism from within Routledge and keganpaul 1953 p : 100. 
(9) 
The aesthetic individual is a creature of whims, self satisfaction and 
self gratification. He has no moral principles, is inactive and unscrupu-
lous in practical affairs and ambiguous in intellectual matters. The 
aesthetic life consists in the enjoyment of the moment no matter what 
that moment consists in or brings to us. One can enjoy good health or 
beauty, or riches and honours or talent. It may consist in the enjoyment 
of music or poetry as long as they are enjoyed for the immediate 
satisfaction they bring to us.' 
The aesthete becomes restless trying to find novel experiences to 
suppress the feeling of meaninglessness. The natural way of escaping 
this as suggested by Kierkegaard is to lose oneself in the crowd of 
everyday collective life.^ 
The notion of choice is central to Kierkegaard's thought. Choice 
involves tension and the individual is filled with dread. It is so because 
he gives up the comfortable and secure world in which be happens to be 
and is confronted with the situation of choice. In this moment of choice 
1. Soloman R. C p : 93 
2. Soloman p : 94 
(10) 
he is not guided by anyone. It is by a penetration into one's being that 
one chooses to be a Christian and makes a leap into faith.' 
Jaspers, though influenced by Kierkegaard, yet endeavours to put before 
us a variety of choices without persuading us to commit ourselves to any 
particular one. This choice becomes efficacious through the subject himself 
by way of acceptance, rejection, estimation and giving meaning to it.^  
The resolution in freedom is entirely unconditional and need not depend 
on any reflection, insight or intuition. Nor is it made in terms of an 
adequate ground or general principle. It springs all at once from the depths 
of one's being. 
This freedom also makes man responsible to himself. In achieving a 
sense of complete responsibility one experiences a sort of dread. It is so 
because in self realization one relinquishes the familiar and stable possi-
bilities for a realm that seems alien and precarious by comparison.^ 
1. Grimsley R : Existentialist thought University of Wales Press 1967 p : 26, 28. 
2. Herssch Jeanne : Jaspers conception of tradition in the philosophy of Jaspersed by 
schilpp P.A. Northneslim University New York, 1957 p : 604. 
3. Grimsteyp : 178-79 
(11) 
Jaspers and Kierkegaard have a remarkable similarity as far as the 
concepts of time and eternity are concerned. According to Jaspers Existenz 
is the union of time and eternity. For Existenz time is the present moment 
in which irrevocable decisions convey the assurance of freedom. Or it is 
the future which is capable of infinite possibilities of choice. Thus 
Existenz has its own relative (time) and its reality depends on the strength 
with which it acts in the present moment.' 
Kierkegaard also emphasizes the fact that Being can be apprehended 
only in relation to Eternity. Eternity, as Kierkegaard thinks, enters in/to 
temporality making only the present its container. Thus time and eternity 
are the foundation which produce existence. 
As far as Jaspers' similarity to Nietzsche's views is concerned, we 
may uphold that Jaspers' thought cannot be neatly fitted into the frame 
work of Christianity though Jaspers does not share Nietzsche's animus 
and hard-hitting attitude to Christianity. Nietzsche bitterly attacks 
Christianity and refuses to accept the final authority of the Church. He 
1. Rehder H : Literary Criticism and Existentialism in The Philosophy of Jaspers, ed. by 
Schilpp. p. 736. 
(12) 
indignantly repudiates the traditions, beliefs and institutions of 
Christianity. For instance, he vehemently recommends the creative 
employment of the passions as opposed to the Christian doctrine of their 
denial and rejection.' 
Jaspers stands close to Nietzsche while dealing with the problem of 
Nihilism. Nietzsche's Nihilism is essentially metaphysical and not 
ideological. The latter implicates a negative and destructive attitude 
towards the beliefs, tastes and attitudes of any authority. Nietzsche's 
difference from the Nihilists is clearly brought out in his attitude towards 
science. Science, he holds, is a set of useful conventions.^ Our whole 
conceptual scheme is an imposition of thought upon reality. For instance, 
thing and attribute, cause and effect, appearance and reality all are an 
imposition of the will-to-power.^ 
His Nihilism is metaphysical in the sense that he believed that the 
world is a blank picture having neither structure nor order about it, nor 
1. Kaufmann J. Jaspers relation to Nietzsche in "The Philosophy of Jaspers" ed. by 
Schilpp. p : 415, 17 
2. Danto C.A. Nietzsche as philosopher. The Machmillan Company N. York p : 30. 
3. Ibid 227 
(13) 
meaning, purpose or value inhering in it. Man acting on the impulse of 
will-to-power imposes on the world a definite shape and form and this 
enables him to turn it into a rational, secure and congenial universe.' 
Though Nietzsche's Nihilism presents a world which is absolutely 
indifferent to human aspirations and he affirms it without any hope or 
expectation which had consoled man through religion, yet he does not 
leave us in despair. With a Dionysian Yes he affirms the world as it is, 
without form and meaning. Dionysus stands for the prolific embracing 
of life in all its variations of joy and suffering. Thus Nietzsche's Nihilism 
culminates in Optimism.^ 
Nietzsche's enthusiastic yes to life reverberates in the whole of 
Jaspers' philosophy. He opens his section of Skepticism and Nihilism 
with the comment, "The first and the very last question concerning 
Weltanschauung is whether one says yes or No to life as a whole".-' 
1. Dantp. 35 
2. Ibid p : 33 
3. Kaufmann : Jaspers' relation to Nietzsche in The Philosophy of Jaspers, ed by Schilpp. 
p. A. p. 414. 
(14) 
As against Nihilism which is rooted in the meaning lessness of reality 
and which is a total negation of all values, Jaspers asserts his philosophical 
faith. The main difference between religious faith and philosophical faith 
is that while the former is the bond of common life under the authority of 
the Church and rests upon revelation that gives assurance, the latter is 
individual without any authority or sense of security.' 
It is Jaspers' contention that the Divine cannot be defined in terms of 
human categories; it can only be witnessed by the Cipher. Cipher, as 
Jaspers understood it, is a sign of Transcendence but unlike the symbol 
the Cipher has no correspondence with Transcendence. These Ciphers 
prevail everywhere but are visible to those who are able to behold them. 
They are opaque for those who are oblivious of them. Any trivial or 
magnificent thing can serve as a cipher. Thus no sacred book contains 
them nor any institution ascertains them. They assume meaning for those 
who endeavour, contemplate and have faith.^ 
1. Allen E.L : Existentialism from within, p. 120. 
2. Ricoeur P : The relation of Jaspers' philosophy to Religion in "The philosophy 
of Jaspers" ed. by Schilpp. 
(15) 
Jaspers' philosophy is ingrained in his communication with Max weber. 
Communication means an interaction in perfect harmony in search of 
truth. Max Weber has been the living spring from which Jaspers thinking 
has taken its origin.' Thus one cannot talk of an influence of Max Weber 
on Jaspers as an element which could be separated from his thinking. 
In the Monograph on Max Weber, published in 1932 Jaspers 
compares the spiritual situation of his time with that of antiquity. Just as 
Socrates appearance on the stage of history was a challenge to the 
Ancients, similarly Max Weber's appearance was a challenge to the 
people of his times. Thus the true flame of philosophy was kindled by 
the coming up of these extra ordinary men. Those who understood the 
philosophical significance of Socrates existence were his pupils famous 
among whom was Plato Jaspers out of modesty does not compare his 
relation to Max Weber to Plato's relation to Socrates^ 
In Max Weber we discover the same straight forwardness and lack of 
1. Manasse EM : Jaspers relation to Max Weber in The philosophy of Jaspers ed by 
Schiipp p : 369. 
2. Ibid. 370. 
(16) 
pretence as in Socrates. Max Weber points out the limits of empirical 
science in order to make room to the existential freedom of the 
individual. He gathers all light which reason provides and tries to focus 
it on our choice and decision. Weber's example, like that of Socrates 
inspired those who were capable of such an undertaking. Just as Plato's 
philosophy could be interpreted as his attempt to say what he 
- experienced through Socrates, so we find Jaspers thinking as his way of 
expressing what he had experienced through Max Weber. Max Weber 
was not a philosopher in the technical sense and Jaspers received from 
Kant and Kierkegaard and to some extent from Nietzsche the conceptual 
tools which he needed in order to express what he experienced through 
Weber.' 
A reader who is familiar with Jaspers' style and expression may feel 
implicit reference to Weber even in his most abstract writings. However, 
Weber's personality is brought out when grief stricken over Weber's death 
he addressed the students of Heidelberg in a commemorative Assembly. 
1. Manasse EM p : 371. 
(17) 
What he said was later developed and expanded in a monograph. The 
occasion for this second publication was the rise of National Socialism 
in Germany.' 
In the Commemorative Address Jaspers had stated that through Max 
Weber the philosophical. Existenz became visible to others.^ In the Monograph 
Jaspers points out that Weber's appearance was full of contradictions. 
There was something antinomical in Weber's personality and thinking 
Jaspers talks about many pairs of contrasts like elevation and descent 
defiance and devotion, unity and multiplicity etc. Weber, says Jaspers, 
combines the fulfilment of the moral demands as law of the day and the 
clear sighted openness for the demons of the Night.^ In the Metaphysics 
there is a section entitled "The law of the day" and the "Passion for the 
Night". 
Jaspers speaks of Max Weber as a demonic person. The demonic type 
of person happens to have a lot of vitality engaging in one enterprise and 
1. Manasse Em p: 372 
2. Ibid p : 375 
3. Ibid 376. 
(18) 
another. He may seek fulfilment in politics, in sciences, in the arts. If he 
chooses the sciences, he is a turning point in the history of ideas. Yet he 
doesn't build up a system or a school of thought and despises the idea of 
having any followers. Max Weber was a dynamic person was always 
striving and did not want to set forth a system. He was ready to re-examine 
his choices in view of actual situations rejected the role of the charismatic 
leader and regarded every one as an equal.' 
The Monograph culminates in a discussion of the meaning of 
foundering. According to Jaspers human existence is supposed to founder 
or to suffer ship wreck. In the last chapter of the "Metaphysics " too, 
foundering is recognized as the decisive cipher of Trans cendence and 
one which gives value to all the others. In the Monograph Jaspers 
accepts Weber's fate as" genuine foundering."^ Max Weber's last words 
"The true is the truth is not mere tautology, but the cipher of absolute 
truth itself. Absolute truth can only be where falsehood is not possible, 
that is, in Transcendence. 
1. Manasse EM p : 383-384 
2. Manasse EM p : 376. 
(19) 
It will not be an exaggeration to say that Weber's philosophical 
Existenz is alive today because of Jaspers: through his philosophy as well 
as through his evocation of Weber's personality. Those who study Weber's 
works in order to apprehend that idea are dependent on Jaspers whether 
directly or indirectly. There are of course other sources from which we 
gather information about Weber's personality. But to them applies what 
applies to Xenophon's writings on Socrates. They complete the picture 
Plato had sketched, affirmed and add question marks to it. But what 
Socrates means to philosophy is known only through Plato.' 
Weber is a philosophical power today because he is the soul of Jaspers' 
philosophy. The question that arises here is whether Jaspers has created a 
Weber myth. The answer seems to be in the negative. Myth implies a picture 
which is but loosely connected with historical fact and which gains authen-
ticity because of its aesthetic appeal. Jaspers never ceases to refer his readers 
to Weber's own writings. Jaspers was fascinated by a 'demonic person' and .^  
since he wanted to speak of him, he had to talk philosophy.^ 
1. Ibid p : 390. 
2. Manasse EM p : 391. 
(20) 
Jaspers' philosophy owes considerably to Protestantism: Jaspers 
speaks of the Bible as a revelation but does not accept it as inspired in 
the traditional sense. He regards it as a record of how men meet God at 
the limit situations of their lives and prevails through them.' 
Moreover, according to him, no man can be an incarnation of God. 
He regards Christ as an ultimate reference-point which can outline for us 
the way most clearly and convincingly. Jaspers, in the third volume of 
'philosophic' makes Jesus the cipher of Transcendence. He also points 
out that Jesus had always concentrated on the inner being of man: an idea 
which is recurrent in his own thought. 
Jaspers in his book "The Great philosophers" regards Jesus and also 
Socrates, Buddha and Confucius as paradigmatic individuals who faced 
the human situations and the extremities of life with utmost patience. 
Jaspers also high-lights the role of suffering in the life of Jesus as an 
aspect of his uniqueness.^ This may be one of the sources of Jaspers 
concept of boundary situations. 
1. Allen E .Lp : 123. 
2. Durfee H.A. : Jaspers' Christology in "The Philosophy of Religion (April, 1964), 
p.135-142. 
(21) 
As far as the influence of Idealism is concerned it may be said that 
the concept of Encompassing which occupies a conspicuous place in 
Jaspers' philosophy is in a way rooted in Idealism. In Platonic Idealism 
idea is not a reality but is an encompassing unity of the perceivable. The 
ideas are again encompassed by the highest idea of the one and the Good. 
Hence Jaspers' fundamental presupposition is that "Reality is neither the 
subject nor the object but is something which encompasses both". He 
called the unity of subject and object by the new term "Comprehensive".' 
This view is based on the Kantian dualism of the phenomena and the 
thing-in-itself, noumena. In place of the traditional dichotomy between 
subject and object Kant put forward a new dichotomy between objects as 
they appear to us which he calls phenomena and things as they-are-in-
themselves which he calls noumena. Thus all versions of idealism based 
on the idea-world are rejected by Kant. Hence according to Kant and 
later on according to Husserl, the world is not my idea 'the world is the 
phenomenon which must exist independently of my idea of it.'^ 
1. Knauss G.: The concept of the Encompassing in Jaspers' philosophy in "The philosophy 
of Jaspers ed by Schilpp P. A. p : 142. 
2. Soloman p : 2 0 - 2 1 . 
(22) 
Hegel in his critique of Kant's theory of knowledge points out that by 
this distinction Kant considers knowledge a tool with which one masters 
the Absolute. Thus one cannot know reality (The Absolute) but only as it 
has been distorted by the instrument of knowledge.' It is noteworthy that 
whereas for Kant God was a postulate only Jaspers, though profoundly 
influenced by Kant's distinction of phenomena and noumena, goes 
beyond it. Hence he remarks, "We apprehend its meaning only as we 
pass beyond the world of objects and through it discover authentic 
reality". In other words, according to Jaspers, one finds God sometimes 
as one rises above the world and sometimes as one enters into it to 
hallow it. The world so to say mediates between God and one's true self. 
The philosophy of Karl Jaspers is a protest against the spiritual im-
poverishment which was the result of the rise of modern science. The 
Nineteenth Century which brought in its wake the French Revolution and 
the Industrial Revolution was a period of crisis both is respect of 
religion and philosophy. Man lost his faith in religion and a strong 
1. Ibid p: 50. 
(23) 
impetus was found in the power of independent human reason and science.^ 
Jaspers was very much conscious of the fact that man has become a 
mere cog in the vast machine of the modern state. The modern state has 
produced a standardized man with the help of educational curricula and 
publicity media. The modern technological age encourages mass 
organization and dispels the idea of genuine community.^ 
We long for a system of knowledge complete and final in itself that 
will provide us shelter. Hence the appeal of two systems of thought, 
Marxism and Freudian psycho-analysis. Each lays claims to total 
knowledge, a final answer to the problems of human life.^ 
Jaspers is critical of the theoretical dogmatism which is characteristic 
of Marxism and the psychoanalytical school. He finds fault with the 
psychoanalytical method which makes man a slave of his unconscious 
drives, the most powerful of which is the erotic impulse. Marxism also 
1. Knudsen : p. 1. 
2. Collins J : The Existentialists, p. 84. 
3. Allen E.L. : Existentialism from within, p. 102. 
(24) 
tried to find a single explanation for the activities of man: man's 
consciousness is determined by his mode of production in material life.' 
Jaspers also disapproves of the theories of society which are a menace 
for human personality. For instance, genetics, sociologism and anthropology 
boast of providing the most adequate approach to our understanding of 
man. They however treat man only in his empirical aspect wherein the 
manifold and diverse shades of his personality do not become apparent. 
Hence man is assigned the status only of a class member, a cultural unit.^ 
Furthermore, experts on eugenics and race theories offer their contri-
bution. But no sociologist can give an adequate explanation of free will 
and destiny, no psychologist has ever been able to understand human 
behaviour and no race theorist can breed a perfect individual.' 
Jaspers was well aware of the fact that man cannot be fully compre-
hended in terms of any conceptual or scientific acknowledge. Man has in 
him ingrained infinite potentialities and is therefore always more than 
1. Knudsen : p. 45. 
2. Collins J : The Existentialists, p. 85. 
3. Bexler J. S.: The contribution of Existenz-philosophy in "The Harvard theological 
Review 1940, p. 58. 
(25) 
can be known about him. He pointed out that there is another Icind of 
awareness which is concerned with the individual's inner development. 
Jaspers belongs to that class of thinkers who despite the so-called 
analytic studies of man still insist that Existenz-philosophie must 
necessarily figure as a system. Before we proceed to articulate what 
Jaspers precisely means by his 'Existenz philosophy' let us focus on the 
general frame-work of 'philosophic', the different themes and subjects 
with which it deals and the approach of the philosopher. 
In is not a treatise on religion in the sense of being loaded with 
religious implications. According to Jaspers the most significant aspect 
of human life is its search for the eternal truth. The deity to which 
Jaspers' philosophy refers is neither the transcendent God of theism not 
the immanent God of Pantheism. So far as the proofs of the existence of 
God are concerned he admits their usefulness as tools for an intellectual 
approach to God. These traditional proofs stem from different empirical 
realities of a cosmic, psychological and moral nature. They emphasize 
the contingency of the world, the failure of human planning, the abrogation 
(26) 
of mans' ambitions which leads us to the abyss where one experiences 
either Nothingness or God. A conviction of the existence of God is a 
pre-supposition not a result of the philosophical argument.' 
According to Jaspers conventional modes of worship, and religious 
propaganda lead us away from God rather than draw us near to Him. One 
can approach God only personally.^ Thus according to Jaspers faith in 
God is not justifiable. Here he agrees with Martin luther who was 
opposed to institutionalized religion. In the philosophy of Jaspers as in 
the dialectical theology of Karl Barth there exists an antagonism between 
faith and reason. The act of faith is generated by freedom which is 
rationally justifiable.^ 
It is not a book on ethics though its does contain moral suggestions 
and recommendations. Jaspers never speaks in a matter-of-fact way of a 
psychologist though there are deep psychological insights embedded in 
his work. 
1. ReinhaxdtKurtF: The Existentialisf Revolt p : 191. 
2. Reinhardtp: 196. 
3. I b idp : 199. 
(27) 
Jaspers' concern is with reality as it unfolds itself before us and with 
thinking in the form of re-interpretation of his personal experiences. 
Jaspers adopts a two-fold method; on the one hand he present man's 
subjective and emotional re-actions and attitudes towards his environment. 
And, on the other, he raises questions that stir man out of his complacency 
and reveal the precariousness of his situation' and appeals to everyone to 
respond actively to his authentic self in the limit situations of death, struggle 
and guilt, in moments of crisis and in extreme moments of distress. It is, 
however, note-worthy, that Jaspers does not believe in dogmatizing and 
therefore does not tend to offer any final answer to life's problems. This 
invests his philosophy with a note of tragic doubt which distinguishes 
him from other existentialist thinkers.^ 
Jaspers was seriously vexed with the diminution of human individuality. 
This brings us face to face with the existential problem of the realization 
of the true self. To begin with, one's self is identical in structure with 
1. Heinmann : p. 64. 
2. Bixier J.S. The contribution of Existenz philosophy in "Harvard Theological Review" 
Jan. 1940 p : 63. 
(28) 
other selves. But it is more; potentially it is made up of Existenz. Existenz 
is as it were "the axis around which all I am, and all that can become 
truly meaningful for me in the world turns".' 
The touch-stone of Existenz is not any abstract criteria of truth 
according to which one's actions are measured as right or wrong nor is it 
the ideal which one wishes to represent.^ It becomes independent and 
responsible only in its relation to Transcendence. 
Jaspers says, "Existenz is either in relation to Transcendence or not at 
all".^ In other words, one can realize that the transformation of one's 
mere existence into authentic Existenz occurs only in its relation to 
Transcendence or Godhead. 
The pertinent question is whether he accepts this challenge or whether 
he resigns himself to a mere representation of man's condition. Existenz 
either soars in its relation to Transcendence or it goes under. Hence an 
attitude of neutrality in regard to Transcendence is not admissible. 
1. Hoffmann K: Basic concepts of Jaspers' philosophy in The philosophy of Jaspers ed 
by Schilpp, P.A. p. 88. 
2. Rehder H : Literary cri\icism and Existentialism in The philosophy of Jaspers ed by 
Schilpp P.A. p : 9735. 
3. Hoffman : Basic concepts in Jaspers' philosophy p : 107. 
(29) 
AN ALLEMBRACING REALITY 
The question of Being, proposed by the Greeks, and re-examined by 
the Medieval thinkers came to be dealt with later by the rationalist 
philosophers like Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Hobbes on the one hand 
and by Bergson, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Heidegger in our own day 
on the other. In Heidegger, in a special sense. Being attained its re-orien-
tation.' According to Heidegger Being is not a genus or class name but 
all individuals are designated thus indiscriminately. It also recognizes 
that existence is not a property of things which things may or may not 
have.. In other words, being is not the name of an entity or refers to any 
particular property.^ In search of a true metaphysics of Being Jaspers 
initiates his philosophic inquiry that would lend due weight to the 
conceptual analysis which is pursued by science and would also bring 
into relief the self-realization which is the mainstay of Existentialism.^ 
1. Sinari : Reason in Existentialism, Bombay Popular Prakashan p : 69 
2. Solomon R : From Rationalism to Existentialism Humanities Press, 1978 p : 191. 
3. Sinari: Reason in Existentialism, p. 61. 
(30) 
Being cannot be grasped in its totality but always appears to us 
divided in to subject and object. Consciousness is the basic phenomenon 
of the split into subject and object. We are cognizant of objects through 
consciousness. Even the unconscious is derived from phenomena in 
consciousness. This subject object dichotomy is our stage for the 
appearance of all that is and can be. The term that we employ for such 
appearance is called the "encompassing." Since Kant this idea has been 
conspicuous in philosophy. Whenever one thinks, thinking relates to 
something definite. Hence every intentional act is directed towards an 
intended object.' 
The first cleavage of Being into subject and object is enhanced by a 
second one in so far as each object, besides its dichotomy with the 
subject, also opposes itself to all objects. Thus every being that we meet 
as an object is a limited, partially determined particular, and not being in 
its totality. One's recognition of objects always takes place within an 
objective horizon.^ No matter how much we endeavour we cannot go 
1. Knauss G : The concept of Encompassing in "The philosophy of Jaspers", ed by 
Schiipp, P.A. Tudor Publishign Company 1957, p. 147. 
2. Samay : Reason revisited University Notre Dame Press, 1971 p: 35 
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beyond the horizon by which we are encompassed. It is the source whence 
all horizons emerge. There is a point where the limiting horizon vanishes 
and from where one could survey the whole. 
In an attempt to bridge the split between subject and object the mind 
may evolve the concept of Being of which subject and object would be 
the two modes. This is unacceptable to Jaspers. He would say that in 
order to grasp the concept of Being the concepts of subject and object 
must harmonize with each other.' But they do not do so because sponta-
neity which is supposed to characterize subjectivity and substantiality 
which is the essence of objectivity are incompatible categories. 
It is the basic insight of Kant's transcendental philosophy that the 
subject can never turn into an object. What locks like an object is some 
sort of detachment behind which the actual subject with/draws itself. This 
'being for us' is what Kant terms 'appearance'. Kant illuminates this 
consciousness by withdrawing from those things to which we are attached 
to the consciousness of these things, from the representation to the 
1. Ibid. p. 56. 
(32) 
possibility of representation. Thus existent things are really imagined 
things enclosed in a transcendental form of appearance which is identical 
with the basic faculty of our mind.' 
If the shift from object to subject implicates a transformation of one's 
immediate consciousness, then the manner of one's thinking should also 
be transformed. The thinking which occurs thus is called 'transcendental 
thinking' by Jaspers. This new attitude also paves the way for philosophical 
faith. By recognizing the limits of knowledge and of the unknowable we 
enter the realm of faith. 
So far as the concept of Encompassing is concerned it goes so far 
back as Greek thought. In Anaximander we find a similar concept which 
we call apeiron. Apeiron is an encompassing of reality which contains 
all the elemental materials and thereby it rules over and regulates every-
thing. For Plato ideas are not objective counters but ideal realities. This 
ideality is an encompassing unity of the perceivable. These ideas are 
further encompassed by the highest idea of the one and the Good'. 
1. Schiipp, P.A. : The philosophy of Jaspers, pp. 142. 
(33) 
The history of the Idea in Western thought is at the same time a history 
of the idea of the Encompassing. Two thinkers are significant in this 
regard and they have deeply influenced Jaspers' thought. Kant and 
Kierkegaard. As regards Kant's theory of knowledge it may be held that 
totality and non-limitation are of the essence of the idea. The idea is the 
Encompassing of the subject and the object and as such the Idea represents 
the highest point in Kants' thought. Kierkegaard offered a radical 
approach to the concept of truth by maintaining that truth is subjective. 
One can speak of truth only in an encompassing sense in which is 
contained both the subjective and the objective. 
The basic idea of the philosophy of the Encompassing is to accept all 
possible truths without however losing the unity of Being'. There is a 
peculiar meaning of truth in each made of encompassing. In consciousness 
at large, truth means cogent validity and we reach a consensus between 
inter changeable points. In existence it means success, happiness and self 
realization. Here the interests of self preservation and self enhancement 
I. Knauss G. The concept of the encompassing in "The philosophy of Jaspers" ed by 
Schiipp, pp. 143, 144 
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will coincide or exclude each other. In mind it means comprehension, 
understanding and interpretation. In Existenz it mean unconditional 
resolve in which individuals are united in a communicative loving struggle. 
The Encompassing implies totality and is inclusive of the various manners 
of one's finite approach to it.' It may be added that the encompassing is 
not a common denominator because each mode encompasses in a 
distinctly different way. The point is this : each of them is the whole of 
Being in a specific way and encompasses all the rest in different ways. 
These relationships form a complex net-work in which the meaning 
of each mode changes according to its relation to others. Like the notes 
of a melody which articulate their meaning in harmony with the larger 
movement that expresses itself in them the meaning of each mode only 
becomes explicit when we consider it as a complex stream of sense.•^ 
Jaspers discusses encompassing in terms of its modes. The main modes 
of the encompassing are two; the encompassing in which we are the subject 
1. Knauss : The concept of the encompassing, p. 147. 
2. Samay, p. 63. 
(35) 
and the encompassing in which being itself is the object. An analysis of 
subjectivity provides Jaspers with three main divisions of these modes' 
existence (Dasein) consciousness-in-general and spirit. To this Jaspers 
adds two other basic divisions of the encompassing a transcendent mode 
of subjectivity (Existenz) and of objectivity (Transcendent). The Being 
which embraces us is called world and Transcendence and the Being which 
we are is called existence, consciousness as-such, spirit and Existenz. 
The medium of their realization is reason. Existence, consciousness as 
such and spirit are the ways in which we participate in the world. The 
world is more than we are. The fact that there is a world is not identical 
with the fact Ihat one exists.^ 
Existenz is potential being which has ample choice at its disposal. 
The possibility of being is latent in us as we try to elucidate what Existenz 
may be. It is a possibility which can be pointed out or appealed to and 
must be actualized by each person himself. It forms the ground of each 
1. Jaspers : The philosophy of Existence. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971 p:12. 
2. Knauss G: The concept of Encompassing in "The philosophy of Jaspers" ed by Schilp 
p. 153,55,56. 
(36) 
individual self. Existenz is the ground and the axis through which every 
genuine thing becomes intelligible.' 
All the modes of the Encompassing are united by the bond of reason. 
Reason plays a constructive role, it is the unifying, recollecting and 
progressive power which allows no gap, break or violation. Reason stands 
for unity and it brings together into communication Existenzen who are 
separated by a void.' Reason becomes enunciated when it is enclosed 
within definite forms and it tends to expand when it appears as a self-
sufficient substitute.^ Reason opens doors, provides impulses and 
forbids us to rest on what we know and it is always in evoluation. All the 
real and possible stand points have their place in the sphere of reason 
which is more than a stand point. Reason enters into all ways of the 
subject object split, but in itself does not know the split. 
Reason always goes hand in hand with intellect. Intellect is never to 
be abandoned, for to despise it is to despise reason. Reason works in 
coordination with Existenz. they are inseparable and inter-dependent. 
1. Jaspers : Reason and Existenz. p. 66. 
2. Ibid. p. 66. 
(37) 
Reason would not surrender to Existenz or Existenz to reason. Existenz 
is vivified by reason and is substantiated by it. They develop simultaneously, 
and illuminate and strengthen each other. Reason is validated by Existenz 
as well as inspired by it. Without reason Existenz remains passive, 
dormant and non-existent. As divergent powers they are at cross-
purposes with each other and separate only to become symbolic of 
aggressivity.' The modes of Encompassing are the basic realities. One 
must feel each mode, yield to it and awaken it in one's self. To become 
real they have to be lived through. The tension between them constitute 
one's facts of life. 
According to Jaspers Dasein is one's being in the environment we 
react to and act upon. One's vital interests, laws, customs, institutions-
in short a whole culture in which one is a participant is required for this 
world or situation to be 'posited" or apprehended. Desires, drives, tensions, 
hopes, fears and perceptions-one's intentional life is incomprehensible 
outside this participation and engagement.'^ 
1. Jaspers : Reason and Exsistenz, p: 68. 
2. Cooper David E : Existential ism Black well Publishers 1990, p: 72. 
(38) 
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1. Jaspers : Reason and Exsistenz, p: 68. 
2. Cooper David E : Existential ism Black well Publishers 1990, p: 72. 
(38) 
Dasein is also capable of consciousness and it is supposed to be the second 
mode of subjectivity. This state of consciousness disrupts contentment and 
peace and man is shocked to know that all his enterprises will slip into an 
opaque past and what lies ahead of him is an uncertain future and a certain 
death. Consciousness confers on him a sort of plasticity and he is also to 
sense that he is more than a mere particle of nature'. Consciousness at large 
implies in fact the accuracy of cognition. It illuminates ideas, making them 
clear and lucid. It is also distinguished by the stages of its illumination. Thus 
the self-will and the urge to survive is there. According to Jaspers things and 
animals happen to be there without being cognizant of it. Man also happens 
to be there in space but he is aware of it. He can always say "I am". By the 
spell of the world one takes possession of one's being : instead of merely 
enduring one's being one can affirm it as one's own.^  
Jaspers is at once with Husserl in the belief that a person or self retains 
identity over the course of time. In other words the human ego is reduced to 
the transcendental ego\ 
1. Samay : Reason revisited, p. 10. 
2. Jaspers : Philosophical faith and Revelation p. 62. 
3. Cooper David p : 42-43 
(39) 
According to Jaspers man is an incarnate being, yet one is not identical 
witlf orfe's body. He manifests himself in objective fragments and these 
objective aspects are only partially identifiable with one's being. Moreover, 
man is a productive being. One very often tends to equate one's self with 
one's achievements and to evaluate one's self through one's work. Yet 
one is not totally absorbed in one's work and therefore feels alienated 
from it. Man is more than a mere sociable subject. If one is expelled or 
alienated from society one may maintain one's being for one enjoys 
certain rights and is crowned with dignity. One's character is the sum 
total of biological, social, economic and psychological factors. However 
one can shape and fashion one's character according to one's own lights.' 
"I stand above it" as Jaspers puts it. Furthermore one has a certain 
linkage with ones' past and can look ahead to future. Infact one is truly 
oneself when one creates a future by an act of his own discretion. A 
person is thus a contingently existing individual and the subject of 
empirical, psychological investigation. 
1. Samay. p. 37. 38. 
(40) 
The third level is spirit or mind. Jaspers regards it as a synthesis of 
existence and consciousness. Like existence it is something concrete and 
like consciousness in general it is universal in character. The mind is 
animated subjectivity and consciousness at large but it is more sophisticated 
than both.' The subject of the mind is imagination : it carves images and 
confers meaning on them. The objective side of the mind is the force 
which acts in terms of order, measure, and definition. It grapples with 
reality, assimilates experience and eliminates what is alien to it. It 
illuminates in the process of communication. The mind as a whole 
manifests itself in works of art, scientific studies, human wisdom and 
revelations, artistic visions, political perceptions etc.^ this provides the 
context of understanding of the historical epoch. 
The question arises in regard to their relationship and order. Each 
mode of the Encompassing, though it refers to each other, yet has its own 
point of origin. Their relationship is one of supplementation and 
1. Samay, S. p. 45. 
2. Jaspers : Philosophical faith and revelation Harper and Row Publishers 1962 p: 64 
(41) 
accentuation. The relationship of the modes become apparent only if all 
the modes are visualized. 
Each mode of encompassing shows in itself a sort of diversity. 
Consciousness at large, while conceived as one, is manifested in numerous 
thinking entities that share in it. Existenz is either in harmony or at discord 
with other souls. The world in split into many aspects and fields of study. 
Transcendence becomes intelligible to those who hear and see its ciphers. 
The modes of encompassing do not yield a harmonious whole'. 
One wants to transcend the dichotomy of the subject and object, to go 
beneath it and to get to the bottom of things. Two possible ways are there 
for us the first is mystical experience. Mystical union of subject and 
object involves self annihilation and self negation. 
Language ceases to be and so does communication. The second way 
to transcend the split is to comprehend encompassing as such. One 
remains in the subject object split, but it takes us to the point where the 
sense of our condition in encompassing effects a change in us. Thinking 
1. Jaspers : Philosophical faith and Revelation p. 72. 
(42) 
about the modes of encompassing violates the security of ones' natural 
sense of being Our accustomed idiom is to say that we are pulled off our 
feet. Fulfilment by encompassing in which both subject and object are 
present as one- this is what we call faith in the full sense of the word. 
Faith in a broad sense that goes beyond immanence is found in affirming 
Existenz and Transcendence'. 
A critical analysis of Jaspers' concept of Encompassing raises an 
epistemological problem. It may be pointed out that scientific knowledge 
is objective knowledge. The Encompassing in the subject object split 
confers meaning on the objective along with the subjective. If we make a 
comparison with Kant's doctrine of Ideas we find that Kant takes the 
Idea in its objective sense its subjective impulse and as the source of 
systematic investigation. The Idea in this triple implication undergoes 
change of meaning. According to Jaspers the Encompassing finds its 
illumination in the split and it is supposed to be the ground of the moving 
force and the goal in all its aspects : it never exhausts itself. The Encompassing 
1. Ibid p: 79. 
(43) 
is present in the object and in the subject as also in their mutual 
relationship.' 
Knauss is of the view that Jaspers' seven modes of the Encompassing 
do not exhibit a clear connection or order. Consciousness as such emerges 
as the all embracing structure of our selves as thinking beings. It is still 
one of the modes of encompassing. The number of the modes seems 
arbitrary. Thus there is one Transcendence, one world, one consciousness 
as such but many Existenzen and existences. Jaspers defends his position 
by saying that he was opposed to any kind of derivation. It is not a definite 
stand point that gives rise to the seven modes but the conscious perception 
of each mode is latent in the process of transcending the subject-object 
splits It may be added that the modes of the Encompassing are the 
figures in which the whole image of Being has been contrived ever since 
the beginning of western philosophy. They have been called by 
many names : matter, life, logos, apeiron, spirit, will, God, nature, idea, 
cosmos, existence and so on. 
1. Schilpp p-A the philosophy of karl Jaspers Tudor Publishing Company 1957 
p: 790-91. 
2. Ibid p : 791 
(44) 
Though Jaspers thinks that each mode is an Encompassing in itself, 
yet he insists that they should not be separated, for otherwise they 
diffuse themselves into all types of isms : materialism, idealism, vitalism, 
intellectualism, and cosmism. Such isolations are the work of the 
intellect which is a reductionist faculty and hence Reason is called upon 
to unite them.' 
The aim of insisting on the subject-object dichotomy as the basic 
situation of our knowledge invites us to look for being beyond this split. 
If Being cannot be thought or spoken of Jaspers seems to think that one 
is able to read certain 'signs' or ciphers which somehow indicate its 
character. Jaspers admires those mystics who try to overcome this 
fissure in favour of a total oneness of subject and object through the 
disappearance of objectivity and the extinction of the ego.' They think 
that being can be neither an object nor a subject, but must be the 
encompassing which appears in the form of the fissure. 
1. Samay S p : 64 
2. Cooper p: 82 
(45) 
David Cooper seems to think that Jaspers' argument for the 
conclusion that being consists neither in subject nor object, but in some 
kind of ground on which this distinction appears is weak. Jaspers seems 
to think that one is able to read certain ciphers which somehow indicate 
its character. 
According to Jaspers "the Encompassing is thought as being itself, 
transcendence (God), the world, and that which we ourselves are : life 
consciousness in general, spirit and Existenz. This, according to David / 
Cooper, does not provide a substitute for the Existentialist attempt to 
dissolve the dichotomy.. What Jaspers is doing is to describe the world 
and ourselves in ways that are free of dichotomy. Jaspers holds that one's 
thought and speech are constrained by the subject-object distinction!. 
Though Jaspers has not been very successful in resolving the subject object 
dichotomy, yet his concept of Encompassing serves as a basis for 
penetrating the three realms of Being world, Existenz and Transcendence. 
1. Cooper p : 82. 
(46) 
II 
THE CONCRETE SITUATION 
An understanding of the concept of boundary situations is most 
essential for determining the climate of Jaspers' philosophizing. The 
situations which are felt, experienced and conceived at the limit of one's 
existence are termed boundary situations. Experiences like death, suffering 
and guilt are discussed under the heading "boundary situations".' 
The first section of the chapter on boundary situation in Karl Jaspers' 
seminal book 'philosophic' is entitled 'situation'. The term situation 
defines various complex and profound conditions. The simplest kind of 
situation distributes physical objects in space. As an empirical being one 
is related to such a kind of situation.^ This also involves other people's 
interests and combinations or chances of the moment. 
"It is a sense related reality neither psychological nor physical but 
both in one. It is the concrete reality which means advantage or 
detriment, opportunity or obstacle for my existence".^ 
1. Latzel Edwin : the concept of ultimate situations in Jaspers' philosophy in "The 
philosophy of Jaspers" ed. by Schilpp, P.A. 184. 
2. Grimsley R : Existentialist thought 174. 
3. Jaspers: Philosophy, vol. II. p. 177. 
(47) 
Unlike some other existentialists, Jaspers catalogues many levels of 
situations. One may discern the economic and political structure of a 
society, the conditioning power of a scientific outlook and techniques 
relevant to it and the potentialities produced by the cultural relations 
among men.' One investigates either universal typical situations or 
historically determined non-recurrent ones.^ 
A situation becomes unique and significant when it is personally 
embraced and accepted as the inevitable feature of the human condition.^ 
Yet one's knowledge of the situation is always inadequate. It is only the 
unconcerned observer who is able to comprehend the situation though 
not in all its aspects. 
A situation exists in terms of the law of change. One can grasp the 
laws which control the situation and thereby change and produce the 
desired situation." One can for instance, create situations in technological, 
1. Grimsley R : Existentialist thought 174. 
2. Latzel Edwin : The concept of ultimate situations in Jaspers philosophy in "The 
philosophy of Jaspers" ed. by Schilpp, P.A. 187. 
3. Grimsley p : 174. 
4. Latzel E : p : 187. 
(48) 
legal and political sphere. The same situation will assume an entirely different 
character when others contemplate and react to it. This is a crucial aspect of 
the situation. 
Since existence implies the fact of being involved in situations one cannot 
leave one situation without entering into another. Moreover to be placed in a 
situation has a wider meaning than to be placed in the world, although situations 
cannot be separated from their worldly context. It is the particular sphere in 
which man's activities are displayed and his welfare enhanced or endangered. 
Jaspers shows man's active role in a given situation, for here he makes 
full use of his potentialities. He takes the situation in his hand, chooses a 
definite line of action and thus modifies the situation. 
There are, however, some situations which are more urgent and challenging 
than all the rest and these are termed "boundary situations." They differ from 
ordinary situations in the sense that they do not undergo any change. They 
are like a wall against which we collide and shatter. We cannot alter them but 
only make them passable. They are thus inevitable.' 
1. GrimsleyR:p: 174. 
(49) 
Boundary situations form an essential constituent of human existence 
itself. Man lives and like every other living being is subject to death. He 
experiences joy and sorrow.' One attempts to avoid, ignore and forget these 
situations even though one finds oneself constantly delivered up to them. 
The third section of the chapter on 'boundary situation"* is entitiled 
'boundary situation and Existenz' which implies that to experience 
boundary situation and to exist is one and the same thing. In other words 
one achieves authentic existence when one envisages these situations 
without any pretence. 
It is potential Existenz which responds actively to the demands of the 
boundary situation and makes us walk open-eyed into them. A sort of 
tension is generated because on the one hand there are a number of 
possibilities at our disposal and, on the other, the situation stands as an 
insurmountable barrier.^ It is in this crisis that the meaning of the 
conflict becomes poignantly clear. 
1. LatzelEdwin:p: 188. 
2. Jaspers : Philosophy vol. II translated by Ashton E. B. The University of Chicago prest 
1932 p : 179 
(50) 
Now the boundary situation is very precarious because it is upto us to 
give meaning to it by assuming it as our own. It places the absolute choice 
of gaining or losing oneself. And it is precisely at these crucial moments 
that one is able to test one's authenticity. 
In boundary situations authentic reality is revealed as if by a leap. 
This is fulfilled by three stages and forms the subject of the fourth section. 
In the first form of the leap one deviates from the immediate practical 
interests and becomes an unconcerned observer who wishes to know what 
has gone wrong with himself and with the world "I even face my own 
existence as if it were a stranger's.' 
In view of the fragmentary and doubtful world one postpones one's 
pre-occupations and suspends all activities, thereby engaging oneself in 
experimenting with a clear eye. To quote Jaspers, "whatever happens in 
the world is doubtful, everything fades away, my own existence included; 
but I stand outside the world, a place from which I aimlessly gaze upon 
the world as on a billowing atmosphere without limits".^ 
1. Jaspers : Philosophy vol. II. p : 179-180. 
2. Jaspers : Philosophy, vol. II. p. 179-80. 
(51) 
The knowledge which one acquires obviously refers to a knowledge 
which is purely factual and descriptive, th i s comes as a gift of the 
substantial solitude and serves as one's only safe point of anchorage 'an 
isle of safety in mid ocean'. One is thus on the mundane plane. 
The first leap is merely a preliminary step in self elucidation. One is 
still anchored on to existence. The germ of Existenz, however, incites 
existence in the furtherance of its quest. To be more explicit, it is the 
achievement of Existenz which spurs existence to move ahead. "My conception 
of the completed way prepared me rather to re-enter the world".' 
The world ceases to be an indifferent object of knowledge because 
existence is immersed in it. One captures the knowledge about the world 
without which one would remain enmeshed in obscurity. Nevertheless one 
draws a sharp line of demarcation between the being of the world and 
Existenz. The former can be glossed over as a specific dimension of being 
but one cannot do away with the latter. 
The boundary situations which were earlier vanquished now become 
1. Jaspers : Philosophy vol. II. p : 180. 
(52) 
worth consideration. They compel us to choose whether we venture to 
expose ourselves to their authentic reality and thus realize ourselves or 
sink in to mere existence. Here one is supposed to clinch the choice 
instead of merely imagining the different possibilities. 
In this second leap the boundary situations which were earlier veiled 
now become crystallized. The time is ripe for the illumination of Existenz. 
Yet this is merely the contemplative state, a sheer possibility. "It is not 
yet Existenz".' 
It is the third and decisive leap that leads from potential to real 
Existenz. Unlike finite situations which are piecemeal and fragmentary 
like keeping promises, loyalty to an oath, fidelity to truth, boundary 
situations are infinite and involve Existenz as a whole. The leap from 
mere existence to genuine Existenz means a real transformation of 
being. One is able to say 'I myself in a new sense.^ There is however no 
mechanical growth of existence. It is a deliberate, conscious effort and 
1. Jaspers : Philosophy vol. II. p : 181. 
2. Ibid. 181 
(53) 
decision that leads from 'heretofore' to a 'hereafter'. Existenz is defined 
as supratemporal in the sense that it stands for all such values as honesty, 
justice, truth, generosity and these values being valid for all times make 
Existenz eternally valid too. 
According to Jaspers the first boundary situation places man in a 
concrete human situation. The fact that he exists in a certain social 
milieu, at a certain time in history, belongs to a particular nation, is a 
member of a specific family, is a man or a woman young or old in short 
that he is not a man in general places him in a concrete situation. 
This way of conceiving the situation determines how one stands in 
relation to a particular situation. What is general about the situation 
depends on the bearings one takes from the physical world. One is not 
finally dissolved into the universal but remains perched on the concrete 
situation. It is this insoluble remainder that makes existence profound. 
Intellectually speaking, one cannot construe this as a boundary situation 
because intellectual knowledge is discursive, relative and inaccurate. 
Hence the boundary situation remains concealed. 
(54) 
Jaspers also goads man to deal with his definite situation actively, 
clearly and consciously and accept it as one's own. The place which a 
particular situation holds in the general scheme of things is derived fi-om 
destiny. Nevertheless, if we are supposed to draw forth this destiny from 
this general whole, Existenz is lost. Jaspers invites the reader to 
participate with him in a groping for a sure foundation for Existenz. In 
this quest universal historicity is recognized as the ground of Existenz. 
The essential features of historicity are concreteness and determination. 
Self-determination becomes the basis for the unfolding of the highest 
potentialities of man. As a matter of fact the decisive turn given to 
determination as 'seizing potential Existenz' makes the future as 
important a dimension of historicity as is the past. This ground is in 
individual phenomena of objectivity, that is, historicity appearing in the 
objectivity of the past, in the forms of historical knowledge and 
speculations on the meaning of history as a whole. It is also seized and 
enriched by subjectivity.' 
1. Henning J : Jaspers' attitude towards history in "The philosophy of Jaspers" ed. by 
Schilpp, P.A. 569. 
(55) 
A situation, Jaspers proclaims, is barred by 'resistance' and confinement 
and binds us to mere possibilities. Jaspers has imagined two ideal cases 
of freedom. In one we achieve absolute control over all opposition. For 
instance, the material coerces us when we sit down to make use of it; We 
over come our sense of repulsion. Hence living organisms and plants are 
used as nutriment and individuals are treated as mere automata. 
Moreover, when one steps on the threshold of life it almost, always 
develops contrary to one's expectations. One meets this opposition by 
contriving one's life in a most agreeable and decent manner. One aspires 
to create for oneself Heaven on Earth and in this attempt to secure 
perfect felicity uses those inferior to oneself as tools for the realization 
of one's ends. The latter then cannot exercise their independent wills, 
cannot take an initiative and are entirely at the mercy of their superiors. 
Such people express themselves in open rebellion and refuse to be 
subservient to any authority. One contrives ingenious devices— train-
ing, habituation and instruction to actualize one's purpose. Hence through 
cultivation they force them to subordinate their wills and in return assign 
(56) 
them a freedom which is only marginal. 
The second ideal case of freedom signifies complete harmony and soli-
darity. In this case the independence of both individuals is vouchsafed 
for. They are agreed on all vital issues and join hands in undertaking any 
enterprise. Both are boderline cases. There are bound to be discrepancies 
among individuals save when suitable conditions are contrived which will 
harmonize the force of resistance and bring temporary corrigibility within 
it. The contingent character of reality would offer resistance even if its 
elements were fully controlled. 
Though Jaspers conceives these two concepts —freedom as an imperious 
force, and freedom as an ideal and absolute accord, simultaneously, yet 
he is of the view that both, these cases would erode Existenz. 
Existenz becomes profound when the situation is elucidated by a 
break-through. This certainly does not imply that one has spurned the 
resistance and achieved accord and harmony. The only import of it is 
that ample choice is available and one is able to sift the truth which lies 
in this situation alone. One's choice is guided by a definite line of action 
(57) 
and one is confronted with a concrete situation. In this choice one either 
freely accepts or rejects one's definite existence as one's own. But one 
cannot provide plausible reasons for one's choice. 
Jaspers declares that every individual is defined by his background. 
Objectively speaking one's existence depends on the fact that one's 
parents have met, got married and this is determined by heredity, 
education and economic circumstances. One looks for one's origination 
and learns that it has followed upon a certain process of evolution-birth. 
One's personality make-up is the gift of one's parents' guidance and 
ministration. One is linked to one's parents by the strongest and most 
genuine ties. This is peculiar of all forms of communication and even if 
the situation compels us to infringe upon it our love and our reverence 
for them remains the same whether we enjoy life or decry it. 
This relationship to one's parents demands a sense of fidelity to it. 
One cannot ignore it, transgress or alter it even if it appears odd or 
discomforting. It allows no substitutes. Yet it is not offered as something 
one has not toiled for. 
(58) 
Existenz is won when we comprehend the fact that there exists an 
indissoluble bond between oneself and one's parents and one owes a 
solemn commitment to it. If one tries to dispense with it one is destroying 
and cancelling the roots of one's being. This family background intrudes 
upon us as a boundary situation which both narrows us down and 
enlarges us. 
The random coincidences of life also encroach upon us in the form of 
the boundary situation of chance. What vocation one chooses, what goal 
one pursues, what religion and ideology one believes in depends to a 
large extent on the social and economic set-up in which one finds oneself 
placed. One's love for the partner of one's life depends on a fortuitous 
meeting. 
In the course of action chance may neither be yielded to, nor 
vanquished. It is not merely decisive or whimsical but something to be 
accommodated within life. At the time of option one falls a prey to it or 
ascertains the particulars with which one is concerned. But this absolute 
necessity is sometimes treated as a chance. One behaves capriciously 
(59) 
seeking release from it by way of the other i.e. from random chance by 
the idea of necessity and from relentless necessity by the idea of chance. 
This precarious state will come to an end only when the vicissitudes 
are willingly embraced with a view to over/coming the breach made by 
chance and necessity. One is deeply immersed in the circumstances of 
life so much so that good or bad will cease to be antagonistic and one is 
preoccupied with the idea of one's fate. 
Jaspers asserts that one is firmly rooted in one's historic situation. 
Historicity in the philosophy of Jaspers signifies a certain sumptuousness 
of existence. It also implies a synthesis of freedom and necessity. 
Although man is always projecting himself in to the future, yet he is one 
who has stemmed from a particular situation and who is a product of a 
specific environment. 
Historicity also refers to a union of time and eternity. The implication 
of it is that one stands above time though not outside it. This sense of 
historicity makes us cognizant of fate itself. There are seeming obstacles 
that stand between one's own self and one's sense of fate. The universal 
(60) 
values and truths come into conflict in our individual case. They have to 
be undermined for one's own good. However, absolute particularity 
stripped of the universals is a mere empty concept. Similarly, the 
universals entirely separated from the particulars are mere abstractions. 
Jaspers proposes different approaches to life and rejects each one of 
them. For example, the theoretical view holds good in science but this 
cannot be conceded as relevant to the best way of living. The perfectionist 
view has a bearing upon short-term aims. The existentialist view is that 
one must affirm one's particular situation, accept historicity and thus 
win Existenz. 
As referred to earlier, Jaspers subsumes death under the concept of the 
boundary situation. To neglect it is to ignore one of the most significant aspects 
of life. Death is a piquant reminder that our wisdom and power are strictly 
limited. Death as an objective fact of existence is not a boundary situation. 
Man no doubt shares the fact of dying with the animals but is distinguished 
from them by his capacity to anticipate and dread its approach.' 
1. Allen E.L. The self and its hazards, p : 33. 
(61) 
Although man knows about his death, yet he is unaware of its definite 
time. Despite the certainty of death man unconsciously seeks to avoid it. 
He endeavours to prolong life and struggles to maintain and extend the 
bounds of his existence. Time and again he is struck by the transient 
nature of things and each time he shies away from this thought. 
One is inclined to concur with Heidegger, "As soon as a man enters 
life he is old enough to die". He relates death to care. Facticity, the 
moment in care, concedes that it is prior to the self. From the very 
beginning of life, the human existence is already involved in the situation 
of mortality. Death is and will remain part of the factual human 
condition. Care also implies 'falling into the impersonal collectivism of 
'they'. This is reflected in the everyday attitude to death which is one of 
flight and avoidance.' 
Jaspers maintains that the definite boundary situation is either ones 
own death or of some near and dear one. The death of a loved one is a 
traumatic experience. It results in a total break of communication, a 
1. Macquarrie J : Existentialism, p. 197. 
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rupture in friendship and love. We experience a profound sense of grief, 
for it is an irredeemable loss. We are over whelmed by a deep feeling of 
isolation after we have parted from the dead person. 
We meet death with an avowal of loyalty. We try to remain true to the 
dead person by cherishing his memory in our hearts. We would try to 
live up to his ideals and prize his values most. In short he is existentially 
present though death has severed all communicative ties with him. As 
Jaspers puts it, "yearning may crush me when I stay behind alone, the 
parting may be physically unbearable and yet these are phenomena of 
being sheltered'"... We are mere existence when we are thus solaced. 
Death is encountered on its true plane when it is regarded as the dawning 
of a new life or another birth. It is as if we have taken a leap onwards. To 
quote Jaspers, "This leap is like the birth of a new life. Death has been 
received in to my life... has ceased to be just an empty abyss. It is as though in 
death I were no longer forsaken".^  A sober serenity thus seeps into our being. 
1. Jaspers philosophy Vol. II p : 194. 
2. Jaspers : Philosophy. Vol. II. p. 194. 
(63) 
For Jaspers the crucial boundary situation is one's own death. It is 
only when one realizes that 'I must' die that one is able to comprehend 
this annulled event. It is by this unique experience that one faces the last 
hazard. One clings to life no matter how wretched and worth/less it be 
Death, on the contrary, revokes every possibility of requital, and 
threatens to cast one's existence into nothingness. 
Jaspers maintains taciturnity as to the question of what will follow 
after death. Hence he remarks, 'the rest is silence'. This Shakespearian 
idea of silence alludes to an ignorance of what will befall us after we are 
dead. Death throws a challenge to us in the sense that one has to face the 
trial of death while one is still alive. 
This silence is impregnated with meaning in Sartre's thought, too. In a 
beautiful simile he calls death 'the final chord of a melody'. To quote 
Sartre, "An end of a melody in order to confer its meaning on the melody 
must emanate from the melody itself. A death....will therefore resemble 
a resolved chord but will not be one, just as the group of letters formed 
by the falling of alphabet blocks will perhaps resemble a word but will 
(64) 
not be one"' To be more precise the melody looks towards silence or the 
exhaustion of sound which follows from it. But the silence is inherent in 
the resolved chord as its meaning. In other words we may say that the 
melody without the help of words does convey meaning. Hence death is 
the meaning of life as the resolved chord is the meaning of the melody.^ 
Heidegger also seems to think that death is inherent in the Dasein, 
though it is neither completed nor fulfilled in death, as a work of art is 
finished or fulfilled in itself. The end of Dasein is present to it from the 
beginning. 
Heidegger calls death as Dasein' supreme possibility to which all 
others are subordinated. There is a kind of hierarchy of possibilities with 
death occupying the key position.^ Moreover, death is something that 
everyone must take upon oneself. It is 'own most' because it is not 
delegatable. This, his critics argue, is either false or trivial. That it is 
false is shown by cases like Sydney Carton's standing in for Charles 
1. Sartre : Being and Nothingness, p. 537. 
2. Chorn J : Death and Western thought New York Collier Books 1963 p. 234. 
3. Macquarrie p. 196. 
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Darney at the scaffold. Carton could not die Darney's death in the sense 
that he could wear his hat. Secondly, is it not absurd to describe death as 
a possibility unless one believes as Heidegger does not that there is also 
the possibility of immortality.' 
What these critics ignore is that the death Heidegger describes as one's 
'own most' possibility is not the event of one's demise but what he calls 
ones' being towards death. It is a living in relation to the prospect of 
death and not one's execution which is one's 'own most' possibility-
which people fail to take up preferring to be 'distracted' against the pros-
pects of their deaths.-
According to Jaspers the success and prosperity that we ascribe to 
life dwindles away little by little. What seems like a goal i'^  merely the 
steppingstone of life. If one plays the most active role in life and aspires 
for some decisive end one is soliciting one's own death. Death no doubt 
has some sort of impetuosity about it but Existenz is the essential limit 
of its possible completion. 
1. Cooper David E : Existentialism. 
2. Blackwell Publisher Basil p. 137. 
(66) 
According to Heidegger death is the end of one's possibilities which 
ultimately makes life meaningful. Death is, on the one hand the end of 
life, but sometimes it seems that it is also the goal of life. This ambiguity 
persists through Sein und Zeit, but in his later writings, death does 
become the goal of life and not just a threat to it.' 
In the boundary situation death remains an irrevocable fact but our 
attitude towards it keeps on changing as we renew it through out our life. 
It is quite possible that one fails to unravel the enigma of death but also 
feels attracted towards it. A man may adhere to life and prefer any kind 
of existence to total annihilation. Such an ambivalent attitude to death is 
inconsistent and self contradictory. Death becomes profound when it is 
embraced single mindedly and also when it is not sought after as a 
refuge. It is then that it becomes dearer than life. 
It is significant to note that whereas Heidegger bears close resem-
blance to Jaspers' thought Sartre offers a contrast to him. Heidegger's 
answer to death seems to be incidental to his main philosophical quest 
1. Solomon R :L From Rationalism to Existentialism, p. 226. 
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the question of the meaning of being. It is Dasein the human way of 
being the concrete individual that is to be questioned in relation to the 
meaning of Being.' 
According to Heidegger the in authentic mode of existence reduces 
death to a biological occurrence, makes us evade the subject of death and 
treat it in a trivial manner. The authentic existence responds to the call of 
conscience, faces the most important choice to be made between authen-
ticity and its opposite and thus frees itself from the tyranny of das Man.^ 
Sartre, on the contrary, does not stoop to death. He treats death with 
bitter scorn. He is agitated with the thought of death, therefore he 
ridicules it when he says that man can be compared to one who is 
condemned to death amidst others standing in the same queue. He, 
however, musters up enough courage to make a fine show on the gallows 
but in the meantime dies of influenza.^ Sartre's defiant attitude is in sharp 
contrast to Jaspers" smug placid acceptance of death. 
1. Chorn J : Death and Western Thought, p. 230-31. 
2. Solomon R. p. 227. 
3. Sartre : Being and Nothingness, p. 533. Harper and Row. 
(68) 
The second boundary situation, according to Jaspers, is suffering. 
Suffering, as Jaspers understood it, is a trial which everyone is supposed 
to face and which shatters all human endeavour. Suffering is education, 
says Plato. It keeps man away from laxity and indolence. It is also in the 
nature of punishment and serves as a deterrent.' 
Jaspers maintains that the natural reaction to suffering is to eradicate 
it at all costs. Everyone participates in this campaign and with all the 
mean at one's command. The outcome is always contrary to one's 
expectations because the success achieved is meagre. Still man deludes 
himself with cherishing the hope that technical competence which has 
made big strides in this direction can help in eliminating all suffering 
one day.^ As a necessary concomitant of it, death, too, will be a painless 
fading of light which is neither feared nor desired. 
There is an evasion of the boundary situation of suffering when we do 
not accept suffering though recognizing it as a necessary datum. "We 
1. Jaspers : Pliilosphical faith and Revelation Publishers N. York p. 245. 1967. 
2. Knudsen R.D. The idea of Transcendence in Jaspers philosophy p. 9. 
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repudiate it by showing the absence of suffering among animals simply 
because they do not react like human beings. Still another evasion of 
suffering is brought to view when one stubbornly refuses to comprehend 
it. For instance, we do not allow the doctor to tell the truth about our 
disease, do not take notice of what troubles us, do not admit our mental 
and physical ailments etc. 
Regarding the suffering of others one behaves selfishly even cruelly. 
To quote Jaspers', "I evade suffering by keeping my distance, by with-
drawing in good time if his misery becomes incurable .... I grow indifferent 
and inconsiderate, indeed 1 despise and finally loath the sufferer, just as 
some animals are inclined to torture their sick fellows to death".' 
Jaspers treats suffering on an empirical basis and confines himself to 
a descriptive analysis of it. Nicholai Hartmann, on the contrary, considers t 
it as a value. But to discuss its negative aspect may prove its worth. For 
instance, one who is incapable of bearing grief feels shattered if a 
misfortune befalls him. On the other hand, one who has a capacity for 
1. Jaspers : philosophy. Vol. II. p. 203. 
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endurance is sustained by it. His perseverance, patience and steadfastness 
grow under its impact. For Hartmann, suffering means the pulsation of 
our innermost being, the unearthing of the depths of our nature, the 
actualization of our noblest energies.' 
Death and suffering are boundary situations to which one is exposed 
inspite of oneself. Struggle and guilt, one the other hand, are situations 
which we ourselves contrive and bring into being. Evasion is not feasible 
because existence entails our participation in them.^ Struggle, as political 
realists from Heraclitus and Callicles to Machiavelli and Nietzsche ha; 
recognized, is an inevitable feature of Hfe^ 
Jaspers recognizes two forms of struggle. At the empirical level it is 
waged for physical and psychological superiority—a fight for power. In 
the first instance, to live at all is to occupy useful space, to eat while 
others remain hungry, and to hold a position that others aspire to. Hence 
1. Hartmann N : Ethics Vol. II. p. 139. 
2. Latzel Edwin : Tlie concept of ultimate situations in Jaspers' philosophy in "The 
philosophy of Jaspers" ed by Schilpp. P.A. 
3. Wallraff C : Karl Jaspers Anintroduction to his philosophy princition University 
Press, New Jessey 1970 p. 150. 
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such emotions as envy, malice, jealousy, spite will endure as long as the 
earth is populated.' More often than not this is the struggle which the 
individual wages unknowingly. It happens when the groups, social 
orders and states carry it out for him. 
This is the case when the conflict is so acute that even a trial of strength 
cannot settle it. Hence one of them get the support of a whole group which 
considers the freedom and comfort of a few individuals only. He profits 
himself at the price of exploiting others. The average individual, on the 
whole, suffers on account of these power relationships. 
Struggle is often ignored or explained away by members of the upper 
classes, by whom food, shelter, clothing and gainful employment are taken 
for granted, until large-scale disturbances such as economic depression, 
wars, momentary instability and mass civil disobedience force it to their 
unwilling attention.^ However, socio-economic knowledge and individual 
differences show that the very existence of the intelligentsia and the 
1. WallraffC: Karl Jaspers: An introduction to his PHilosophy. p. 151. 
2. Ib idp: 151 
(72) 
cultural values which they cherish depend upon the dull and unrewarding 
labour of the congenitally incompetent persons.' 
"The premise is always a cruel one and at crucial points violent 
exploitation which the individual need not consciously know about, since 
others accomplish it for him. The individual merely consumes what comes 
to him by right from somewhere, not in payment of any material service 
rendered on his part".^ 
The boundary situation is conceded when one imagines the state of 
affairs as harmonious and seeks to approach everyone on the basis of 
peace and equality. One is contented so long as the real situation is 
concealed and tends to misrepresent the character of struggle as efficacious. 
In other words one covers up the situation and puts a blank on the face of 
the struggle. 
There is an empirical fact which shows that only in small groups or 
enclaves—the family, the church, the small homogeneous community-
1. WallraffC. p : 151. 
2. Jaspers philosophy, vol. II. p. 207. 
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do we find reciprocal cooperation. Where huge organizations are 
concerned, it is only the slow tempo of the struggle which gives the 
illusion of lasting peace.' 
"It is only the slowness of the gradual process, the silent sinking at 
the end, which hides the battles, the triumphs and annihilations from an 
eye trained to see only suddenness and pathos. Eventually the sole reality 
appears to be the peaceful blossoming and multiplying of the survivors".^ 
There is a striking similarity between Jaspers' views and those expressed 
by Marx- in an even more distinct and pronounced way than Jaspers. 
According to Marx classes occupy dissimilar places in production. One of them 
is dominant, the other subordinate. The exercise of domination is a question of 
material production. It is competition which has placed the subordinate class 
in the most inhuman situation. The worker is the slave of the property-
holding class, rises and falls like a commodity. If the demand for workers 
increases, the price of workers rises, if it falls, their price falls.-' 
1. WallraffC. p. 151. 
2. Jaspers : philosophy Vol. II. p. 207. 
3. Labica G : Marxism and the status of philosophy, The Warveston Press Sussex p. 247. 
(74) 
It is Marx's hypothesis that human productive activity in every sphere 
of life, and not only in the economic realm, is alienated labour. It is so 
because work is not voluntary but it is imposed and forced labour. The 
compulsion that curbs spontaneous, free and creative activity turns it 
into alienated labour is the need to accumulate wealth.' 
The boundary situation of struggle is concealed when one acts as if 
the struggle does not exist or looks upon power and struggle as things to 
be vanquished. Here one adopts a partial view and becomes indifferent 
to the waste, disintegration, chaos and anarchy which are abundantly 
found in life. One views struggle as healthy competition and believes 
life to eventuate into coherence, cohesion and harmony. 
"But there will be occasions when I scent threatening perils, when I 
get nervous and feel vaguely oppressed as it becomes clear that lawlessness 
and strife may be insoluble. Or I may calm down when I do not feel imperilled, 
living in fact by combat constellation that favour me, I may again believe 
in a life without combat".^ 
1. Tucker R : Philophy and Myth in K. Marx. p. 136. 
2. Jaspers : philosophy Vol. II. p. 207. 
(75) 
Jaspers maintains that the boundary situation is veiled when we 
remain passive and do not use force even in self defence. Such an 
extreme kind of non-resistance and submission is not conceivable unless 
of course one surrenders one's own existence. Diametrically opposed to 
this is the view that power is of supreme worth and should be one's 
target at all costs and at every critical juncture of one's life. It is the 
attainment of power which embellishes human existence and it is what 
confers value on it. This affirmation of struggle for struggle's sake means 
the fulfilment of Existenz. 
The boundary situation of struggle is explained away by an appeal to 
reason. One entertains the false notion that perfect reasoning can chalk 
out an ideal programme for human existence. Thus true justice might 
prevail, power will become an agency for realizing the right, righteousness 
would be put in/to actual practice. Furthermore, power might become an 
intelligent force and a safeguard of justice. 
One aims at a new order but it will be pernicious and maintained by 
the same threat of force and by similar laws. Only it is upheld and 
(76) 
enforced by new sovereigns. Everyone is conscious of it, but everyone 
pretends to be oblivious of it in so far as he is himself well-off. Each one 
profits by it and favours it in so far as his vested interests are served by 
it. In an unpropitious position one bears it disadvantages as long as they 
foreshadow optimum prospects. 
Marx, in the German Ideology, says that there is a dichotomy in the 
midst of the dominant class between material and mental labour. Every 
dominant class possesses its band of workers, clerics statemen, jurists, 
moralists. They may or may not perform their function, but it is they who 
provide the cloak beneath which the industrialist profits from the labour 
of others and circulates wealth which he has not created. The capitalist 
needs the judge first of all to ensure that the law which serves his class is 
held in general awe, and then to flatter him with the illusion that it will 
eternally prevail.' 
It is Jaspers' conviction that no definite peaceful state of human affairs 
exists nor is such an ideal state credible. Moreover, the boundary 
1. Lobica G : marxism and the Status of philosophy, p. 295. 
(77) 
€ 
situation provides no permanent solution. The so-called solutions are only 
of an ad hoc nature and provisional. Struggle there is beyond all dispute, 
the pertinent question that remain to be asked is. How and by what means 
should we struggle, when to benefit from it, and precisely how long should 
we suffer and endure ? 
Along with death, struggle and suffering guilt stands as the fourth 
situation of extremity. Jaspers discusses it in connection with 'defiance' 
and 'the passion for the night' which are two specific modes of linkage 
between Existenz and Transcendence, Jaspers also refers to the revolt of 
Prometheus—the myth of an immemorial guilt of becoming human. This 
reminds us of the Biblical fall of man. Here also knowledge drives Adam 
out of paradise.' 
Guilt is an inevitable feature of human existence whether one acts or 
does not act. Every action that one performs for one's means of 
livelihood, for survival, sustainment and growth results in the other's 
deprivation, elimination and displacement. No doubt one is guilty through 
1. Allen E.L : The self and its hazards, n. 36. 
(78) 
the very fact of being finite. Furthermore, one's engagement and pre-
occupation with life's trivialities is tainted with guilt. For example if a 
young girl witnesses the T.V. plays table tennis and goes out with her 
friends she cannot lend a helping hand to her mother which she is 
supposed to do. 
Again and again one incurs guilt because every affirmation of one's 
freedom and thereby every choice that one makes rule out other 
possibilities. For instance, a working woman chooses to be fair to the 
claims of her family she cannot justify her job in a way in which she is 
supposed to do. Often one is haunted by the fear that perhaps one's love 
is too selfish. Politics and business as well as war thrust upon us an 
impure motive. To deter from action is guilt beyond question, an evasion 
which in itself is a kind of decision. Moreover, action involves a sort of 
self-deprivation. 
Kierkegaard envisages the problem of guilt thus. Aesthetically 
considered the dialectic of guilt is this' the individual is innocent. In the 
daily routme of life, in business, in the common daily intercourse of life 
(79) 
one man is held guilty in this respect, another in that. Thus innocence 
and guilt are alternate determinants of life. 
Kierkegaard maintains that in the ethico-religious sphere man feels 
quilt as a burden which one carries from place to place from which one 
never gets out. Unlike the beast of burden, from which the burden is 
sometimes taken off, unlike the labourer, who once in a while enjoys 
freedom. Not even at night does he get out of the harness".' 
According to Hartmann, the phenomenon of the consciousness of guilt 
does not consiiiate the basis of an independent argument. It is akin to the 
phenomenon of responsibility and accountability. One can either assume 
or absolve responsibility but one cannot shrug guilt off one's shoulders. 
Like Jaspers, Hartmann also thinks that guilt always follows as a consequence 
and exists in moral transgression. 
Guilt implies authorship, not of some moral agency or invisible power, 
but man is his own monitor. It is a power that gets accentuated within 
1. Kierkegaard : Concluding unscientific postscript, p. 475. Princeton University Press 
1941. 
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man himself, speaks out to the moral consciousness something over which 
man has no control.' It weighs so heavily upon man that he bends under 
its strain. It can drive man to pain, misery, anguish and confession. The 
feeling of guilt is not something anticipated but it is very much there. "It 
bursts in upon a man like fate. He makes no mistake about the guilt. It is 
suddenly there, judging , contradicting over powering".^ 
According to Jaspers one might reconcile oneself to conflict, pain and 
death if one could hope to preserve a clear conscience. But what one 
does not intend and can not condone are often laid at one's door.^ 
1. Hartmann : Ethics. Vol. II. p. 172. 
2. Ibid p : 173. 
3. Wallraff C : Jaspers : An introudction. p. 156. 
(81) 
Ill 
THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT 
Jaspers in his two books "The way to Wisdom" and "The perennial 
scope of philosopy" discusses man as we envisage him ie concrete, 
finite and temporal. His psychological make-up includes his descent 
and parentage, natural endowment, the situation in which he is placed, 
the blind natural processes and death. 
Man's finiteness further implies his dependence on the historical 
world order produced by human Golleetivity.' It is only man whose 
finiteness involves him in history in which he realizes his potentialities. 
Man's historicity is from the outset multiple historicity. First, it is 
objective history presented in re-collection and documentation. The 
basic feature of history is that it constitutes a transition. In history 
nature is present at every moment. It is the reality that changes very 
slowly and unconsciouly like nature. But once spirit comes in, 
1. Jasper's: Perenial scope of philosophy translated by Manheim RNew York 1949 
p: 62- 63. 
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consciousness, reflection and unceasing movement are entailed by it. 
The more decisive, single and less identical repetition there is, the 
more authentic does history become. Authentic truth, however, is related 
to that permanency which is not duration in time, but time effacing 
eternity. This truth one meets in the present, in one's own transition 
and not in imitation of the identical repetition of phenomena.' 
Secondly, it is the unity of the history of mankind. The implication 
of it is that though there are many peoples, many cultures and a 
multiplicity of historical facts, yet men are always concerned with each 
other. They are always interested in one another, confront one another, 
learn from one another. Moreover, in the choice of one's future course 
one is motivated by the past. One admits the guilt of past actions, 
conditions, motivations and decisions of the past so that one may find 
the way to truth. Changed views of the past come from a will to make 
the right decision now, in a new situation. Mere presentation of 
history turns into responsible historic consciousness, the expression of 
1. Jaspers: Origin and goal of history translated by Bullock M. New Haven Yale University 
Press, ]953p:243,45 
(83) 
a will to be either noble or mean, truthful or reprehensible.' One's 
theoretical knowledge of history becomes meaningful when its thought 
contents put up a challenge before us or make an appeal to us. Thus 
in obedience to the existential call the individual fufils his sense of 
historicity by expanding so that it is subsumed in the all embracing 
history. But he truly fulfils it when he is actively involved in it. 
Thirdly, one becomes aware of the total historicity of all 
existence, of the universe and of mankind when one compares it with 
eternity. One objectifies the singular in the reality of natural phenom-
ena ranging from an individual landscape or tree and on to the order 
of the cosmos. Historicity, according to Jaspers, is the historic con-
sciousness proper, an awareness that the individual does not become 
historical by the mere fact of being situated in space and time. Nor is 
the individual the representation of the universal. The historical is 
rather the unique, the single, the irreplaceable-that which animates the 
Jaspers : Philosophical faith and Revelation translated by Ashton EB Harper and Row 
Publisher N. York p: 105. 
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universal. The real individual is consumed, permeated and transformed 
by the historical individual.' Man is not history as a natural being, 
but only as a spiritual being. 
There is a whole chain of determinancies of one's situation, chance 
occurrences and objective conditions. Above all, there is the historic 
determinacy of existence itself. One's nature is disclosed in heredity, 
one's history in tradition, stability through heredity is contrasted to 
the weakening of tradition. Our everyday life may break loose from 
tradition, the historically evolved ethos may cease and the life-form 
may turn down. The fact however, remians that it is not heredity but 
always the content of a tradition^ that makes us human. 
One disowns one's temporal existence so much so that one dispar-
ages existence itself. The fact is that it is in existence that one is 
assured of oneself and of the historic origin that links one to all. 
Moreover, one acquires authenticity when Transcendence is submerged 
1. Jaspers : Origin and goal of history p : 242. 
2. Ibid p: 236. 
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in it. What one has rejected as mere existence is the physiognomic 
aspect of one's being. Only in this physiognomic aspect, and not 
outside it, does one become a substantive being. 
There is a seeming dichotomy between the historic being and 
historic reality, whereas existentially they are so much inter-twined 
that one cannot be conceived without the other. One achieves 
self-unification when one's being has been accepted and grasped and 
condensed in the historic process of possible Existenz.' 
Besides historicity, the questions of freedom and communication 
are raised with regard to one's finite existence. 
Jaspers seems to think that an isolated being is a mere empty 
concept with nothing to sustain it. Moreover, birth and heredity do 
not make a man fully human. He is supposed to be equipped with a 
sense of tradition, of norms and etiquette which make up his world. 
He is, however, not a mere recipient of tradition but is replenished by it. 
1. Jaspers : Origin and Goal of history p: 242. 
(86) 
Thus if one feels forsaken in the process of communication or 
eschews it, it looks as if one is sunk into a void. One shudders at the 
thought of an existence that has become arid. ":I go waste when I am 
nothing but I".' 
One grows and develops by conciliation with the 'other'. One can 
rejoice at one's freedom only when the other is free, too. One affirms 
one's existence only in the other's assertion. One carries the burden of 
not only one's self but of the other. The other conveys what none else 
can impart to him. One owes to him impulses which no one can implant 
in him. The evocative power of this appeal breaks the hard shell in 
which one is enclosed like a monad. Although they remain distinct 
individuals yet they strive jointly for their mutual self-revelation. 
o 
A sordid relationship develops when the 'other ' , instead of 
welcoming one as one does a friend, belittles oneself and acts as an 
object. "As my obedient slave he keeps me from coming to myself 
and he does the same as my master. Only mutual recognition allows 
1. Jaspers philosophy vol II p: 52. 
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both of us to rise to ourselves. Only together we reach the goal each 
one is aiming at."' 
Nevertheless, communication is bruised by the multitude. "I destroy 
communication by my very pursuit of it with the largest possible 
number. If I want to do justice to ail-that is to say to everyone I come 
across I fill my existence with superficialities".^ 
Man is not merely finite because he bears a certain relationship 
with other fellow beings. It is in his fmiteness that he becomes aware 
of his potentialities and so he constantly strives and quests and in 
such a way that from it springs the existential impulse to elevate 
himself through his freedom.^ 
Freedom does not exist in isolation, it also points towards Tran-
scendence. At the core of one's being one is related to Transcendence 
and this makes one into a free being. But it is no less true that had 
1. Jaspers : philosophy. Vol. II. p. 53. 
2. Ibid p: 55 
3. Jaspers : The perennial scope of philosophy p : 66-67. 
(88) 
there been only Transcendence the will should have followed involuntary 
obedience. 
Human freedom is at the heart of all potentialities and through 
Transcendence man is guided to his own inner- unity. This guidance 
offers no objective conviction and it is apprehended by subjective 
certainty. Guidance functions through man's judgement as regards his 
own acts, this spurs him on as well as checks and confirms his actions. 
One would like to know the judgment of his fellow men, but the 
decisive judgment that matters is that of God. Obedience to God's 
command always involves the risk of error, the risk whether one has 
truly heard the guiding voice never ceases.' 
In one's finite existence is heard the unconditional imperative: this 
happens when one is in danger of losing oneself. An absolute impera-
tive has its source in one's own self It is not grounded in finite aims 
or accounted for by some extertnal authority.^ 
1. Jaspers : The perennial scope of philosophy, p. 71-73. 
2. Ibid p: 33-34. 
(89) 
The existential imperative comes as the command of one's authentic 
existence bidding one's empirical existece. It ordains man's life and 
decides whether it is worthwhile or meaning less.' The absolute does 
not become temporal: it is eternal existing in every new moment.^ In 
paying heed to the unconditional one makes a choice. This decision is 
the result of deliberation and springs from freedom. 
Freedom, according to Jaspers, exists as volition. The will gains 
momentum when it is stiired at a specific moment and is called upon 
to take a decision. It also requires a certain amount of tenacity 
because without strict adherence to the purpose the thing in question 
cannot be accomplished. Sometimes vehemency reigns supreme when 
the individual concerned pays no heed to the conditions and situations. 
But the unconditinal volition remains superior to each of these. 
Man's conation is directed towards an object, but there is another 
sense of willing which does not aim at an object. The 'volition proper 
1. Jaspers : Way to Wisdom : Translated by Man helm R: New Haven Yale University 
Press p: 57. 
2. Jasper: The perennial scope of philosophy p:34 
(90) . 
is unconditional, groundless, purposeles'^'. One cannot achieve one's 
freedom by one's will. In other words it is not possible to "will" this will. 
At the peak of freedom lies a feeling that one cannot will and act 
otherwise. Thus though free and spontaneous one cannot make a fresh 
beginning. The consequences that accrue from decisions are beyond 
one's initiative : they are decisions made before one's birth. 
As existence one moves in a restriced sphere and is capable only 
of marginal freedom. The encompassing sense of historicity in which 
necessity and freedom coalesce confers on us immense freedom. In 
this the past still lives, its decisions are not totally but only relatively 
final, they can be revised.' Thus one adhers to decisive froodom 
dispensing with lukewarm decisions. 
Though one is bound by the laws of nature, history the divine will 
and the cosmic order, yet the materialization of every action takes place 
only by the individual himself. Moreover, freedom can be exercised 
1. Hoffmann K: Basic concepts of Jaspers philosphy in the philosophy of Jaspered by 
Schilpp P.A.P.: 102. 
(91) 
within a particular framework and it is relevant to call oneself free in 
that context only. 
According to Jaspers the individual choice entails moral 
obligations and duties, commandments and prohibitions, for there can 
be no freedom without law. Yet the moral law is always below 
Existenz and so, if duty requires something to be done outside 
oneself, it may not be responded to. This is so because one has to 
abide by the Moral Law.' 
Jaspers lays great emphasis on the point that the decision becomes 
the substance of the man. He chooses what he understands as the good 
in the choice between good and evil.Evil from this standpoint is the 
will to submit to evil passions and impulses. It is the urge to destroy 
and inflict torture and pain and finally to annihilate. Good is a return 
to the authentic life in obedience to the unconditional imperative. Man 
becomes authentic when be distinguishes between good and evil.-
1. GrmsleyR;p: 180-81. 
2. Jaspers : Way to Wisdom : 60. 
(92) 
The decision has its poignant meaning on each of the following 
three levels. Morally, man bases his decision on thought. Ethically he 
liberates himself from perversion through re-birth of his good will, 
metaphysically, he achieves awareness of his being in his capability 
of love. He chooses the right and his motives become pure. On each 
level a decision is to be taken and an alternative is visualized. Only 
when the three levels are united or submerged in each other is the 
unconditional realized.' 
The existential imperative is also expressed in the will to communicate. 
The appearance of the 'other' is a gift and not an achievement. The 
impulse to communicate is not enough to establish a rapport unless 
one commits oneself to it and even then success is not achieved by 
mere formal acquaintance. 
According to Jaspers it is a unique kind of relationship in which 
one has access to those finer feelings which hold us accountable. 
Further, one may be pressed down by animosity but is ready by all 
1. Ibid p: 61-62. 
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means to dispel malice at the hour of death. 
According to Jaspers it is not one's privilege to have friends. Inspite 
of one's deep earnestness to solicit the presence of others one may be 
deprived of their company. It is only when one suffers the agony of 
being alone, wishes to have a sense of security and eagerly desires 
company that communication matures. It may be added that 
communication disrupts if it is reudced to mere revelry and gossip. It 
is Jaspers' contention that one can gloss over the impulsion or can 
live it so that it is eventually subdued. 
One is implicated in the rupture of communication. Likewise its 
fulfilment implants in us a sense of something that has been conferred 
on us in an incongruous manner. Comunication is a perpetual struggle 
in which individuals are either bound in unison or are at variance 
with one another. Such a commmunication is sustained at the expense 
of a moment's solidarity. 
Jaspers points out that man and his world grow and develop not 
instantaneously or with monotonous regularity. One has to accept 
(94) 
fluctuations which both repel and lead to our fulfilment. One who 
observes fine decorum is moved by scruples and wants to make his 
life spik and span does not become Existenz. Life, so to speak, is not 
a bed of roses but an erena of struggle and conflict. 
Jaspers proclaims that to seek perfection of the other is not a 
legitimate demand. It is also not possible to tailor the other 
according to one's own taste and judgment. One is supposed to be 
considerate and generous to put up with his lapses and failures 
instead of judging him by super human standards. All criteria are 
supposed to be secondary and can only be a means of communication, 
not a condition of it. 
It is not in communication but in the boundary situations where 
the absolute imperative is most poignantly heard. Taking into account 
the concept of death, Jaspers speaks of instances where death has been 
conquered and man has acted unconditionally without giving heed to 
the consequences. A historical survey will bring out the fact that 
individuals staked their lives in willing conformity and surrender to 
(95) 
an absolute imperative.' They have risked their lives in love, in battle 
and in achieving lofty aims. The finest example is Socrates who went 
along his way unhesitatingly, unmoved by the passions of anger and 
hatred and rejected the opportunity for flight and drank hemlock 
staking everthing on his fate. 
Certain martyrs like Thomas More, have shown the purest moral 
energy in respect of their faith. To die for something in order to bear 
witness to it is to render one's death impure. Martyrs inspired by a 
longing to die in imitation of Christ are still more impure. 
Seneca awaited his death sentence for years and finally overcame the 
desire to escape death and in the end surrendered himself when Nero 
demanded his death. Boethius sentenced by a barbarian died calmly. 
Seneca, Boethius and Bruno were people who had to conquer 
themselves. And precisely for this reason they can point the way to 
us. These are historical examples of men who knew how to die.^ 
1. Jaspers : Way to wisdom p: 53. 
2. Jaspers : Way to wisdom p: 52, 53, 54. 
(96) 
In an attempt to conceptualize death, Jaspers points out a clear cut 
distinction between what may be termed an actual and a potential death. 
With reference to actual death one may quote him, "in objective 
thought... The necessity of death belonging to life is incomprehensible, 
although this knowledge of (death) being inseparable from life is 
nevertheless in exting uishable. 
Actual death refers to the fact of its inevitability. We fail to 
anticipate the exact hour of the occurrence of death but are at the 
same time most certain of its advent. It is potentially immanent death 
which establishes the unique certainty of actual death. It makes us 
think of death negatively visualizing it by means of imagery and ideas. 
For example, one can live in physical pain, in fear of death in 
situations in which death seems inevitable.' 
As Jaspers speaks of actual and potential death, similarly Sartre 
says that the word 'waiting' (ie for death) implies two things : one 
Kunz H: Critique of Jaspers concept of Transcendence in "The philosophy of Jaspersed 
by schilppp: 505. 
(97) 
can expect death in principle and one can wait for it. The latter 
happens when one is sentenced to death and the execution is to take 
place at such and such a time. In the former case one can and may 
take death into account but one is not sure of its exact hour of arrival.' 
There is a marked difference between death through old age and 
pre-mature death. Death that concludes old age allows us to make the 
most of our resources, but life looks like an utter failure when one is 
plucked in the prime of life. The truth of the matter is that death takes 
us all by surprise.^ 
It is Jaspers contention that we move at the superficial level when 
we are gripped by fear to look at the flux of things and seek the point 
of stasis in it. It is necessary to take note of the fact that a tacit 
purpose is involved in the fleeting and transient nature of things : the 
phenomena of evanescence as it may be called. 
Furthermore, if we take a positivistic view of all things we would 
1. Sartre Being and Nothingness. Translated by Barnes H.E. University of Colorado 
p: 535. 
2. Sartre Being and Nothing ness p: 536. 
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sink into an apathetic state. Or in a mood of utter despair one regards 
deatli as the most catastrophic event or again one is so much lured by 
the prospect of continuance of living that one acquiesces to remain at 
the level of mere existence. 
There is nothing morbid about this contemplation of death, yet with 
such subterfuges proposed death loses its true meaning. 
Jaspers is emphatic on the point that the ultimate situation should 
not be evaded. The reason for it is that only then do we become 
identified with Existenz. It is from this point of view thai he 
critically examines the traditional answer to death. 
The boundary situation is concealed when one retreats from this 
situation and comes to regard death as merely accidental, or becomes 
unmindful of it, or defers it by the notion of uncertainty regarding the 
time of its occurrence. The situation is glossed over when one 
pacifies oneself and is not provoked by what may take place in after 
life. This merely shelves the boundary situation of death and does not 
release us from the horror of it. 
(99) 
According to Jaspers the limit situation of death is evaded when 
one befools oneself with the prospect of pleasures likely to be 
available in the next life. The so-called proofs of the immortality of 
soul are trivial and not of much consequence. 
Paradoxically, it is through belief in immortality that Marcel resolves 
the problem of death. Marcel is worth quoting here; "Death is the spring 
board of an absolute hope. A world where death is absent would be a 
world where hope would exist only in an embryonic state"' It is 
significant to note that what provides others with the basis for the 
experience of death, becomes for Marcel the basis for the experience 
of immortality.^ Marcel's views regarding the immortality of soul are 
based on the distinction between one's life and one's existence. 
It might be suggested that one's life is the sum total of all that 
happened in the past. But such an account would tear it off from the 
present in which one is actually living. The final import of one's life 
1. Choron J; Death and Western thought collier Macmillan Publishers London p: 259. 
2. Ibid p: 257. 
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is seen in the realtionship between one's self and one's body. One 
affirms one's life as one's own in which case one can discard it as 
one does an old suit of clothes. On the other hand one completely 
disowns it by asserting that I am not my life, nor do I have a life. 
Thus one's life sharply segregates itself from one's existence.' 
Jaspers rejects the notion of immortality without however ignoring 
one's quest for Existenz. He is no less conscious of the fact that the 
impulse to life and the appalling fear of death is inevitable. It is only 
in the most exalted moments of life that this fear can be shunned. But 
since these crucial experiences do not constitute the banality of 
everyday life one is perpetually gripped by the joy of living on the 
one hand and by the assurance of Existenz on the other. 
Jaspers, like every right-minded person, reconciles himself to death. 
Courage, as Jaspers understood it, is to die truthfully without any 
pertense. Courage in the face of death is not a firm, austere calm, for 
1. Allen EL: Existentialism from within published by Routledge and Kegan Paul Lx)ndon 
p: 162-3 
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this would evade Existenz. Tranquility is something which is to be 
constantily retrieved from the realm of pain. If equanimity is altogether 
immuned from despair Existenz is not worth having. Any one who is 
oblivious of the horror of death is much the same as one who is 
enthralled by it. Japers remarks. "Composure in the face of death is 
the calm attitude in which both these elements can still be heard. In 
this composure we overcome life without scorning it. Time and again 
the pain of death must be felt and each time the existential assurance 
can be newly acquired".' 
Thus the whole of Jaspers philosophizing means an act of learning 
to die. This learning to die has nothing to do with the stoic ideal which 
is based on the power of reason to control one's emotions or timidly 
succumb to death. So far as Jaspers is concerned it is only when one 
is faced with the ultimate situation, is confronted with death and thus 
experiences utter failure and total ruin that the experience of Tran-
scendence is achieved. 
1. Jaspers : philosophy Vol II. The University of Chicago Press p: 199. 
(102) 
The leap from foundering into Transcendence is the leap from anxiety 
into calm. It is in the midst of this infinite calm that Jaspers comes to 
terms with death. This certainly does not allude to a union with the 
living God. What Jaspers gives is not religion but philosophil faith 
without creed or dogma.' 
This triumph over death is also significantly brought out by 
Jaspers while dealing with the boundary situation of suffering. One is 
at the superficial level when one refuses to stand up the tragedies of 
life or becomes a passive recipient of them. One is mere existence 
and the matter is thus glossed over. The existential call, however, 
directs us to look suffering in the face. Questions about the validity 
and sense of suffering are discarded as irrelevant ones. 
There is a moral insinuation in Jaspers' thought when he regards 
suffering as a trial which everyone is supposed to face and which shatters 
all human endeavour. Moreover, according to Jaspers, everyone is 
supposed to bear his burden alone. It may be added that suffering 
1. Chorn J: p: 229. 
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opens the way to existential fulfilment and illumination. He seems to 
think that the pursuit of mere happiness is grossly despicable and 
destroys the inherent richness of man. 
The existential impulse demands an active participation in the struggle 
o 
against suffering postponding and alleviating it to the best of one's 
ability, keeping one's poise all the same till it is finally liquidated. 
Jaspers regards the enduranace of suffering as inevitable for the 
elevation of Existenz. Similarly he contends that it is from pollution 
that one emerges pure and purgated. In other words one lands in 
situations and incurs guilt so that one may come up undefiled. In the 
boundary situation of guilt one's quest is for the purity of soul. In 
order to win Existenz it is necessary to acknowledge the 'guilt' and 
accept life's discipline where it is sternest and most exacting. It 
involves no remorse and the conscience is clear. Embracing the 
o 
boundary situation and making oneself responsible for the act makes 
it genuinely one's own. 
According to Jaspers the boundary situation of guilt is avoided when 
(104) 
one interprets one's act in a moral sense by saying that one is not 
responsible for those acts which do not issue from one's motives. 
Moreover one is overwhelmed by feelings of complacency smugness 
and self righteousness thus confusing oneself with the purity of one's 
possible existence. One may also ignore the boundary situation by 
imagining all guilt as specific and something which can be expiated. 
Hartmann and Kierkegaard stand close to Jaspers while dealing 
with the concept of guilt. Hartmann proclaims that guilt cannot be 
blotted either by a change of disposition or through a sincere forgiveness 
one the part of one who has been wronged. Forgiveness relieves the 
guilty of that special pang of conscience which inheres in the attitude 
of one who has been wronged, but it cannot extirpate the moral guilt 
altogether'. 
According to Kiekegaard man encounters guilt both in the ethical 
and in the religious stages of life. For him, in a particular situation, 
one can cast off his guilt and so be without guilt. When a person 
1. Hartmann N : Ethics Vol. Ill published by George Allen and Unwin London p: 271 -2. 
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defends himself thus he admits that he is essentially guilty. And it is 
this totality of guilt which presumes that in a given situation one can 
be guilty or otherwise. One the other hand one who is essentially 
innocent has nothing to do with guilt, Kierkegaard, however, affirms 
that one enters the realm of religion when one accepts guilt as the 
permeable aspect of one's existence.' 
In the boundary situations of death, suffering and guilt Jaspers 
beacons us to choose the existential way of life. The two modes of 
life are clearly introduced and sharply distinguished : there is a 
constant urge to aspire for the authentic existence by transcending 
existence at the mundance level. 
1. Kierkegaard : Concluding unscienfific postscript published by princeton University 
Press 1941 p: 470-1. 
(106) 
IV 
AN ANIMATE EXISTENZ 
Existenz and Transcendence which in mythical terms are referred 
to as soul and God are subjects of metaphysical inquiry and speculation 
and not of theoretical cognition alone. They are thus largely inaccessible 
and inexpressible. 
At the level of existence one leads a blind, vegetative life which is 
rounded off in death. Existence is blank, odour less and insipid unless it 
is vitalized and nourished by Existenz.' Existenz should be regarded 
as the opposite of the persona or mask and of the role which existence 
has to play. It has very much more to do than with the position, 
behaviour patterns and costumes which society prescribes.^ 
In an elucidation of Existenz one grasps different concepts as signs 
of Existenz : decision, choice, communication, historicity etc.^ Existenz 
1. Hoffman K : Basic concepts of Jaspers' philosophy in "The philosophy of Jaspers", 
ed. by Schiipp, P.A.p. 100. 
2. Wallraff C : Jaspers An introduction to his philosphy, p. 100. 
3. Philosophical faith and Revelation, p: 94. 
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is not reflected in lukewarm, tentative and indifferent decisions but is 
compellingiy felt in the highest moral decisions. The approach to 
Existenz then must begin with freedom. 
Freedom, as Jaspers understood it, is not an observable fact but an 
existential experience. Jaspers speaks of objective freedom which is 
opposed to physical coercion, torture and black mail of every kind.' 
Objective freedom is the condition of the appearance of freedom, not 
existential freedom itself. 
The question of freedom originates in the self who wills its existence. 
Though cognition is not identical with freedom, it is indispensable to 
it. Without knowledge there can be no choice and meagre knowledge 
implies a limited choice.^ 
There is another variety of freedom which is termed as psycho-
logical freedom. According to it, one is free to make a choice as far 
as motives, desires and tendencies are concerned. In the second place 
1. Jaspers : Philosophical faith and Revelation p: 235. 
2. Wallraff C.F: Karl Jaspers Princeton University Press 1970 p: 110-1. 
(108) 
freedom involves a moment of impulse. In other words, there is an 
element of spontaneity which makes choice unpredictable. This is not 
to be rejected by some mechanical process (e.g. tossing coins), for the 
process would itself have to be chosen. Impulse, spontaneity and 
caprice, though not identical with freedom are among its ingredients.' 
At the moral level one preserves one's autonomy at all costs and does 
what seems to be right in a particular situation. The moral imperative or 
command is just a means, a mediation and not something magisterial. The 
moral law can only enlighten but never justify one's decision.^ 
The resolution implicit in choice which expresses one's real will is 
the absolute decision of Existenz. Its criterion of truth is not success 
but what is true in failure. Thus the crux of the matter is that "I 
choose". This resolution also demands that one firmly adheres to it. 
This freedom of choice also makes man responsible to himself. But 
this sense of responsibility fills him with a feeling of dread. To quote 
1. Ibid p: 111. 
2. Blackham : Six Existentialist thinkers Routledge and kegan Paul 1961 p :51. 
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Jaspers, "I may resist decision shut my eyes because I do not want to 
will, horrified by my freedom to bind myself to decide something for 
all time I would like to shift the responsibility and let things happen. 
To welcome freedom or to shun it-whichever I choose over any length 
of time is the phenomenon of what I am' ". 
Thus one's choice is existential and absolute. It cannot be reduced to 
psychological explanation in terms of motives, nor subsumed under a 
rational ethical principle and is not an automatic obedience to law.^  These 
enter in to one's decisions but one is certainly not bound by them. 
Another sign of Existenz is communication. Communication is the realm 
that lies between Existenz and Transcendence. In conformity with the Christian 
tradition Jaspers asserts that each individual self stands on its own ground 
and is not exchangeable for any other self. These two are disparate except 
for the unity of Transcendence by which they are encompasssed.^ 
1. Jaspers philosophy Vol. II p: 102. 
2. Blackham p: 42. 
3. Kanfmann F : A philosophy of communication." in the philosophy of Jaspers ed by 
Schilpp P.A. p: 219. 
(110) 
The term communication signifies different shades of meaning and 
there are qualitative leaps in the use of this term. If we take language in a 
universal sense it extends upwards to God or downwards to nature. 
Jaspers, however, is quick to emphasize the merely metaphorical use of 
this broader sense.' 
The problem of communication is conspicuous in Jaspers ' 
philosophy because it had a bearing on his own past life. The very 
fact that communication is introduced by Jaspers as a break-through 
of solitude reflects a desire for it which he was obsessed with 
since his youth. It is not merely a philosophical axiom but 
something born of his personal experience and has thus an autobio-
graphical significance.^ 
Communication, according to Jaspers, has its legitimate place in 
the human realm as such. According to Jaspers such questions as "why 
communicate" and "why am I not alone"? Cannot be answered in purely 
1. Ibid p: 231. 
2. Ibid p: 211-12. 
( I l l ) 
rational terms. One cannot prove the others' existence as a corollary 
of one's own Jaspers isat one with Heidegger and Sartre in the belief 
that the other 's existence is a self-evident fact. The other is 
encountered as a factual necessity which is as primordial as one's own 
existence. Thus one's task is not to prove the other's existence but to 
ascertain its implications from the point of view of its relevance to 
one's own existence.' 
To begin with, we find an embryonic form of communication in 
social relationships. We meet as teacher and student, doctor and 
patient, superior and subordinate, buyer and seller, clerk and customer 
etc. There are wide ramifications of this process of communication. 
We are either members of the same profession or enter into a contract 
with others, or engage in a law suit, one either raises arms against the 
other or is bent upon a friendly emulation. In all these cases one finds 
that there lies at the base a psychological realism, an intellectual 
medium or an impetus to achieve a comprehensive ideal. 
1. Grimsley R : Existentralist thought p: 163-4. 
(112) 
According to Jaspers one's individual consciousness harmonizes 
with the general consciousness of the community. However, upright 
one is in one's pursuits one it still tethered by social bonds. The 
substance of the community, its mode of thinking, its manners and 
ideals are not subject to censure or reproof. One acts, thinks, believes 
and passes judgement like everyone else. Opinions, goals, fears 
and joys are related to other people because of an unbreakable 
identification of all. 
It is not enough merely to exist within society, one must project a 
good image of oneself. Character has little visibility, but an attractive 
appealing personality matters a lot. The more successfully the self 
conceals behind the mask, the more is one acceptable.' In a communicative 
situation one manipulates the other by concealing the real motive and 
the actual purpose of the action. One recognizes the other's existence 
insofar as it is geared to one's own needs. If there follows a struggle 
one will try to supersede the other. In all these modes of communication 
1. Wallraff : Karl jaspers. An introduction to his philosophy p: 118. 
(113) 
one moves on an impersonal plane. A true communication is thus inhibited. 
Though communication does offer a sense of satisfaction, yet it is 
not adequate enough. One is oppressed by the idea that one is a mere 
existence—a part of a larger whole, a fragment in an ideal unity, 
embracing a given demeanour but not one's real self. This sense of 
impoverishment in communication is thus the origin of a break/through 
to Existenz. 
Existential communication is not to be imitated or exemplified. Each 
moment is unique, is not to be arrested and is not repeatable. One 
transcends beyond the concrete and is thus not limited by time. It is an 
active process rather than something finished and static. In communication 
one is illuminated only when one is magnanimous towards the other. To 
presume that it is one's inherent disposition that sparkles in the company 
of the other is to decry the possibility of Existenz. 
So far as one's inborn potentialities are concerned, they serve as 
data for possible Existenz. Existenz is the vantage point whence one 
takes decisions, chooses the guidelines of our conduct and makes a 
(114) 
passionate quest for manifestation. If one wants to be illuminated one 
may be prepared to undergo any trial and face any hazard. But if one 
wishes to remain in a smug little corner, pure and undefiled, one will 
not take any risk. 
"For in manifestation I lose my stable empirical existence in order 
to gain my possible Existenz; whereas in seclusion I maintain my 
o 
empirical stability at the cost of losing my possible Existenz."' 
Existenz is also historic. Existence is within time, while Existenz 
being in time transcends time. To be more explicit Existenz is, on the 
one hand, a record of changing events, while on the other, it reaches 
out beyond the limits of time: its historicity is eternity embodied in 
time.^ Only by virtue of its historicity is Existenz able to apprehend 
Being intuitively in the flux of appearances. 
Historic self-realization is an elucidation of Existenz. Historic stand-
points are the steps in which Existenz manifests itself. One cannot 
1. Jaspers philosophy Vol. II p:59. 
2. Hoffman K; Basic concepts of Jaspers' philosophy in "The philosophy of Jaspers 
ed by Schilpp p: 102. 
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formulate them and cannot ascertain their origin. From them man 
acquires his knowledge and volition, his prototypes, his criteria, his 
thought patterns and his symbols e tc ' 
The paradoxical unity of time and eternity finds its expression in 
the exceptional moment: that in which the past and the future become 
coalesced. It does not project itself in to the future, nor does it find 
fulfilment in the past. The moment, the instant of decision, must be 
opposed to the passing moment. Historicity, while subsuming both, 
stands for the unity of what is ephemeral and transient with the 
substantial density of the moment. It is not however a single moment 
but a series of collective moments.^ The animated and exhilarating 
moment is the culmination of the existential process. 
Furthermore, historicity has to be distinguished from the cares and 
pursuits of existence. One's coercions and inhibitions to which one is 
subjected provide a sense of fidelity. One may be consistent and 
1. Jaspers : The origin and Goal of history p: 251. 
2. Hoffman K : p: 102. 
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coherent in one's habitual way of life, but still may be unfaithful. 
The authenticity of a pledged word, moral responsibility and a straight 
demeanour are the corollaries of fidelity. Fidelity in the true sense of 
the word implicates one's genuine link to one's past. 
Fidelity implies keeping faith with one's parents, experiences of 
childhood and places which have impinged upon us. Fidelity thrives 
when every tiny detail is picked up and willed. He who tears away 
from the vital concerns of life cannot sustain himself. 
In infidelity one can abuse and disown one's origins. Here nothing 
is warranted. It will be a false appeasement if one ignores the man 
or the matter by such remarks, "What done is done" or "such things 
will happen".' To be authentic one is supposed to strengthen the bond 
of communication instead of cancelling it out or betraying it. 
What were merely superficial contracts become strong and inviolable 
ones. Furthermore, fidelity admonishes us to keep distant from being 
atrophied. 
1. Jaspers : philosophy Vol. II p: 120. 
(117) 
Historic Existenz tends to be both broad and narrow. The breadth 
of one's situation has nothing to do with its physical expanse.' The 
domain of one's existence which is always confined, entangled in all 
sorts of situations, burdened with tasks and enriched with traditions 
confers on one a genuine breadth of freedom. 
The common place existence in time means the everyday happenings 
of life. One grows and develops while living in them : they however 
do not point to a terminus to be led up to. One may indulge in 
casuistry, but what matters is that the ethos seeps into our being and 
eventuates into meaning. An individual's conduct is neither something 
given, nor formally laid down. In this process of self-appraisal one 
proceeds step by step and what strikes him as right makes him 
amenable to it in one's historic existence. 
The every-day situations of life may be as stern a test of historic 
fidelity as a great crisis if they are permeated by an existential awareness.^ 
1. Grimsley R: p: 173. 
2. Ibid p: 173. 
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These, as Jaspers says, "impart to existence the tension that prepares 
it for their reception when the time is ripe and the situation is at hand. 
It is from these moments that every day life gets the background which 
confers solemnity and weight upon it even when its particular 
substance is poor, the background which makes it glow even where it 
cannot be more than disciplined toil".' 
According to Jaspers the situational character of Existenz expresses 
itself in three eventualities: being-in-the-world, being-amidst-the-other 
and being-to wards-transcendence. Thus Existenz in relation to Being 
poses a metaphysical issue and in connection with truth it becomes an 
epistemological question^ So first the relation of Being and Existenz. 
Existenz takes its bearings from the world. In the first instance, 
the world appears as hostile to us. One seems to be a pawn in the 
huge cosmic scheme and a mere speck in the cosmological order. The 
world is neither harsh nor benign and not intelligible either. Facing it 
1. Jaspers : Philsophy Vol. II p: 123. 
2. Hoffman K: Basic concepts of Jaspers' philsophy in "The philosphy of jasper ed 
by Schilppp: 110. 
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squarely one finds repose in the world. Though its ways may be 
forbidding and bewildering both in point of our achievements and 
failures we trust it all the same. 
From the practical stand-point one is faced with a degree of 
ambiguity while dealing with it. This world is not one which one has 
shaped and contrived. It is that which is variable both with reference 
to time and the people who live in it. One may feel quitting it for its 
distractions or cling to it because of the blind will-to-live. Existenz is 
the danger-signal which warns us to be on our guard lest we should 
be ensnared by it. The world fascinates Existenz as the medium of its 
realization and disdains it for its possible sinking into mere existence. 
This generates a tension between Existenz and the world. 
Existenz is not tied by the fetters of subjectivity and objectivity. 
Though one is bound by the objective social amenities one does not 
remain stuck up to them. Existential solidarity is not to be sought in 
the objective realm. One is a consolidated whole and forms a totality 
by himself. 
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The struggle for existence is a passive phenomenon though actively 
undertaken. It becomes the medium of existential struggle, one in which 
it is realized and finds fruition. 
Possible Existenz is at war with itself. It fights the sinister forces 
pitted against it : the sensuous side of nature and a wretched damned 
existence without Transcendence. Only in this struggle which ensues 
after each victory and is waged in more rigorous way after each 
defeat can a possible Existenz come to be real. 
Another form of struggle is that which is carried on between 
existence and Existenz. To take an example from the concept of death 
where Jaspers, besides the fear of death, speaks of the fear of existential 
non-being. Existential non-being implies a state of utter despair, 
ambiguity and infidelity. The fear of existential non-being is so 
distinct in kind from the fear of death that despite our use of identical 
words non-being and death belong to two different categories. As 
regards existential non-being Jaspers says, "I do not live, and so my 
possible Existenz suffers the agony of being unable to die. The peace 
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of radical non-being would be a deliverance from this horror of 
continual death".' 
The import of all this is that an existence which is divorced from 
Existenz is tantamount to death and one is condemned to live thus. So 
this vulnerable Existenz yearns for death which would be a solace in 
the perspective of the eternal curse. Further more, existential dread is 
significant because if it is dispelled one is damned to a wretched kind 
of existence. 
As far as the communion with the other is concerned, one is 
fascinated by the other only in his segregation. The self in its 
richness and diversity does not absorb any other being. Love of being 
centres on the innermost vital and dynamic core of one's being. 
Communication cannot be established with the crowd. It is possi-
ble only with selected like-minded men who are committed to an ex-
istential solidarity and who are mutually bound each to each in a nexus 
of loving relationship. In the day to day world the option seems to be 
1. Jaspers : philosophy Vol. II p: 199. 
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between the ego-centric isolation and collective unity. The only 
solution for Existenz lies in Transcendence. 
As far as the relation of Being to truth is concerned, individual 
truth is included and enveloped by the truth of Being.' The elucidation 
of truth-the truth which is cogent, qualified and identical with the self 
is what enables Existenz to become real. The truth which is cogent 
has a wide connotation. Qualified truth is also upheld by a sizeable 
number of men. 
According to Jaspers existential truth is alive in a triple relation 
Existenz, co-Existenz and Transcendence. Kierkegaard's famous 
dictum that subjectivity is the truth is thus renewed, for existential 
truth is individual.' Existenz enjoys existential solidarity only when 
truth is identical with one's self. One cannot part with it, behold it at 
a distance or comprehend it properly. One can declare it to be absolute 
only at a given moment because truth cannot be revealed in all its 
Kaufmann F : A philsophy of Communication in the philosophy of Jaspers ed by 
schiipp p: 224. 
(123) 
transparency even by an elucidation of its diverse aspects. 
Truth is either unequivocal and not chosen or it is made uncondi-
tional by choice. It dispenses with all other untruths and emerges as 
one single truth. Truth, we may add, cannot be got at immediately. 
Crisis and fresh beginning, effort and enterprise are rooted in the 
human quest for truth. Jaspers says, "He does not enter in to the 
process and become untrue because he is unreal. If I want to be true I 
must dare to make mistakes and to put myself in the wrong; I have to 
carry things to extremes, to place them on the razor's edge if I want 
to bring them to a truthful decision".' 
Since one subscribes to one's own truth, one cannot comprehend 
all other truths but must join others in their pursuit of it. The truth of 
the other person concerns one as seriously as one is concerned with 
and for the person himself By harmonizing with their truths i.e. the 
ways in which truth presents itself to them, one helps their possibilities 
to become actualized.' But there is no import of personal truths, nor 
1. Jaspers: philosophy Vol. II p: 63. 
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do the truths of others which one recognizes and respects take the 
place of truth which presents itself to one and whose born representa-
tive one happens to be. 
Jaspers seems to think that struggle is inevitable for the achieve-
ment of a truthful authentic existence. It is to be willingly embraced, 
else existence remains embryonic only. The struggle is needed to 
kindle the spark latent in man. To be sure one is not a product of 
circumstances but maker of his own self. Indeed existence is purged 
when it is put on trial. To quote Jaspers, "I stunt possibilities that are 
inherent in me and coerce my impulses; I shape my given propensities; 
question what I have become"^ Furthermore "there is no limit to the 
questions that are the implements of this fight for criticism and 
purification of soul".^ 
This quest for true fulfilment brings to us the realization that, 
1. Kaufmann F: A philosophy of communication in "The philosophy of Jaspers ed by 
schilpp p: 225. 
2. Jaspers : Philosophy Vol. 11 p: 206. 
3. Ibid p: 213. 
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independent though we are yet we are not complete and self sufficient 
beings. We are finite and particular, bound to our historicity-a 
particular state, community, nation etc ' Furthermore, we become aware 
of our concrete human situation in which we are placed and also realize 
the concrete content; the everyday world of common place objects and 
the round of occupations with which we are supposed to deal.^ 
In a concrete situation one comes into contact with another 
self-hence a unique loving struggle. One really matures through the 
revelation of one's self to the other. 
It will not be out of place to express Sartre's view in this regard. 
According to him conflict is the meaning of being for others. It is so 
because while one regards others in an objectifying manner, one 
receives the same treatment from others. 
The instance given is that of a person sitting in a public park on a 
summer day enjoying the soft soothing air, the sun-shine and the 
1. Grimsley R: p: 164. 
2. Allen EL : The self and its hazards p: 62. 
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flowers. All of a sudden a man appears on the scene. At first one 
regards this man as no more than an object.' But a 'look' on the part 
of the other is felt as a threat to one's freedom. One has the feeling 
that he has stealthily taken away one's world. Every thing is in its 
place, every thing is the same, but one has been raided in one's isolation. 
One's whole universe becomes disorganized and disintegrated by this 
other self. The others' presence has created a tiny crack in one's solid 
substantial world.^ 
Even more embarrassing is the situation when one is listening 
through a key hole and hears foot steps behind him. One shudders at 
the thought that one has been seen by the other.^ The other's look 
usurps one's freedom. For example the obscurity of the dark corner 
which signifies the possibility of concealment is wiped away when 
one apprehends that while the other has his hand in his pocket, he has 
a weapon there. His finger placed on the electric bell is a signal to 
1. Allen EL : Existeniatism from within: Routledge and kegan Paul 1953. 
2. Sartre : Being and Nothingness Methuen and Co. p: 255. 
3. Ibid p: 260. 
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call the police. The other can reveal one's identity by illuminating the 
corner with his flash light.' Thus with the others' 'look' one has been 
totally deprived of ones' freedom. One retaliates against the deprivation 
of ones' freedom by a continuous effort to imprison the 'other' in his 
objectivity. One finds out 'ruses' to make the other an object. But 
one 'look' on the part of the other is enough to make all these schemes 
turned down and to make one experience once again the transfiguration 
of the other.^ This is one of the dimensions of a person's encounter 
with others. 
Jaspers' reciprocity between the selves bears a close resemblance 
to that rapport between the selves which Satre offers as the solution 
to the conflict. It happens when a "Third' appears on the scene and 
embraces the two combatants with his 'look'. Thus the "Other's" 
possibilities and one's own are levelled into dead possibilities and 
hence the relation becomes reciprocaP. The other's possibilities earlier 
1. Sartre : Being and Nothingness p: 264. 
2. Ibid p: 297. 
3. Sartre : Being and Nothing ness p: 418. 
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aimed at striking his fellow and one's own employed for defending 
oneself are "now complementary to each other, imply one another and 
involve one another for the "Third".' 
This is the origin of class consciousness. The peasant, the labourer, 
the servant, the proletariat: all are organized in a single whole 
because they have in the feudal lord, the capitalist, the master, the 
bureaucrat a common antagonist. It is through these superiors that 
these weak people experience the collective alienation and are able 
to look them as 'our burdens, our 'miseries' and our suffering'. It is 
not however the hard work, the low living standard and the 
humiliation which comprises the oppressed collectively as a 
class. The solidarity of work as a matter of fact constitutes the 
labouring collectivity.-^ 
According to Jaspers, in loving struggle one must control psychological 
drives like egoism, envy, aggression, for they lead to self-centeredness 
1. Sartre p: 418. 
2. Sartre p: 421. 
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and isolation'. In this striving one is related to one's fellow beings by the 
bond of love. Love is not in itself communication but the source from 
which it springs and by which it is animated. Its embodiment in existence 
lends it an air which both binds us to and estranges us from the other. 
Love refers here not to the blind clinging to impulse but the 
clear-sighted summoning of one Existenz to the other. Real live 
demands self-commitment and fidelity. It thrives only when it is 
embedded in communication. Hence a final rupture of communication 
is the end of love. Jaspers also stresses the inner independence of selves 
though they embark on a relationship of a most delightful kind. They 
are intimately close and yet infinitely remote from each other. They 
form so to say a community of monads.^ 
In Satres philosophy love has an entirely different connotation. It 
signifies one's desire to assimilate the 'other' in one's own self. In 
1. Wallraff: karl Jaspers : An introduction to his philosophy prinction University Press, 
1970 p: 136. 
2. Kanfmann F: A philosophy of communication in "The philosophy of jasper ed by 
schilpp p: 231. 
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this absorption one does not reduce the other to an object but wishes 
to possess his freedom. This again gives rise to conflict, because the 
'other' refuses and resists this sort of assimilation'. 
Jaspers emphatically says that loving struggle is not to be understood 
as being protected in quiet love being free from all argumentation and 
having the full claim of acceptance and affirmation. Love is magnanimous 
and spontaneous. It is something that happens, not something that one 
chooses. It has a cathartic role: It refines, purifies and educates. The 
desire to possess or domineer over some one whom one loves and 
respects really erodes it. 
It is interesting to note that this is what Sartre precisely means by 
love. The lover reveals and organizes his beloved's world. He demands 
that the beloved makes of him the absolute end and value of one's 
existence. He is no more a mere object in the midst of others or one 
that had fallen in the world. He is justified in the very fact of existence^. 
To quote Sartre, "These beloved veins on my hands exist beneficently. 
1. Sartre : Being and Nothingness p: 366. 
2. Grimsley R: p: 122-3. 
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How good I am to have eyes, hair, eye-brows etc We now feel that 
our existence is taken up and willed in its tiniest details by an absolute 
freedom which at the same time our existence conditions and which 
we ourselves will with our freedom. This is the basis for the joy of 
love when there is joy. We feel that our existence is justified."' 
Jaspers finds the culmination of love when in the case of a common 
peril both Existenzes freely put themselves at stake. Sartre sees the 
culminataion of love in seduction which consists in making oneself in 
to a fascinating object so that the other yields his freedom to him. 
Jaspers regards loving struggle as inevitable for Existenz. Hence 
an evasion of it will leave existence at the superficial level only. Thus 
for Jaspers Existenz is an act of commitment: it has to decide in time. 
Existenz must dare and must make a decision: It cannot wait. It is not 
the moral judgment one passes as an observer but a moral decision 
made in one's life which is implied by the living practice of Existenz^ 
• 
1. Sartre : Being and Nothingness p: 371. 
2. Jaspers : Philosophical faith and Revelation p: 247. 
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Jaspers shows certain deviations from the loving struggle. For 
instance there is a display of intellectual superiority. Thus instead of 
enduring the other's short comings, there is an assertion of one's 
abilities and talents. In an actual verbal discussion one is so much 
over whelmed by egoism pride or complacency that one ends up the 
debate ill-humouredly or drops the subject, turning the conversation 
in to another channel. 
There is a break-down of communication due to differences in race, 
nationality and religion. Hence prejudice, suspicion, envy and malice 
thwart a free communication of selves. In case such pepole come in 
to contact with one another they fall into an unpleasant taciturnity. 
There is a lack of social inter-course when individuals engage 
themselves in loose and idle talk or one of them prefers to end the 
discourse by conceding the other's point of view. One actively participates 
in the fiery discussion of ideologies-such as the protestation of love 
for humanity though having no love or sympathy for one's neighbour'. 
1. Kaufmann F: A philosophy of communication in "The philosophy of Jaspers ed by 
Schilpp p: 215. 
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Loving struggle is spurious when one adopts the charitable posture 
of sympathy and outward aid.' Here one's real motive is the pleasure 
which charity guarantees in ones own superiority, the relish of it 
springing from pity and compassion. Moreover the delightone has in 
the little acts of generosity which are suitable and depends on one's 
mood takes the other by surprise and a sense of gratitude. 
Loving struggle is an affectation when one claims deep concern 
and keen interest in the other's growth and well being: this is sheer 
hypocrisy and exhibitionism. Such persons believe in idle compromises 
and wish to keep up appearances all the same. 
In all these cases there is no genuine involvement and reciprocity 
between the two individuals. Here instead of existential manifestation 
there lurks in one's behaviour a tendency to assert one's individuality. 
It happens when one who suffers from an inferiority complex develops 
a vindictive desire to defeat every body and have the consolation that 
no one is happy. It is also the case when a dejected man puts up 
1. Jaspers : Philosophy Vol 11. p: 214. 
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absolute ideals for others in order to spurn them when they do not 
come up to the mark. To quote Jaspers, "A loveless one defies the 
others, with the idea of judging him by divine standards and crushing 
him... Here it seems as though a fighting one could always make me 
trying to trap the other to show up his failures' ". 
Sartre, too speaks of the deviation from a genuine communication. 
Instead of true intercourse of self with other selves one accepts and 
adheres to the picture which others have of him. The doctor and the 
clergy man merge their persons in the official. The artist who leads a 
Bohemian life may do so because he knows that people are prepared 
to make him do so. The politician says what his audience are waiting 
to hear from him^ Social life, as a matter of fact enhances play-acting. 
Success and popularity are achieved by the role which others want us 
to take on. 
1. Jaspers : Philosophy Vol II. p: 215. 
2. Allen E.L. : Existentialism from within p: 64. 
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V 
IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE 
The concept of Transcendence forms the bed-rock of Jaspers' whole 
philosophizing. It becomes conspicuous when he bases the main thrust 
of his process of argumentation on this very concept. 
In his Metaphysik Jaspers points to two different approaches to 
Transcendence : formal transcending and existential relation to transcendence. 
One can apprehend and reduce transcendence to a variety of categories : 
a) the categories of objectivity such as being and nothingness, the one 
and the Many, form and matter, the universal and the particular. 
b) the categories of actuality such as time, space and substance. 
c) the categories of freedom such as possibility, Existenz e tc ' 
Transcendence stands over and above mere concepts and cannot be 
exhausted by the logical categories. They however constitute cipher scripts 
which though they fail to give us knowledge of Transcendence, yet open 
1. Schrago : Jaspers : Beyond Traditional Metaphysics and Ontology in International 
philosophical Quarterly May 1965 p. 175. 
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the way to the existential relation to Transcendence. Jaspers describes 
four existential relations in the form of antinomies.' 
a) Estrangement and love. 
b) Fall and elevation. 
c) Righteousness and passion 
d) Unity and multiplicity. 
Existenz envisages Transcendence as estrangement. Estrangement or 
defiance is grounded in a refusal to identify oneself with the source of 
one's being.^ The question is posed thus : why is one born? Why does 
one suffer and die etc.? Moreover, the desire to question the ways of God 
is a kind of defiance. It may be asked: how is the course of things with its 
oddities and absurdities vindicated? The bounties and gifts of nature are 
not commensurate to the deeds of men. This defiant attitude turns man 
into a cognitive and inquisitive being. 
Jaspers cites the myth of Prometheus who was guilty because he 
introduced knowledge to mankind. Prometheus, the rebel, was accused 
1. Ibid p:176. 
2. Grimeley R : p: 183. 
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of crime because he refused to succumb to force." The story of Job's continuing 
argument with Jehovah is a conspicuous example of the first act of defiance 
against God.^  These myths are similar to the Biblical myth of the fall of man. 
Adam was guilty because he disobeyed God and the lure of knowledge 
caused him to be driven out of Paradise. What is implicit in these myths 
is the sense of freedom. Man's worth and glory lies in his act of defiance. 
Defiance is the natural human response. One who is clear-sighted, 
looks at facts and makes queries and will say 'No'. In defiance one lives 
on one's own impulses, follows one's own whims and chooses one's 
course of action. Godlessness is not defiance. It involves a sense of 
remoteness and a lack of faith. Godlessness may become blasphemous 
and God becomes dead. It is no less true that the Deity does not want him 
to submit blindly. He allows him to be pugnacious and then to resign and 
thus surrender turns into a corollary of defiance. Defiance and surrender 
coalesce when one feels belittled before Transcendence. One feels 
utterly crushed and trembles before the mighty power. 
1. Ibid p : 183 
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Defiance or estrangement is not far removed from love, for it is in 
isolating oneself from Transcendence that one achieves a clear insight 
into and a deep devotion to the source of one's being. Were defiance to 
pre-dominate, Transcendence would vanish and were devotion to triumph 
Existenz would be destroyed.' Estrangement and love go together 
without touching the point of contiguity. To deny God is mere feigning. 
It conceals an implicit affirmation of Him; it is more sublime than blind 
faith. True surrender must spring from a defiance that has been won over 
"To chide God is thus to seek God and every no is a plea for a yes, but 
for a true honest yes".^ 
Elevation and fall 
Existenz is both divorced from existence and is drawn towards it.-' 
One is the author of one's actions and the arbitrator of one's possible 
rise and fall. One enters into communication with one's fellow beings to 
discover their worth and help them come out with the best in them. One 
1. Grimeley R : p: 184. 
2. Jaspers philosophy Vol III p : 71. 
3. Schrago : p : 177. 
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is not genuine if one isolates oneself. Descent or fall is the result of 
affectation in one's behaviour and gestures. One is on the decline if one's 
judgments and approvals are put forward to cover up latent motives. One 
may, for instance, praise a man not because one loves him but because by 
praising him one's intention is to hurt others. Or one may disdain the 
possible Existenz because one does not wish oneself to be evaluated by 
absolute standards. Thus the motive, in both the cases, is the same. 
Historically speaking, elevation and fall are real in the present. The 
transcendent relation of the categories of time stands for the pure present, 
against an immense future and against a sumptuous past. For an Existenz 
the only representation of being is each present moment. The truth is not 
to be located in the past, nor is it preserved in the future. The truth lies in 
realization at the moment into which all history is absorbed. 
One descends, or rises above, if either the demon or the genius (as 
Jaspers terms it) supervenes. Demon and genius are the two aspects of 
one's inner self. Demon is the sinister force in us. It contrives evil and 
instigates us to bring it about. It plunges us into reckless and passionate 
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commitments. Genius stands for loyalty, fidelity, and rationality. While 
genius gives certitude the demon is ambiguous. While the genius speaks 
in a firm clear voice the demon speaks in a hoarse whisper. Jaspers 
expresses these two forms thus, "They are close to me like friends who 
share a long history with me, and they assume the form of enemies who 
challenge or tempt or enchant me. They do not leave me in peace".' 
Righteousness and Passion. 
By 'day and Night' Jaspers seems to evoke two opposed tendencies : 
the one signifies reason, stability, order, consistency, clarity and the other 
is the irrational urge towards darkness, ruin and disaster.^ In the growth 
of the individual both interact with each other and this interaction has its 
impact upon their respective roles. 
Impulse, lust and passion are manifestations of night. The night is 
evil in relation to day, because every definition moves in to the light of 
the day and is relative to the day. In a concrete real situation a decision is 
1. Jaspers: philosophy Vol III p : 80. 
2. Ricocur p : Relation of philosophy to Religion in "The philosophy of Jaspers ed. 
by Schulipp p : 634-35. 
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called for. Come what may, one embarks upon day or surrenders to night. 
But if one surrenders to passion and chooses disaster one is bound to be 
guilty for in so doing one moves away from constructive, harmonious life. 
The theme of guilt dealt with by Jaspers in the boundary situations occurs 
with a new force in the analysis of defiance and of the "passion for the night". 
It seems that one who is guilty of being incited by the passion for the night 
has forfeited the right of being pardoned. Here a question crops up 'Is this 
inevitable guilt directed towards disaster and not towards redemption? Does 
this cover the true guilt which Biblical injunction, in Jaspers phj-ase, equates 
with vanity and servitude' ? What follows from it is that guilt takes a different 
dimension here. It is neither evaded nor redeemed. 
Unity and Multiplicity. 
God is supposed to be One and He is revealed as the ground of all 
Existenz. Though He is in close proximity to us, yet He maintains an 
absolute distance. In Other words though He is too remote and inaccessible, 
yet He is a felt presence. As a concept, the one God is supposed to be a 
1. Ricoeur P : Relation of philosophy to Religion in "The philosophy of Jaspers ed. 
by Schilpp p : 635. 
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personal God who listens and answers our prayers. One invokes God in 
prayer. To quote Jaspers, "Prayer is an invasion of the mystery, an 
importunity which man may dare in his greatest loneliness and need, but 
as a daily habit and developed custom it is a dubious fixation".' To be 
more explicit offering prayers to the Deity every day becomes stereotyped 
and impoverishes the relationship to God. 
Multiplicity is equally defensible. Multiplicity is not a concept set 
apart from unity. It is very much inherent in it. Inspite of long standing 
polytheism the concept of the one Deity has always been there beyond 
all personifications. The idea becomes crystallized as an omnipotent, 
omnipresent, omniscient Deity, as loving and wrathful, as just and 
merciful and so on. The fact however remains that multiplicity has to be 
curbed for the sake of unity. 
From this we go on to divine reserve. God does not manifest Himself 
to us but remains hidden in mystery. He reveals Himself in our 
experience and every feature of it serves as a sign or symbol of his 
presence and will. A symbol denotes some non-objective entity. 
1. Jaspers philosophy Vol 11! p : 111. 
(143) 
The cipher, as Jaspers terms it, resembles the symbol in that both 
refer to an absent and abstract reality." In a cipher, symbol and what is 
symbolised are united in such a way that their separation is not possible. 
In his early writings Jaspers makes a distinction between a cipher and a 
symbol. This corresponds to his distinction between an interpreted and 
an intuitive symbol. An intuitive symbol never takes a final form and has 
no definite meaning. It is simply a code entity. Jaspers, in his later work 
uses cipher and symbol interchangeably thinking that his use of cipher 
will be equated with an intuitive symbol.^ In cipher reading one makes a 
raid on the meaning which is not far removed from the symbol and 
discerns into the very kernel of the cipher itself.^ Instead of finding its 
meaning elsewhere it dissects its interior layers and penetrates its depths. 
Thus they play an evocative and not a semantic role. 
There comes a decisive moment when God permeates a particular 
1. Grimsley R : p: 184. 
2. Schrago : p : 178. 
3. Samay S Reason Revisited : The philosophy of Kanl Jaspers University of Notre 
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object, event or thought so much so that consciousness is saturated with 
it. At that crucial moment all the elements are woven into a rich web of 
meaning and a decisive certitude. However, this certitude is not final or 
absolute: what appears to be the fruit of metaphysical quest becomes the 
starting point for further inquiry.' 
Jaspers has elaborated a hierarchical arrangement of ciphers. He wishes 
to show how consciousness rises from a silent reflection of ciphers to a 
meditative awareness of Transcendence without going out of the domain 
of symbolism.^ 
Such an experience takes place when one is free from all distractions and when 
one detaches oneself from all objects and pre-occupations. It is in the midst of 
such elevated moments that Transcendence dawns upon us and one feels the 
presence of Transcendence pervading all things. Since one does not deliberately 
invoke these states so when they come one discards them as merely subjective. 
But if one accepts them without bias, they can bring revelation in a flash.^ 
1. Samay S : p: 177-78. 
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Jaspers calls this phase as 'the immediate incommunicable language of 
being'. This sublime experience is the reading of the first language. Its 
reading does not depend upon a rational approach or logical insight. It 
goes beyond that : the most superb thoughts are conveyed through the 
most trivial aspects of reality. A metaphysical experience cannot be 
delineated or demonstrated nor can it be produced at one's will. One's 
experience of a cipher diminishes when it is universalized.lt is rich when 
it rests on the particular and it is grasped there and then.' 
At first one is a silent recipient but immediately it advances towards 
communication. The silent recipient formulates his experience in terms 
of language. Thus a second stage begins which may be termed as mythical 
communication. In this phase man detaches himself from the immediate 
present and tries to articulate his experience. What was basically the 
language of Transcendence becomes part of culture. Mythical language 
both preserves and transmits the original experience.^ It appears in three 
1. Grimsley : p: 186-87. 
2. Samay S : p: 179. 
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forms: as myths, as revelations of a beyond and as mythical realities.' 
a) One encounters the Greek gods in the objects of nature. Hence they 
are personified and stand parallel to physical realities. Jaspers seems to 
refer to experiences like spanning the sublimity of the sea through its 
immensity etc.^ In other words, it is the vastness of the sea which instils 
in us a sense of awe. Myths are based on a complex logical structure 
which is not easy to comprehend. They serve to ease existential tensions 
not rationally but by telling a story. Myth is meaningful for one who has 
faith in its trutn although one has not arrived at it by one's own insight. 
b) The myth of a world beyond reality reduces empirical reality to mere 
sensory phenomena. Existenz makes intrusion into the supersensory world 
which is coalesced with Existenz by revelation. 
c) At the third level all reality becomes mythical. Jaspers gives the 
example of Van Gogh for the use of imagination to invoke a world 
1. Thyssen j : the concept of foundering in "The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by Schilpp 
p : 308 
2. Thyssen J : The concept of foundering in "The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by Schilpp 
p : 307 
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beyond this physical world but manifested in it. Van Gogh's paintings 
make an appeal because he sought a mythical quality in landscape, 
people and things. 
Finally one formulates one's own cipher-script or one's thinking 
itself becomes symbolical. Such a form of expression is more coherent 
and rational than the language of myth.' In other words, one tends to give 
an existential interpretation and a metaphysical meaning for the 
mundane course of events. 
Another way to talk of Transcendence is to talk of it analogically. But 
this apprehension remains on the speculative level. Speculation is not a 
cult, it is only an analogous to it. Speculation reveals the ciphers, not the 
Absolute which the cult evokes in prayer. Thus it is not the nature of God 
that matters but the relationship to Him. There is beyond all philosophizing 
a certitude that God is, no matter how faint that certainty my be.^ 
A third way of speaking the speculative language is evident when one 
1. Grimsley : p: 186. 
2. Wallraeff : p: 188. 
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discovers being ontologically. In other words, one comprehends one's 
substratum as the same with being. 
The fourth way is to reflect upon the origin and end of all things. This 
contemplative way of apprehending Reality takes us to the brink of a 
precipice where one encounters Nothingness or experiences God'. 
The rich abundance of ciphers include everything that comes within 
the range of one's experience no matter how trivial it is^. Thus it is not 
limited to the three cipher forms mentioned above. In the realm of 
ciphers one is nearer to Transcendence and also farther away from it. It 
is so because the symbol influences extraneously. The cipher makes 
Transcendence transparent without impairing either Existenz or 
Transcendence. However, a penetration into cipherology makes 
Transcendence into an object, and subjective behaviour patterns are 
conceded for the apprehension of metaphysical experience. 
According to Jaspers, each symbol represents Transcendence in all 
1. Ibid : p: 182. 
2. Grimsley : p: 187. 
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fairness and totality. There may be disparities as far as proximity and 
remoteness go, but every symbol is an aspect of Transcendence as an 
absolute. However an access to Transcendence is always beyond any 
cipher or myth. 
There is a perfect unity between Transcendence and the physical 
object which symbolizes it so much so that an interpretation would mean 
a violation of this unity. A conscious symbolism wherein things have 
their co-relates in terms of signs, metaphors and models is not a 
cipherscript. An unconscious symbolism is equivalent to that in which 
one places a cipher parallel to Transcendence and it is in this alone that 
Transcendence manifests itself. Thus the cipher is what it is, it cannot be 
explained in terms of something else. 
The apprehension of Transcendence through the ciphers is a continuous 
achievement as well as a recurrent loss. The expression of being is silent. 
What will speak depends on the Existenz that sympathetically listens to 
it. Ciphers are saturated with meaning everywhere but are not always 
intelligible. The truth of the cipher depends on the person who beholds 
(150) 
this truth. Its ambiguity is not cleared by one's effort or endeavour. Each 
of the countless number of ciphers can be read in numerous ways and 
each attempt to read becomes a cipher, their ambiguity is their very 
essense'. It may be added that to read the ciphers is not to be learned for 
it is a matter of faith. Furthermore, the transcendent experience which is 
conveyed by empirical facts loses its veracity when it is universalized 
and prescribed for all. 
There is a definite systematization as far as ciphers are concerned. 
They are not all on the same plane. Jaspers treats nature as a cipher. 
Nature as a cipher Inpoetry and in painting the natural world is treated 
as a cipher. Ciphers are found in nature as well, for our existence is a 
part of nature. Objects of nature fill us with a rich and indelible 
experience. The import of these ciphers of nature is that they are a means 
of human interaction. It touches our sensitivity' and gives us immense 
joy. One feels a sympathetic affinity with one's fellow beings. 
Hoffman K : Basic concepts of Jaspers philosophy in "The philosophy of Jaspers 
ed. by Schilpp P.A. p : 108. 
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History. The past is preserved whereas the future is the reservoir of 
immense and unknown possibilities. History educates us according to 
the divine plan. We obey' are disobey God and are likewise rewarded or 
punished individually or as people. We live under the protection or threats 
of God. History is regarded as a progress or an evolution. 
Man : The cipher par-excellence is individual existence, for here 
self-determination and choice is the conjunction of nature and history in 
a microcosm. Thus in Jaspers' philosophy art mediates the reading of 
ciphers in nature, history and in man provided this mediation takes place 
at the intuitive level.' 
Thus myth, poetry and the plastic arts suggest a certain 'aestheticism' 
because Jaspers gives to art a seriousness which is contrary to the 
conception of "art for art's sake". It may be added that in Jaspers art 
becomes an aesthetic equivalent of revelation.^ According to Jaspers 
religious myths and dogmas are valid as ciphers, but they should not claim 
1. Ricoeur P : Relation of philosophy to Religion in "The philosophy of Jaspers ed. 
by Schilpp P.A. p : 626. 
2. Ibid p : 627 
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to be more than that. The ciphers provide no definite conclusion. Their 
language is ambiguous and leads on to different interpretations. 
According to Jaspers the fruitlessness of all endeavour to apprehend 
the absolute is itself the expression of an ultimate cipher which we may 
call the cipher of foundering.' Foundering is a pointer to that invincible 
hitch which Jaspers delineates in the boundary situations. In other words, 
in the boundary situations and in foundering, too, one encounters an 
insuperable situation, against which we either shatter or collapse. 
Foundering, one may add, determines all other ciphers though in itself it 
remains uninterpretable.^ 
According to Jaspers, Transcendence is apprehended when one makes 
a leap from anguish to calmness. Furthermore, it is not a passive endurance 
but bearing suffering with every iota of strength that remains. It is in this 
active suffering that one experiences foundering. 
1. Thyssen J : The concept of foundering in "The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by Schilpp 
p : 312. 
2. Thyssen J : The concept of foundering in "The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by Schilpp 
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The^reality of Transcendence is apprehended in its relation to 
embodiment. It is so because man has a psychological yearning to see the 
deity clothed in corporeality. Opposed to it is the immanent reality which 
has the abundant wealth of phenomena and all that manifests itself to 
one's senses. Thus cipher or reality : that is the heart of the issue. 
The pertinent question that faces us is : whether reality stripped off 
corporeality can remain, effective as a cipher ? Is the cipher strong enough 
to exercise force awaken and guide us is it as strong as embodiment or 
even stronger? Take for instance the eternal punishment of hell which is 
supposed to be a very influential cipher. The question arises whether the 
cipher makes an impact if one is not threatened with a future hell or is it 
the human actions which carry weight? Instead of separating guilt from 
punishment, that is the sin committed now would be answerable only in 
the hell in future.' will the cipher be strong enough to invoke the feeling 
of remorse which follows as a result of wrong action? Has the cipher an 
appealing force to invoke our existential decision to win or lose ourselves? 
1. Jaspers : philosophical faith and Revelation p : 102-103. 
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In the past, cipher language, and embodiment were intelligible to the 
common man: it was the air they breathed in. To day the situation has 
changed. The cipher language is not tied to embodiment. Embodiment 
cannot be maintained in a world tainted with scientific realism. Thus 
embodiment may strengthen us psychologically, but weakens existential 
certitude.' 
Every embodiment, as an object of empirical observation, has a general 
character and is likewise replaceable. Embodiment enjoys distinction 
when it is taken in to historic consciousness and thus becomes unique 
and irreplaceable. For example, faith in revelation rests upon a unique 
historic embodiment. The revealed God was not embodied once upon a 
time he remains embodied at each moment here and now. Though the 
corporeality of God is rooted in time, yet the cipher that becomes 
conspicuous in the revealed God is not tied to the corporeality of revelation. 
In other words, we may say that though God has revealed himself at a 
particular moment, yet this moment is arrested for all times to come. The 
1. Jaspers : philosophical faith and Revelation p : 104. 
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cipher that emerges as powerful, challenging and commanding is still 
not bound to the corporeality of revelation. Thus cipher, too, is historic 
but its embodiment is in language which is mute and is called language 
only metaphorically.' 
An embodied God is also a personal God. Our thinking fascinates us 
to equate the personal God with Transcendence. The cipher of the per-
sonal God is the only communication of the human and the divine as I 
and thou. We assign attributes to the personal God as one who protects 
and commands, is merciful and wrathful, loving and forgiving etc. Man 
approaches Him with utter trust but also fearfully. In prayer man feels 
personally addressed by God and addresses Him in return. He beacons 
Him in the hour of need and also surrenders to His will. He asks 
questions and complains to Him. He expects answers and is forsaken if 
he doesn't hear from Him. He listen to God's directives and goes his way 
by reposing trust in Him. He will feel the presence of God while fighting 
injustice, in being benevolent to his neighbour and even in the most 
agonizing moments of life. 
1. Jaspers : philosophical faith and Revelation p : 107. 
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This personal God is the cipher of Transcendence. In the Old Testament 
we have both the commandments to make no image or likeness as well as 
an abundant images of the personal God. The commandment refers to 
Transcendence while the images and likeness are the ciphers of 
Transcendence. Throughout the Old Testament the tension persists between 
Transcendence which is real without image or likeness and Jehovoh who 
reveals himself concretely.' The cipher of the personal God had a tremendous 
effect whether he resides somewhere on Mount Sinai or in Heaven. 
Besides the personal God there is the incarnated God Christ who is 
regarded as a unique cipher. The incarnation of God in Jesus is not just 
any incarnation, it is of the one God and all the other so-called in 
carnations are false. Christians believe that God is present in human form 
and He is both human and divine at the same time. It is laid down in the 
New Testament that God is physically present, rose in flesh and blood, 
was crucified, showed himself to his disciples and talked to them. Belief 
in the truth of this testimony is the basis of the Christian faith. Here we 
I. Ibid p: 141. 
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find not the propagation of any doctrine, the framing of any law, or the 
furnishing of guidance. Primarily it is the revelation of God assuming 
human form, entering in to the world and under going extreme suffering. 
His human experience is such that he is to die alone, on the cross forsaken 
even by God. But the end is the resurrection in the flesh, the miracle that 
voids all suffering and anguish. To believers this act of God is historic 
reality in the world of objective fact.' Ciphers are supposed to give us 
access to this revealed reality. They refer to God's emergence in to the 
world at one particular place. They mark a fictitious point where the 
reality of Transcendence and the spatial temporal reality are to coincide. 
Such an inter position is superfluous for Transcendence is still hidden 
from us.^ Those who are witness to this revealed reality put a stamp on 
the authority of this revealed reality but declares the process of 
revelation as come to a closed In other words revelation is concerned 
with time, with the particular instant when God entered in to the world. 
1. Jaspers: philosophical faith and Revelation p : 145. 
2. Ibid p : 109. 
3. Ibidp : 110. 
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It is the basic perversion of thought to transform cipher language in 
to embodied reality. One draws a sharp line between reality and cipher 
because cipher is never the reality of Transcendence but only its possible 
language. One wants to seek purity and the purity of any cipher depends 
on truthfulness. One must be truthful enough not to mistake it for 
embodied reality. 
Man dwells in the realm of ciphers from the day he starts thinking, 
but it is only when his vision expands that he purifies this realm of ciphers.' 
This realm of ciphers is not a series of signs-for signs denote something 
which can be said, seen or known directly. There are modes of ciphers. 
Ciphers mean a language that is understood in ciphers alone that does 
not denote something else and whose speaking subject is unknown, 
unknowable and untraceable. They can be interpreted, but only partially, 
their meaning remains inexplicable. Anything can act as a cipher whether 
it be real or a product of imagination. Ciphers are sought in mythological, 
ritual, poetic and artistic tradition as well as in philosophy.^ 
1. Ibid p : 93. 
2. Jaspers : philosophical faith and Revelation p : 123. 
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Art and poetry are the fountain head of the most splendid and purest 
cipher language. They lift us out of barbarism and make us human. The 
great poets, Dante and Shakespeare, manifest ciphers through their 
poetry which fascinates us because they mean no such embodiment as a 
fixed cult does in its object of faith. Poetry delights us in forms and 
figures because we enjoy a lack of commitment and the appearance of all 
possibilities of life, the good as well as the evil. 
Ciphers cannot be arranged in a particular order because any attempt 
to infix them would diminish them. To quote Jaspers "to stay alive, they 
must remain suspended. Talking in ciphers we are philosophically truth 
only as long as we keep them in this suspension." As far as their inter-
pretation goes, they never mean what we seek, sense or experience in 
them. Hence our effort to transcend penetrate or ascend to the height 
fails. Thus speechlessness is the limit of inter pretation: it culminates in 
silence. Yet this silence is achieved not by abstaining from thought and 
speech but to carry them to extremes where they make us fall into taciturnity.' 
1. Jaspers : philosophical faith and Revelation p : 124. 
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The cipher world is not a harmonious realm, but a struggle is waged 
for the purity of ciphers against their realization in myths and revelations. 
To be more explicit, it a struggle for the reality of Transcendence against 
its distortion : it is fought for its preservation against its confusion. 
The second struggle is waged in ciphers against other ciphers and does 
not emerge till the first, for the purity of cipher world has been won. 
This struggle begins when ciphers evoke an existential response. Some 
ciphers will envision our path in life, while others may be repudiated for 
seducing us. Some ciphers may fascinate us whereas others may instil a 
feeling of rebellion in us. It is also possible that they may not create an 
impact upon us at all." In this struggle of ciphers, it is the truth of 
individual cipher which is at stake its import and its proximity to the 
ground of Transcendence. 
A silent struggle ensues in our soul unknowingly even unconsciously 
in the way we live with the ciphers. We may meet them casually or 
impressed by them or turn them down-the crux is always the struggle for 
1. Ibidp : 125-26. 
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the adoption of what guides us. This determines our attitude towards them 
all and our association with them.' We cannot explicitly explain this core 
or pervasive principle because we have no pivotal point where all things 
are apprehended and where every thing in its place is true and real. 
Ciphers have their weight in an ascending order. First they are 
manifested in aestheticism as convey multiple meanings. Then we feel 
their impact and partake of them. Finally they illuminate Existenz in real 
situations. There is no objective neutral understanding of ciphers.^ The 
interpreter either aims at a rational, psychological or sociological 
explanation of them or at a personal experience of them by living in them. 
Both ways are distinguished in principle and are not distinct in actual 
interpretation. What begins as an objective observation in myths and 
symbols can in fact become a form of adoption.^ 
The cipher realm that speaks to the individual may be scant and arid 
or rich and abundant. The struggle that takes place in this realm is for the 
1. Jaspers : philosophical faith and Revelation p : 127. 
2. Ibidp : 119. 
3. Ibidp: 117. 
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achievement of truth and the most conspicuous is the struggle for truth 
itself. The cipher struggle continues even if we are not conscious of it or 
ignore it as trivial. Sometimes we may forget it, and often it makes us 
self conscious. This struggle keeps our mind open, urges communication 
and removes the bars to our understanding. Mutual understanding in 
ciphers means communication in contact with Transcendence. It allows 
the most profound ties and the most strange antagonism. Men who feel 
an affinity with Transcendence are still forced to struggle for the purity 
of the ciphers. It is the case when there is a rift between men but they 
still want to understand each other, not in this or that language, but in 
the whole motion of the cipher world. 
In a critique of Jaspers' concept of Transcendence, Holm has rightly 
pointed out that Jaspers doesn't give an anthropomorphic concept of God. 
But he puts up the question whether cipher is only real and God merely a 
fictitious notion. He finds it difficult to separate reality from symbolism 
in Jaspers' philosophy. Holm further inquires whether God is to be 
understood ontologically or only axiologically. He himself answers this 
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query by saying that Jaspers has not raised these issues sharply and he 
would reject these possibilities. Jaspers himself affirms that with this 
last statement Holm has understood him perfectly well." 
Jaspers points out that Pfeiffer has expressed this objection most 
beautifully. He asks whether it is presumptuous on our part to speak of 
God at all. Lichtigfeld too recognizes in Jaspers thinking the Biblical 
idea of an unpictured God^. 
Jaspers elucidates his position by saying that though one finds a clue 
to Transcendence in ciphers, yet this reality is not present in any cipher 
or myth\ When Jasphers speaks of demythification he does not mean the 
interpretation of mythical content but rather a going beyond all myths. 
Thus it is a reality which is beyond all myths and thinking though 
experienced only in myths and thoughts^ 
1. Reply to may critics in "The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by Schilpp p : 781. 
2. Ibid p : 783. 
3. Reply to may crities in "The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by Schilpp p : 783. 




A modest attempt to elucidate Existenz in the boundary situations 
necessitates a critical analysis of both Existenz and boundary situations. 
But before we could do it, let us hurriedly examine the points of criticism 
raised against Jaspers' philosophy in general. 
Mr. Samay in his book "Reason Revisited" has levelled the charge 
against Jaspers that his philosophical system is positionless. Jaspers does 
not attempt a massive system that claims universal validity. Such a kind of 
modesty may be genuine and should not end the philosophical quest itself.' 
Jaspers himself says that this is a deliberate attempt on his part 
because he does not want imprison the reader to be tethered to definite 
positions. He would like him to retain an order of possibilities whence to 
choose a definite standpoint on his own.^ 
Jaspers goes on to say that he does not offer his system of thinking as 
1. Samay : Reaon revisited, p. 248-49. 
2. Reply to may critics in "The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by Schilpp p : 833-34. 
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the only true one but he only tries to work out ideas. These ideas do not 
leave everything in suspense: there is implicit in it a sort of decision. He 
invites the reader to an analogous decision, namely, to come to oneself 
as Existenz.' 
Baumgarten maintains that Jaspers' philosophy revolves round a fixed 
centre. It is Jaspers' contention that his thought moves round something 
which at the centre implies guidance. From this follows well-defined 
decisions which are not supposed to resolve into abstract formulas. His 
thought, therefore contains both complete tolerance and unconditional 
determination.^ 
Kenning says that in Jaspers, emphasis falls more on striving than on 
its content, more on potentiality than on stability, more on freedom than 
on obedience, more on the future than on the past.^ 
As regards Jaspers' philosophy it has been pointed out that if we sift 
his terminology we find that what he has to say is basically very simple 
1. Ibidp : 829. 
2. Schilpp : The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by p. 833-34. 
3. Schilpp : p. 830-31. 
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Even so it is an arduous undertaking to penetrate through the dense 
vocabulary in which his thought is expressed. Moreover, it is only when 
we take off layer after layer of this vocabulary that we are able to make 
some headway with his thought and grasp its full content. 
It may be maintained that Jaspers' existentialism is a philosophy of 
Becoming rather than of Being. It is thus anti-intellectualistic and 
voluntaristic. Like many German thinkers, Hegel, Schopenhauer 
Nietzsche, Jaspers prizes more the 'elan' of seeking and striving rather 
than of possession.' The critics of Jaspers in their argument point out 
that Jaspers' philosophizing is not based on logical reasoning. Jaspers 
has a good reason to do so for the suspension of logic must give way to 
philosophical faith. Taking the boundary situations one by one we find 
that he does not round them off by way of logical unity, nor does he find 
a rational coherence in them. They are all harmonized when they are 
merged iijlo Transcendence. 
Not only the boundary situations but all existential concepts like 
1. Reinhardt K.F. : The Existentialist Revolt, p. 198. 
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freedom, communication, historicity etc. sink in to Transcendence. 
As far as the concept of freedom is concerned, Jaspers concludes by 
saying that freedom assumes meaning only in its relation to Transcendence. 
In other words freedom is a gift from Transcendence. It is bestowed upon us 
from above. So freedom coupled with necessity is the essence of freedom. 
Historicity, too, finds its culmination in the ciphers because they 
refer to God's emergence in to the world at one particular place and time. 
Ciphers are supposed to give us access to the interposed and revealed 
reality. They mark a fictitious point where the reality of Transcendence 
and spatial temporal reality are to coincide. Such an inter position is 
super fluous for Transcendence is still hidden from us.' One must make a 
distinction between cipers, words, writings which are tied to the revealed 
reality and ciphers, words, writings which are the work of man. Those 
who are witness to this revealed reality put a stamp on the authority of 
this reality but declare the process of revelation come to a close.^ In other 
1. Jaspers : philosophical faith and Revelation p : 109. 
2. Ibid p : 110. 
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words revelation is concerned with time with the particular instant when 
God entered into the world. To believers revelation is a reality in so far 
as God is a historic phenomenon in the world of objective fact. 
Communication too consummates in its link to Transcendence. 
According to Jaspers communication with the deity is superior to 
communication with man Although in the literal sense there is no 
communication between Transcendence and Existenz, yet one is assured 
of His presence in one's will to communicate with one's neighbour. Such 
communication is a kind of holy communion and divine service. To speak 
with Franz Kafka "This relationship to our neighbour is the relation of 
prayer.' 
According to Jaspers love finds its fulfilment in Transcendence. He 
sees in love the human endeavour for union with God through communi-
cation with man. This concept was first hinted at by Plato who found its 
Christian version in Augustine and then Kierkegaard confirmed it.^ 
1. Kaufmann F : A philosophy of communication in the philosophy of Jaspers ed. by 
Schiipp P.A. p : 223. 
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Although it is through love that God can be experienced, God is not love. 
It is only by way of a symbol that one can speak of him as love. 
As far as his procedural analysis goes Jaspers insists and rightly so 
that thinking proceeds from experience.' In the boundary situation he 
pursues the same line of thought. As regards death he explains it on an 
empirical basis saying that it is an objective fact, and that it is inevitable. 
Likewise, we come across, on the one hand, the responses of the 
common man and on the other the existential answer of a truly Existenz 
being. 
If we make an attempt at elucidation of existence, we may employ the 
negative method. We would point out what existence is not. According 
to Jaspers existence is not something given, present and positive.^ It is 
something which is created, moulded and shaped. The affirmation that 
existence is both what is, and itself makes what is poses a serious 
problem for us. How can one think of something that is its own cause and 
1. Samay S p : 251. 
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effect, donor and indebtor at the same time." We may meet this objection 
by saying that existence is the reservoir of immense potentialities and 
existence has a lot of plasticity in it : thus it can always be fashioned 
cultivated and refined. 
Existence is absolutely dissimilar to things in the world. The 
individuality of things consists in their each being a member of a class of 
things and they can be known through class concepts. Existence is not an 
illustrative case of a class and hence cannot be known thus : it can only 
be elucidated.^ 
According to Jaspers in speaking of existence we use concepts like 
temporality and eternity simultaneously. Existence has consciousness of 
both being in time and being above it : Jaspers calls this form of 
consciousness 'historical'. 
Similarly solitude and communication refer equally to existence. One 
learns of solitude only when one encounters the other in communication 
1. Samay S p : 142. 
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and one enters into communication only as a solitary being.' The theme 
of communication tempers the isolation of existence and thus through 
the concept of communication the autocreation of the individual is 
expanded into a reciprocal creation. 
The solidarity of a person no longer appears as an endeavour of a 
lonely person facing a hostile world but a gift and a blessing received 
from a friend who inspires authenticity in oneself while receiving the 
same through him. This relationship protects the participants against 
being, impersonalized at each others' expense. Instead of making every 
effort to keep the other as an object, communicative existence challenges 
the other person to come out with the best in him. Instead of passing on 
and receiving general in formation, both the combatants speak in their 
own person and express their own selves. Existential communication is 
not a mere utterance in public but a revelation and a sharing.^ 
Samay expresses it thus, "The language that serves such an existential 
1. Ibid p : 156-57. 
2. Samay S p : 151. 
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dialogue cannot be a neutral meeting ground, a linguistic no man's land 
where nameless opponents discuss some abstract issue but rather must be 
the very battle-field of a 'loving struggle' where two persons meet face 
to face not to vanquish but to liberate each other."' 
Whereas ordinary communication sink differences between the 
combatants, existential communication shows a preference for the unique 
personal and particular aspects of communication and puts a premium on 
self expression. 
4 
Existential communication is the delicate hyphen which both links 
and separates the selves who meet there. That is why loving struggle is 
the permanent situation of existential communication : love seems to unite, 
while struggle separates and loving struggle maintains this unity in 
separation.^ 
According to Jaspers existence has an antinomical structure. It is 
asserted that what has positive worth in its has a negative aspect too. 
1. Samay : Reaon revisited, p. 248-49. 
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One is released from the negative side only at the price of losing the 
positive one. The antinomical structure of existence implies its fragile, 
brittle nature. In choosing a particular course of action one weighs the 
different possibilities and favours that which promises optimum results. 
Hartmann expresses a similar view when he says that if we observe 
the table of values we find a contradiction in them. For example, one 
who considers justice above love gives preference to justice although the 
two values justice and love are not opposed to each other. Every such 
decision favours only one side not both at the same time. Hence it is both 
a fulfilment and a violation of the valuational scheme.' 
According to Jaspers a sort of tension is generated when one has to 
choose between mere existence and Existence. This also takes the form 
of an antinomy. One way of evading the situation is to adopt the attitude 
of a spectator who merely beholds life from a high pedestal instead of 
living it through himself. He is fascinated by the alternative courses open 
to him and refrains from making a genuine choice. 
I. Hartman N : Ethics Vol II george Allen and UnwRin New York The Macmillan 
Company 1951 p : 77. 
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The other way of evasion is to undermine one of the terms of the 
antinomy by illuminating the other. In so doing one suppresses the 
precarious demand of the concrete situation. 
A boundary situation is expressed in an antinomy, too. Man as a 
mortal, suffering and sinful being faces the challenge whether to 
succumb to these situations or to stare at them undauntingly. The 
experience of the boundary situation however makes us desperate and 
lonely. Such a feeling is associated with man's need for Transcendence. 
For it is precisely within this physical domain that man apprehends the 
absolute presence of Transcendence. Boundary situations are thus merged 
in to Transcendence. In other words, it provides the vantage point from 
which to look at these situations. 
We begin with death. From the experience of death which is unique 
and single (happens only once) we infer the power of one God.' As death 
never recurs and doesn't take place in a similar way, so the experience of 
1. Kunz : Jaspers' concept of Transcendence in The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by 
Schilppp : 514-515. 
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Gods' presence is unique and is peculiar to each individual. Moreover, 
the singularity of factual death is revealed in potential death. Death as 
viewed by us is something far-fetched and beyond our comprehension. It 
is felt close when it is encountered as the specific death of a specific 
individual. For this reason along with death, we speak simultaneously of 
possible death. It is this immanent death which points towards the 
beyond himself of man's being.' 
Jaspers says that Kunz's analysis of the concept of death is open to 
question. Jaspers points out that the certainty of death as based upon the 
experience it death is subject to criticism. The prospect of death which is 
foreshadowed in such psychological states as conditions of illness, one's 
own constitution and the concrete situations in which one is placed seems 
inevitable. It may be pointed out that there is certainly no fact which is 
common to all human beings. Moreover, there is a contradiction in 
saying that one does not believe in one's own death even though one is 
aware by experience of its occurrence. One is so much immersed in 
1. Kunz : Jaspers' concept of Transcendence in "The philosophy of Jaspers" ed. 
by Schilpp P.A. p : 505-506. 
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being alive that at the conscious level one does not realize death even 
though one affirms it at the intellectual level.' 
The second argument Kunz offers must also be examined. The presence 
of potential death within man as the source of the idea of Being. One is 
pressed by the need to question, search and discover the origination and 
destination of one's being. By this idea of derivation Kunz seems to mould 
the very old philosophical problem of being and Nothingness.^ 
Summing up, we may hold that death no doubt finishes off life but the 
boundary situation of death makes us face the pertinent question whether 
one has lived an abundant and rich life or not. It may also be added that 
Jaspers stands for the acceptance of death without any furtherance of life 
in the next world. This is so because he categorically rejects the notion 
of immortality. 
Immortality, as Jaspers understands it, is not a metaphysical certainty 
that belongs to the future, it is immanent in being. When one thinks of 
1. Reply to may critics in "The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by Schilpp p : 820-21. 
2. Reply to may critics in "The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by Schilpp p : 822-23. 
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immortality one does it in concrete terms. Jaspers, however, insists that 
it must be apprehended symbolically by way of a cipher. What follows 
from it is that we must face death as a boundary and as far as immortality 
is concerned it is shrouded by a grim unknowability. 
Rejecting immortality, Jaspers goes on to affirm the authenticity of 
existence. Thus in favour of an elevated Existenz, one may disdain 
existence. Hence in moments of exaltation, like an act commitment in 
view of a heroic deed or at the point of a great venture, man em.braces 
death and finds dying easy. Death is thus counterpoised to existential 
non-being. Death is also encountered by the individual within the 
specificity of the historic character of each moment. In other words it is 
the transient moment that announces death. Pause and duration are the 
possible symbols of eternity. 
One is filled with false optimism when one is blind to eternity, talks 
away death and trusts in reason. True optimism, on the other hand, makes 
us look into the abyss of reality.' 
1. Reply to may critics p : 831-32. 
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The notion of suffering is next to death in Jaspers' thought. One finds 
a clue to this concept in Jaspers' voluminous book "The Great Philoso-
phers". Here Buddha is described as posing the three pertinent questions: 
what is suffering ? Whence does it come how can it be overcome? He 
prescribes the path which leads to redemption from suffering.' In the same 
book Jesus case is also cited: he had to undergo terrible suffering. But he 
did not suffer passively. He acted in such a way that his suffering should 
be a goad to men. 
Jaspers, in another of his major works "philosophical faith and 
Revelation" clinches the issue. He envisages the problem of evil from 
two angles. According to Jaspers all evil is rooted in the very nature of 
things. All entities are potentially perfect but actually imperfect. They 
are limited and unfinished. Furthermore, all entities are antithetical. Such 
an antithesis is expressed in terms of two opposed powers. In the physical 
world it exists as light and darkness, in society as constructive and 
destructive elements and in action as good and evil. Evil from a different 
I. Jaspers : The great philosophers ed by Arendt it. Translated by Manhein R : Printed 
in U.S.A. 1962 p: 33. 
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angle is mere nonbeing. It is simply lack or omission of good.' 
Evil, as a matter of fact, calls for a basic distinction to be made 
between physical suffering and moral evil. One lies in nature, the other 
in man. The former springs from necessity, the latter from freedom. To 
take a few examples one may say that man is assailed by physical ills and 
sufferings, like the ailments which not only shatter human existence but 
also destroy human physique. There are congenital defects and 
abnormalities. There is suffering which man entails upon himself. 
And, moreover there ismisery and pain caused by servitude. There is 
deterioration caused by poverty and starvation. Thus there is no limit to 
human suffering, true there are various degrees of suffering but suffering, 
nevertheless, is an inevitable accompaniment of life. No one is relieved 
of it fully. Moreover, everyone is supposed to bear his burden alone. 
According to Jaspers there is dysteleology manifested in the disaster, 
ruin and misery of life but there is still the mysterious teleology exhibited 
Jaspers : philosophical faith and Revelation translated by Ashton E. B. Harper and 
Row publishes New York p : 244-45. 
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in the glory and beauty of life.' Thus, instead of ignoring and reducing 
pain and suffering, one should illuminate the other aspect of reality. 
One may high-light the poise, equilibrium and coherence which is no 
less apparent. 
The antithesis between good and evil is symbolised by Jaspers as 
'Law of the day' and Passion for the Night'. The former signifies reason, 
stability, even fidelity and the latter aims at destruction. It is an 
embodiment of defiance. Jaspers also speaks of genius and demon which 
refer to the humane and rebellious aspects of human beings. Genius is 
the inherent goodness latent in man and demon is the passionate side of 
his nature. Hence genius and demon stand for the godly and satanic 
elements of human nature. Thus damnation and grace run a parallel 
course in Jaspers' thought. 
After suffering and death, the third boundary situation is guilt. The 
moral wrong lies in the will and action of the human beings and the 
metaphysical wrong in the ground of one's being. In other words, one is 
1. Jaspers : philosophical faith and revelation p : 255. 
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guilty through the very fact of being finite. To accept one self thus is to 
choose to be guilty. Thus guilt lies at the root of freedom. 
This confusion between guilt and finitude is supposed to be one of 
the serious problems of existentialist philosophy. Christianity does not 
regard guilt as one of the constituents of existence. Thus finitude appears 
as an ontological concept and guilt as an ethical concept.' It is the 
Christian belief that the death of Jesus on the cross is an atonement of 
the sins of mankind which is confirmed by faith. 
So far as Jaspers is concerned he is opposed to the Christian concept 
which covers up guilt. According to him, no one can atone for the other's 
sins and no one is answerable for it. He is opposed to redpmpticn cf Vvhicli 
man in his faith is certain and goes on sinning shamefacedly because of 
this faith.^ Jaspers' concept of guilt is certainly distinct from Christian sense 
of sin. It does not envisage any forgiveness, nor does one emerge as a 
1. Ricoem P : Relation of philosophy to Religion in The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by 
Schiipp p : 632. 
2. Reply to may critics in "The philosophy of Jaspers" ed. by Schiipp p : 780. 
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happy well-integrated and innocent being.' Guilt, in the Jasperian sense, 
leads to foundering, but to achieve authenticity one must insist on 
recognizing the full amount of wrong that has been done. The only purity 
one can have in this world is to take up guilt and responsibility with an 
active conscience. 
Agreed that guilt cannot be eradicated but it can certainly be 
condoned by that most wonderful act of communication which is called 
good will. Forgiveness is a matter of understanding between two human 
beings. It is born of love and it clears all malice leaving only the good 
will to prevail. Thus guilt is counter-poised by good will. 
The fourth boundary situation is struggle. According to Jaspers to exist 
and to struggle are one and the same thing. No matter how passively one 
resists and whatever peaceful and fair means one uses in this respect, the 
struggle always comes to an end in the subsistence of one participant and the 
deprivation of another, the office and rank of one and the unemployment 
1. Ricoeur P : Relation of philosophy to Religion in The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by 
Schilpp p : 633. 
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of the other. Hence a clash is bound to take place between the legitimate 
claims of two persons. 
There are some people who are more active than others. They aspire 
to grow and develop more rapidly. They struggle in a harmonious way 
using peaceful measures or express themselves in an open antagonism 
using all sorts of ingenious means, fraud treachery perjidy. But, says 
Jaspers, "If the use of force does not end with the destruction of one side 
it will buttress a social relationship in which the victor has gained power 
and the vanquished preferring to stay alive has taken it upon himself to 
serve and to be ruled."' 
Moreover, the practical affairs of everyday life imperil life and health. 
It is asserted that population increases so enormously ihai however 
abundantly we enlarge our food supply scarcity will always be there. The 
vast disparities among human beings cannot be defined so that a distribution 
of tasks and labour according to these differences, is not feasible. 
Indisputably every individual faces marginal situations where the 
1. Jaspers : Philosophy. Vol. II. p: 205. 
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determining element is not order but violent force. And one unscrupu-
lously puts the other on the altar in order to establish his own solidarity. 
Besides, a correct organization of human existence would not do even 
if it were guided by a thorough insight. A penetrating gaze into the heart 
of the matter will show up more intricacies. They yield nothing but the 
instinct for power, desire, dominance, and the exercise of force open or 
concealed. Hence an accurate rational arrangement is only provisional 
and of limited value. 
Jaspers was not certainly oblivious of the fact that existence no doubt 
depends on struggle, force or power but it depends on cooperation, 
compromise and understanding as well. In the first instance we depend 
on our parents' ministration. We owe to them guidance and training. 
To be sure we see in everyday life place for all-peace, agreement, 
harmony - any way they are necessary for existence itself. Furthermore, 
freedom, justice, love, friendship and fidelity are valuable words for us. 
Agreed that waste, disintegration, chaos and anarchy are abundantly found 
in life, but life is also not wanting in coherence, cohesion and harmony 
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either. Struggle, on the empirical level, is perhaps not a new concept. 
But struggle for the achievement of one's authentic existence which is 
termed as loving struggle is a unique concept of Jaspers. Jaspers has 
juxtaposed struggle for material expansion with struggle which is waged 
for our noble self. In other words, this violent struggle for survival is 
superseded by a striving which is for a much higher purpose, that is, for 
the elevation of one's self. The spirit belongs to the same category. There 
is much enthusiasm on both sides. But whereas the struggle for physical 
survival involves selfishness, meanness, brutality and egoism, the loving 
struggle is characterized by generosity, tenderness, concern and care. The 
ethical dimension of Jasper's thought lies here. 
Loving struggle does not aim ai achieving superiority pcv/er or victory 
over the other. Both win or lose together. Defeat lies in avoiding the 
situations of crisis which demands the exercise of one's freedom and that 
of the other. The use of force including intellectual superiority or the 
power of suggestion puts the loving struggle to an end.' It is so because 
1. Allen E.L. The self and its hazards p : 26. 
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the other person is not an enemy to be vanquished with force or deceit. It 
flourishes in total non-violence. Jaspers is worth quoting here, "If the 
technical arsenals of the combatants differ, if one is more knowledgeable 
or more intelligent than the other, has a better memory, or is less prone 
to fatigue, both will equalize the level by handicapping themselves."' 
Loving struggle requires each participant to be strict to himself. It 
intensifies and high-lights the differences between one existence and 
another instead of alleviating and concealing them.^ It is a friendly 
emulation in the pursuit of a common goal carried on by a common 
consent in which each individual pours out his whole wealth before the 
other, or as Jaspers puts is "All cards are shown".^ 
Allen illustrates this point by citing the example of two scientists 
working on the same problem. Neither of them wishes to excel the other, 
but only to find a solution. One freely passes on his discoveries to the 
1. Jaspers : Philosophy. Vol. II. p: 60. 
2. Kaufmann F : A philosophy of communication in The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by 
Schilpp P.A. p : 213. 
3. Allen E.L. : The self and its hazards p : 30. 
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other, while openly criticizing his fellow's work. Generosity and help 
fullness is evident in their attitude to each other, and if a solution is to be 
found it will belong to both.' 
The ardent striving is suspicious of all sentimentality, pity and 
complacency.^ It is not to be understood as a contest in which one is 
over-indulgent, uncritical and compensates for his fellows infirmities. In 
this relationship one respects and coaxes his counter-part, but also 
questions and challenges him. As the development of the self takes place 
in a complementary way both Existenzes share each other's support and 
favour as well as censure and resistance.^ 
Loving struggle happens to be a war of ideals. There is collision in 
the sphere of religion and morality. There is bound to be a clash between 
atheism and religious beliefs. As far as morality is concerned it is just 
possible that two persons may have different criteria for evaluating the 
1. Allen E.L. : The self and its hazards p : 30. 
2. Blackham Six Existentialist thenkers p : 53. 
3. Kaufmann F : A philosophy of communication in The philosophy of Jaspers ed. by 
Schilpp P.A. p : 226. 
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same action. Furthermore, any one prizing generosity as the highest value 
in life struggles with his money-minded counter-part. There is certainly 
a conflict between an honest and a corrupt person. 
There is as a matter of fact, a whole net work of relationships in which 
this struggle is manifested. The strength of the struggle varies in the 
different situations. We meet as master and servant, as teacher and pupil, 
as father and son etc. In all these cases the distribution of power is very 
disproportionate. There is therefore apparently less tension in these cases. 
It is more glaring in the case of two partners, two brothers, husband and 
wife etc. 
Jaspers has high-lighted the nature of man with perfect acumen. But 
what he proposes is to spurn the baser seif for ihc cultivation cf his noble 
self. The energy of the man of enterprise is diverted to the highspirited 
man for the growth of finer feelings and for engendering such a state 
when all pride, ambition and envy are set aside and man emerges as a 
self-composed, self sustained and harmonious being. This form of 
existence is in close consonance to the Sufi way of life. The two fold 
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pillar of Islam can be taken as a combination of the stand points of the 
fallen and the unfallen man, and the Sufi is ready to move from one to 
the other.' The perfect balance of the primordial soul depends on the 
harmonious union of the inner and outer segments of human personality. 
Every form of mysticism begins with a search for the primordial state 
since this state means human perfection which is the only basis for the 
spiritual ascent. What distinguishes Islamic mysticism from other forms 
of mysticism is that it proposes an ideal to man.^ 
According to Islam perfection is a synthesis of the Qualities of 
Majesty and beauty and Sufism advocates embracing of these Divine 
qualities. This amounts to stripping the soul of the limitations of the 
fallen man, the habits and prejudices which have become second nature 
to him and appropriating the characteristics of man's primordial nature 
which was made in the image of God.^. 
1. Lings M : What is Sufism p : 76. 
2. Lings M : What is Sufism p : 56. 
3. Lings M : p : 18. 
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As far as an image of the primordial man is concerned, the seal of 
Solomon with its triangles seems to point in opposite directions the pull 
of the outer world is balanced by the pull of the heart. It is significant to 
note that the Prophet of Islam represents the harmonious resolution of 
the opposites'. The prophet called the war against the soul' as the 'Greater holy 
war'. The former implies fighting against the rebellious elements of the souP. 
The sufi aims both at the purity of heart and purity of action. Moreover, 
Sufism implies denying the soul physical pleasures. It may be added that 
Sufism teaches man how to purify one's self, improve one's morals and 
build up one's inner and outer life in order to attain spiritual bliss. 
As far as the method of the Sufis is concerned it aims at the mortification 
of self and liberation from baser passions.^ The sufi term fana (extinction) 
and Baqa (subsistence) refer to the self as being annihilated and this 
enables it to subsist."* Jaspers comes very close to the ideal of Sufism 
1. Lings M : What is Sufism p : 56. 
2. Ibid : p : 29. 
3. Ibid : p : 4. 
4. Ibid : p : 78. 
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when he assumes that man in his authenticity is God Himself. 
Thus we find that elucidation of Existenz can best be undertaken in 
relation to morality. The moral dilemma that concerns one as possible 
Existenz is whether to preserve one's identity, become firmly rooted to 
one's historical ground and thus gain authenticity, or to sacrifice one's 
integrity, refuse to make commitments, fail to remain loyal and true and 
ignore Existenz. 
Existenz is constantly confronted by the choice of being and non-
being. Consciousness of freedom is not a matter of inference but of 
experience, and arguments of freedom do not prove but rather affirm and 
assure.' Significantly it is the highest moral decision of the individual 
ihai matters, for morality is rooted not in eternal scale of values nor in 
the moral practices of a given society.^ It is the instant of choice, of 
anxious venture and of responsibility that has the stamp of authenticity.^ 
1. Wallraff : Karl Jaspers : An introduction to his philosophy p : 109. 
2. Ibid : p : 173. 
3. Ibid : p : 181. 
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The strong and self-reliant individual who is more than a creature of 
impulse is forced to make his own decision and he is guided by a 
conscience illumined by accurate knowledge of his situation. Jaspers, 
however, believes that when we trace conscience to its source, we come 
across a force that is beyond conscience.' Paradoxically, it is when one is 
most free that one is most bound and dependent. Actions that one regards 
as spontaneous stem from a source which is beyond one's control and 
comprehension. Jaspers inquires whether this voice of conscience is the 
voice of God. This makes an appeal to one's empirical existence and 
Jaspers speaks of a basic core in man which may be invoked.^ 
The conscientious individual maintains autonomy, honesty and 
veracity in view of the boundary situations as we!!. He makes use of 
discretion, faces the boundary situations courageously and repudiates 
mundane existence in favour of a genuine existence. He accepts death, 
agony and sin as permeable aspects of life. For moral growth each 
1. Ibid : p : 176-77. 
2. Wallraff : p : 177. 
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individual existence struggles with his fellow being. It is an appeal an 
awakening and a continued process. Each raises pressing questions and 
makes demands but respect is implicit in the struggle and affirmation in 
this critical questioning.' In this struggle for truth a basic solidarity is 
pre-supposed. This in its turn refers to mutual solicitude and anxiety which 
are the forms of struggle and are manifested in it. 
What is here described is a precious and extremely rare experience 
which Jaspers felt with his brother-in-law Ernst Mayer, with his student 
friend Hannah Arendt and which is achieved fully with his wife Gertrude 
Mayer.^ 
In conclusion one may hold that if we assess these situations honestly 
we find that Jaspers does not give just a negative picture. Boundary 
situation is both a shattering one and a liberating one^. Like Sartre who 
says that "one is condemned to be free" one may say that one is 
condemned to live and live thus-to face death, to be doomed to suffer and 
1. Ibid : p : 136. 
2. Wallraff: p : 135. 
3. M?cquarrie John : Existentialism p : 245-46. 
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compelled to take upon oneself whatever guilt falls upon one as one's lot. 
Boundary situations bring us to the edge of a precipice where one 
experiences nothingness or God.' In other words it is in the boundary 
situations that we encounter Transcendence. According to Jaspers 
Transcendence cannot be defined by any predicate, objectified by any 
representation or achieved by any inference, although all categories are 
applied as means of saying that it is not a quality or quantity, not a 
relation or ground, not one or many, not being or nothingness.^ Jaspers 
says on the concluding page of his 'Philosophic' that it is enough that 
God is, no matter if we do not know His nature.^ 
Jaspers however doubts whether the tragic perplexity of our 
existence can be answered by a leap of faith. It is not possible to unite 
the way of philosophical vision and the way of prayer and worship in a 
single life. Again we come to the boundary and take one path or the other. 
1. Wallraff: p : 182. 
2. Ibid : p : 183. 
3. Ibid : p : 188. 
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Those going one way or the other are revered each by the other but there 
is no_ f^inal synthesis,,no ultimate fusion„no^one_way that.can clear all 
differences.' Jaspers message is that whatever course we may take one 
must struggle and should strive vigorously and this effort brings its own 
reward. 
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APPENDIX : JASPERS AND THE GLOBAL 
SITUATION 
It will not be presumtuous on my part if an overall assessment of 
Jaspers' thought is attempted. To begin with, Jaspers is not a popular 
philosopher. But greatness should not be weighed in terms of success or 
popularity. His style is intricate and his thought difficult to grasp. He 
has no following and no isms. According to Walter Kaufmann he didn't 
exercise any influence on German philosophers, and what is true of 
philosophical circles holds true of the whole Western canon. Jaspers drew 
little attention in Europe and was not appreciated in America either. In 
Japan, on the contrary, numerous monographs were published on Jaspers 
and according to Fumio Hashimoto many of his works were widely read 
by Japenese students. Hashimoto thinks, that Jaspers' thought is a 
genuine East-West interaction which touches the heart of the Orientals. 
The reasons for Jaspers' unpopularity in the West are multiple. Some 
critics think that it may only be a matter of arbitrariness on the part of 
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the lovers of philosophy. Others regard it as historical accident of a few 
years that it is Heidegger and not Jaspers who is considered the founder 
of twenthieth century existential philosophy'. While these may be 
superficial reasons for his unpopularity, the genuine reason may be that 
he got separated from the idealist and rationalist tradition and also 
alienated himself from the Western stream of philosophizing which 
begins with Aristotle and Hegel and as Jaspers himself says ends up with 
Heidegger and Sartre. Jasper belongs to the tribe of exceptional figures 
of philosophy'. Heraclitus, St. Augustine, Geordano Bruno, Kierkegaard 
and Nietzsche. In the preceding pages I have pointed out that inspite of 
his obscurity and unpopularity Jaspers is a great philosopher from whom 
emanate valuable philosophical insights.^ 
Jaspers' foremost contribution to existentialist philosophy is his 
concept of the boundary situation the kind of situation in which the 
motives and values that govern an indivudual's life are explicitly brought 
1. Samays : Reason Revisited : University of Notre Dame press p: 239-40. 
2. Samayp: 240-41. 
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philosopher as an active participant in the admiistration of a great 
university, devoted to the free pursuit of truth, as the husband of a Jewish 
wife whom he married in 1910, he was placed, from 1933 to 1945, in the 
second boundary situation of his life. 
Germans under Hitler lived at a boundary and all of us do so 
indirectly. The total threat to freedom is with us all the time. Not only 
that, the total threat to life itself, in the nuclear age, has been likewise 
magnified.' 
Jaspers, in his book "The future of mankind", talks about the changed 
military situation. Both Russia and America, the two great world 
powers, with large stock of atom bombs can destroy each other's cities 
and industrial centres with prompt military action.^ Although America 
and Russia are spending huge amounts of money to produce nuclear 
weapons, for both are trying to achieve military superiority yet a world 
war is for the time being impossible to break out. It is so because if any 
1. Ibid p: 82-83. 
2. Jaspers : The future of mankind. The University of Chigago Press 1961 p: 59. 
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of the big powers uses the atom bomb which is likely to produce an 
immediate retaliation both sides might be destroyed. Geographically 
speaking, Europe and America are in a more precarious position than 
Russia because their population is concentrated in big cities and they 
have dense industrial areas. Thus in view of the new armament techniques, 
world strategy has turned to global thinking and the whole world has 
become one battlefield. We can only surmise as to what is going on in 
the strategic brains of Russia and America.' 
It is a consequence of world strategic position that all military 
planning of small nations depends upon the great powers. Whether they 
take sides or practise neutrality the small countries fight only with their 
connivance and help and under their partial protection. Politics has a dual 
aspect: there are the two super-powers and the interests of the small 
nations depend on them. The latter aspire after status, independence, 
power and a chance to form new states.^ Both great powers have their 
own ends to serve; they want to maintain and extend their area of 
1. Jaspers : Future of mankind 60-61. 
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influence in the world. The present situation arises from the tension 
between the "impossibility" of an atomic world war and the danger which 
threatens the small nations that the impossible might happen. When the 
tension is heightened and the world war seems inevitable both 
super-powers call for a ceasefire. 
In 1948 when Israelis defended their new state against attacks from 
all sides and was about to win the war, there was a threat of aerial 
bombardment by the British, it did not lead to peace which follows upon 
a victorious war but only to an armistice. In the Korean and Indonesian 
wars it was again an armistice and not the achievement of total or 
absolute peace. " Armistice" is the hall mark of this new politics.' 
Another situation which Jaspers' portrays is the free world versus 
totalitarianism. It is not enough to think in terms of world government: 
such a world government requires a world parliament, a world police, a 
world currency etc. This may ensure peace but may not prevent the most 
terrible kind of despotism.^ 
1. Jaspers : Future of mankind p: 63. 
2. Ibid p: 96. 
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Peace lies perhaps in the concept of confederation: conferderation can 
be made effective with freedom of speech.' Totalitarianism means 
coercion and terroristic subjection. In a totalitarian state one faces 
situations where imprisonment, deportation and execution by police action 
without public trial follow automatically. Thus all life is functionalized.^ 
The free world encourages quick thinking, new scientific discoveries, 
and provides ample scope for free and spontaneous action in every 
field of life. It allows free discussion and competition and stimulates 
expression of the inherent potencies of the individuals. 
The totalitarian world is weak internally and strong only externally. 
At home it can maintain its rule by terror, but externally it forms 
organizations with planned and directed totalitarian methods. 
The free world is strong internally though weak on the external front. 
Its strength lies in the free consent and cooperation of its people. It is 
weak externally because the free states are not united and any attack from 
1. Jaspers : Future of mankind p: 97. 
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outside may discover the free world vulnerable because it is not united, 
armed and ready for war.' 
There is a demand all over the world to put an end to H-bomb tests. If 
totalitarianism succeeds, it will mean the termination of all life, and the 
H-Bomb test may result in the death of thousands of human beings from 
bone cancer or the birth of thousands of monsters. One has to choose the 
lesser evil.^ 
The weight of the argument is shifted to the side of totalitarianism 
when it is a question of the preservation of human life. In other words, if 
human life is not to be jeopardized nuclear war must be prevented though 
one may have to surrender to totalitarianism. 
From the humanistic point of view one must think in terms of human life 
and not of the destruction of man' s potentialities. But there is another side to 
it and that is, man prefers death to slavery. He has risked his life for freedom 
and has come out with such out bursts, "Give me liberty or give me death". 
1. Ibid p: 108-9. 
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Seen from a different perspective a totalitarian state would use the 
atom bomb over which it exercises some kind of control. It will use it in 
limited areas and without imperilling the life of men everywhere. 
In all these arguments for and against totalitarianism and the threat of 
atom bomb, it must be kept in mind that both sides take into account the 
final risk that does not really exist." We can envisage neither total 
extinction of mankind by the super bombs nor complete suppression of 
freedom under totalitarian rule.^ 
In the same book Jaspers views at all major problems-colonialism, 
nationalism, the united Nation and so on with immense clarity, honesty 
and complete lack of blind passion. Take for example colonialism. 
Europe upheld a common ethos, a sense of community in the biblical 
sense as well as a legal order. Outside Europe there were unclaimed lands 
which could be occupied by anyone who wished and dared to do so. 
This colonialization was marked by the exercise of greed, ruthlessness 
1. Ibid p: 166-7. 
2. Jaspers : Future of mankind p: 168. 
(205) 
and tyranny inflicted on all the peoples on Earth. They were at peace in 
Europe, but outside Europe they fought battles without beginning or end. 
A significant feature of this colonial age was the fact that Europeans did 
not regard non-Europeans as human beings like themselves. They denied 
them all rights and they were subjected to an utmost degree of exploitation. 
No authority with political power could prevent Europeans from forcing 
these people to do their bidding or alternatively being killed.' This 
colonial process extended over four centuries resulted in hatred of 
Europeans by all other nations. 
It is a moot question why in Asia " nationalism" is a much stronger 
force than in Europe. "Nationalism" of the Asian nations is based on a 
real racial distinction between them and the Westerners. It is rooted in 
their culture because Indians, Chinese and Japanese are spiritually much 
closer to each other. Finally, the ideology of nationalism springs from a 
feeling of inferiority in the reluctant acquisition of Western technology 
and thought combined with feelings of superiority apropos their religious 
and philosophical way of life. 
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According to Jaspers one has to accept the fact that the age of coloni-
alism has come to an end. Europe's rule of the world is almost ended, her 
world superiority shattered and is now a thing of the past and her future 
is seriously imperilled.' The technological Age, with its invention of the 
American atom bomb is reallly the collective endeavour of European 
immigrants from Germany, Italy and Hungary. It no longer rests in the 
hands of a few privileged nations.^ 
Agreed that colonial powers have had their own achievements -
British in India, the Dutch in Indonesia, the Germans in the African 
colonies and in Chinese Kiao chou but the fact remains that they were 
not motivated by the furtherance of the native peoples interests. 
Furthermore, to achieve world peace and to lessen the hatred which 
more than half the world bears towards the West, it is necessary to accept 
honestly that colonialism is bound to wither away.^ 
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Taking up the issue of the United Nations shows Jaspers' deep interest 
and involvement in the relevant fact. He thinks that the principles 
mentioned in the Preamble of the United Nations Charter are fine. They 
relate to the preservation of human rights, maintenance of the dignity 
and worth of human beings, equality of men and women and of all 
nations whether they be large or small. 
The charter takes into account certain recommendations and has less 
to do with the actions of the U.N.O. The Security council requires seven 
out of eleven votes and among the seven, five are in the hands of the 
permanent members-China, France, Russia, Great Britian and United 
States, in other words they alone enjoy the Veto power.' 
According to the charter any dispute is to be solved by negotiation, 
inquiry and mediation and if sanctions are put they will not involve the 
use of armed force. 
Resolutions of the United Nations are unfortunately not always 
carried out. The resolution against Egyptian involvement in Israel's use 
1. Ibid p: 142. 
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of the Suez Canal was not enforced by the U.N. On the otherhand when 
Americans came to the aid of the south Koreans, it was America's 
decision which was upheld and legalized by the U.N. 
The U.N. claims that it has respect for law and that it upholds the 
ideal of justice. But this is a piece of sheer propaganda and what they 
care about is world opinion. The U.N. merely toys with the concept of 
law and justice. The fact of the case is that undersirable facts are 
concealed, unwanted questions are ignored and harsh realities covered 
up cleverly and unashamedly'. 
Thus in the pages of the "Future of Mankind" we find reflected the 
energy of Jaspers' philosophical thinking. Given concrete moral issue, 
or faced with the intellectual implications of a particular boundary 
situation, Jaspers integrity and the rigour and incisiveness of his power 
of argumentation as well as his precision and lucidity rightly evoke one's 
admiration and respect. 
1. Jaspers : Future of mankind p: 145. 
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